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FBIS-EEU-95-244 *20 December 1995*

CONTENTS

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ALBANIA

Berisha: Long Way To Go for EU Admission *[Munich FOCUS 18 Dec]* 1
PNDSH Demands U.S. 'Commitment' to Kosovo *[Editorial Report]* 1
Joint Bank With Greece To Open in Tirana 'Soon' *[KOHA JONE 15 Dec]* 2
Article Deplores Albanian Youth 'Exodus' *[Zofingen RILINDJA 12 Dec]* 3
Personnel Reductions Made at Gjader Air Base *[GAZETA SHQIPTARE 15 Dec]* 4

BULGARIA

Prospects for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina Doubted *[24 CHASA 15 Dec]* 5
FRY Minister Discusses Telecom Cooperation *[Sofia Radio]* 5
Prime Minister Receives Belarusian Ambassador *[Sofia Radio]* 5
Confidence, Security Agreement Signed With Romania *[Sofia Radio]* 5
Cabinet Adopts Draft Bills, Accords With Greece *[Sofia Radio]* 5
Zhelev Denounces Dismissal of Radio Journalists *[Sofia Radio]* 6
Comment: BSP Infighting Led to Cancelled Visit *[DEMOKRATSIYA 16 Dec]* 6

CZECH REPUBLIC

Klaus on Budget, Price of Gas, Social Peace *[DENNI TELEGRAF 15 Dec]* 7
RDP Group in Trouble Over Illegal Negotiations *[MLADA FRONTA DNES 15 Dec]* 8

SLOVAKIA

Meciar on Rift Between Kovac, Parliament *[London FINANCIAL TIMES 20 Dec]* 9
Kovac on His Rift With Meciar *[London FINANCIAL TIMES 20 Dec]* 10
Commentary Analyzes Outcome of Russian Elections *[PRAVDA 19 Dec]* 12

HUNGARY

Ex-Official Discusses NATO Mission in Bosnia *[MAGYAR NEMZET 19 Dec]* 13
Troop Strength for Bosnia Role Cut by 100 *[Budapest Radio]* 15
Committees Reject Referendum on NATO Entry *[Budapest Radio]* 15
Ethnic Leaders From Slovakia, Romania Hold Summit *[Budapest Radio]* 15
Trade Unions Join Forces in 'Action Alliance' *[Budapest TV]* 16

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

TANJUG Views Problems Facing NATO Troops 17
Prlic Views Accord, Reconstruction, Refugees *[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA 18 Dec]* 17
LBO: No 'Clear Concept' for Implementing Accord *[Sarajevo Radio]* 20
Banja Luka Patriotic Front Accepts Peace Accord *[Banja Luka TV]* 20
Serb Prime Minister on Cooperation with IFOR *[SRNA]* 20
U.S. Envoy Tells Serbs: No Map Changes *[SRNA]* 21
Bosnian Serbs 'Nervously' Watch IFOR Arrival *[AFP]* 21
Tuzla Expects Troops To Stimulate Economy *[DNEVNI AVAZ 10 Dec]* 21
UK's SAS Expected To 'Stop' Muslim Units *[Ljubljana DELO 15 Dec]* 22

Departure of Volunteer Islamic Fighters Viewed *[VECERNJE NOVINE 13 Dec]* 23
Speaker Wants Assembly as Highest Authority *[Sarajevo Radio]* 23
MBO on Future Tasks; Announces Leader's Return *[Sarajevo Radio]* 24
Silajdzic: Croats Hindering State Revitalization *[Sarajevo Radio]* 24
Corps Commander: Zepa Could Have Been Defended *[OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) 14-21 Dec]* 25
'Minimal' Sarajevo Natural Gas Supply To Increase *[Sarajevo Radio]* 27

CROATIA

Commentary: Serbia Obstructing Mutual Recognition *[VECERNJI LIST 16 Dec]* 28
Options for E. Slavonia Reintegration Considered *[VECERNJI LIST 17 Dec]* 28
Commentary Views Tudjman Strategy for Zagreb *[NOVI LIST 12 Dec]* 29
Military Success of Operation 'Flash' Praised *[VELEBIT 26 May]* 31
Varazdin Unit's Role Lauded *[VELEBIT 26 May]* 33
Contribution of 123d Brigade in Slavonia Praised *[VELEBIT 26 May]* 33

THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Commentary Views Continued Serbian Pressure *[VECER 16-17 Dec]* 34
Military Cooperation Protocol With Turkey Signed *[MIC]* 35
VMRO-DPMNE Leader Urges Early Elections *[VECER 19 Dec]* 35

POLAND

Walesa Calls Top-Level Meeting on Security Threat *[Warsaw TV]* 38
Prime Minister Oleksy Implicated *[Warsaw TV]* 38
Walesa Accuses Oleksy of 'High Treason' *[Warsaw Radio]* 38
Oleksy: 'Dirty Provocation' *[PAP]* 39
Walesa: KOK Meeting Unjustified *[PAP]* 39
Army Ready for All Eventualities *[Warsaw Radio]* 39
Cabinet Denies State Security Threat Exists *[PAP]* 40
Russian Security Denies Oleksy-KGB Ties *[PAP]* 40
Allegations 'Groundless' *[Warsaw Radio]* 40
Borowski: Walesa Trying To Stop Kwasniewski *[Warsaw Radio]* 40
Press Reacts to Walesa's Allegations *[Editorial Report]* 41
SLD Deputy Comments on Treason Accusations *[Warsaw Radio]* 41
Deputy Sejm Speaker on Walesa's Allegations *[PAP]* 41

ROMANIA

New Envoy Assesses 'Very Good' Ties With U.S. *[AZI 14 Dec]* 43
Parliament Authorizes Sappers Battalion for Bosnia *[Bucharest Radio]* 44
Russian Gas Imports To Increase by 20 Percent *[CURIERUL NATIONAL 12 Dec]* 44
Poll Shows Iliescu, PDSR Leading in Popularity *[Bucharest Radio]* 45
PNTCD's Ratiu To Run for Presidency If Asked *[AZI 13 Dec]* 45
CDR Leader Details 'Contract With Romania' *[JURNALUL NATIONAL 8 Dec]* 46
Editorial Views Emerging 'Leftist' Opposition *[ADEVARUL 11 Dec]* 51
Hardliner Objects to UDMR Leadership Policy *[ADEVARUL 15 Dec]* 53
PDSR's Nastase-Martian Struggle Continues *[ROMANIA LIBERA 12 Dec]* 53

SLOVENIA

Coalition Parties Agree on Reduced 1996 Budget *[Ljubljana Radio]* 54
Leftists Pass Law Halting Land Restitution *[Ljubljana Radio]* 54
Court Staves Off Reform of Payments Agency *[SLOVENEC 13 Dec]* 54

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

UNSC Asked To Postpone Resolution on Srebrenica *[TANJUG]* 55

Army Budget of 4.2 Billion Dinars Announced *[Belgrade Radio]* 55
Kontic Receives Military Financial Experts *[TANJUG]* 56

Serbia

Daily Assails Media 'Barriers' in Serbia, Bosnia *[VECERNJE NOVOSTI 19 Dec]* 56

Montenegro

Bulatovic on Yugoslav Recognition of Croatia *[TANJUG]* 57
FRY Right to SFRY Succession *[Belgrade Radio]* 57
Albanian Parties Oppose Military Port *[Zurich BOTA SOT 8 Dec]* 58

Berisha: Long Way To Go for EU Admission

AU1912131095 Munich FOCUS in German 18 Dec 95 p 202

[Interview with Albanian President Sali Berisha by Gaby Neujahr; place and date not given: "A Long Way to Europe"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Neujahr] Mr. President, which questions are in the foreground during your current visit to Germany?

[Berisha] I would like to deepen bilateral relations and hope for cooperation in all fields. Another important point is Albania's integration in Europe.

[Neujahr] Will you broach the situation of the Albanian majority in Serb Kosovo?

[Berisha] Certainly. I am very glad about the position of the German Government, which links any support to Serbia with a settlement of the problems in Kosovo.

[Neujahr] What would the settlement be like?

[Berisha] No one can demand that the Kosovo Albanians be satisfied with less than they had in 1974 (when extended autonomy rights were anchored in the Constitution—the editor). However, the Albanians should understand that democracy also means a readiness for compromises.

[Neujahr] When could Albania be ready for EU membership?

[Berisha] Albania is lagging 50 years behind Europe. However, over the past three to four years, the country has undergone the most dynamic change in East Europe. Today our economy is stable, our foreign debts are paid, and inflation is only 5 percent. All communist laws have been replaced with democratic ones.

We have made great progress, but it is still a long way for us into the EU.

[Neujahr] Parliamentary elections will be held in 1996. Who has the best prospects?

[Berisha] Serious polls show that the elections might become an adventure for my Democratic Party. However, I am sure that we will win.

[Neujahr] The opposition fears that there will be no free and fair elections.

[Berisha] They are already announcing their defeat. The elections will be fair and free. Albania has left the times behind when elections were just a farce. I invite in particular the Social Democrats from Europe to watch the elections.

[Neujahr] Why the Social Democrats?

[Berisha] Since they complain about how the leftists are treated in Albania, they should come and take a look for themselves.

[Neujahr] Why do the former communists still have many followers?

[Berisha] This is due to Albania' special history. The years of communist dictatorship, total isolation, and control have changed the population psychologically. We cannot be compared with any other East European country. However, I am sure that pluralism is further gaining ground among the people.

[Neujahr] What will happen if the old communists win the elections?

[Berisha] You are thinking of the inconceivable. However, if this happens, I will respect the result of free elections. But I do not think that this will happen.

[Neujahr] Some of your opponents accuse you of being a "turncoat." During the dictatorship you were Enver Hoxha's personal doctor, but at the end of the 1980's you suddenly were a convinced democrat.

[Berisha] Yes, I was Hoxha's doctor, but I never visited him. However, to be honest, if he had called me, I would have gone to see him. For a doctor all people are equal. However, I was not "his" doctor.

I was a cardiologist and I got involved in the democracy movement earlier than others. But I did not do that to get power.

PNDSH Demands U.S. 'Commitment' to Kosovo

AU1912180895

[FBIS Editorial Report] Zofingen RILINDJA in Albanian carries on 14 December on page 2 a 300-word report by B. Kajtazi and R. Fazliu on a news conference by the Pristina-based Albanian National Democratic Party (Partia Nacionaldemokratike Shqiptare, PNDSH), the place and date of which are not given, entitled "Breaking the Closed Circuit of Peaceful Resistance." The same paper on 15 December carries on page 6 a 500-word PNDSH statement entitled "The Kosova Issue Demands a Fair and Fast Solution."

The 14 December report states that PNDSH Chairman Rexhep Abdullahu said at the news conference that "the PNDSH will not accept any compromise forced on us by the greed of the Serbian occupier. The international community, therefore, now has one last opportunity to correct its centuries-old mistakes over the Albanian question. We have supported and will continue to support the efforts of the Albanian Government and President Sali Berisha to solve the Kosova issue,

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and those of the Kosova Government and President Ibrahim Rugova. Albania must be the Piedmont of our movement to solve the Albanian question, in order to halt the genocide against the Albanians in Kosova, which has now lasted more than a century.

"The PNDSH supports the conferences of Dayton, London, and Paris, whose aim has been to end the war in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, but we cannot countenance the delays in settling the issue of Kosova that are allowing the Serbian occupier, before the eyes of Europe, to commit genocide against the Albanians. It is evident that the Albanians are not in a position to defend themselves by peaceful resistance from the silent ethnic cleansing and the physical extinction that Serbia is visiting upon them. This is the last chance for the world to understand the seriousness of the Kosova problem and the Albanians, before it is too late."

The public statement issued by the PNDSH at the news conference and published in the 15 December issue of RILINDJA states:

"Analyzing both domestically and internationally the increasingly serious position of the Albanian people in Kosova, which has been deteriorating especially since the Dayton conference in the United States, to which the Albanians and the legitimate representatives of the Albanian people in Kosova were again not invited, the Presidium of the PNDSH emphasizes as follows:

"1. We think that this is the last moment for all existing Albanian political parties and associations to assemble and to produce a common stand on solving the issue of Kosova and the Albanian question in general. International political circumstances created especially after the conferences in Dayton and London show that international circles are increasingly marginalizing the unsolved Albanian issue.

"2. Historically, the Albanians have always supported the solution of problems by peaceful means, as those used at Dayton and in London. However, they have now waited for more than a century to take part directly in gatherings of this kind at which the fate of the peoples living in the territory of what was once Yugoslavia, including the Albanians, is decided.

"3. It must be clear to the broad international community that the Albanians are determined to see a fair and fast settlement of the issue of Kosova at all costs, on the basis of the principle of self-determination. It is therefore the last moment for international decisionmaking circles to be persuaded of the reality of the Albanians' potential in the Balkans. As soon as this happens, Serbia too, the main factor obstructing a solution to the Kosova issue up till now, will be persuaded of the strength of this potential.

"4. The PNDSH demands of the United Nations, the EU, and especially the United States a constructive commitment to solving the Albanian national question in occupied Kosova. The will of the Albanians expressed through their referendum for the independence of Kosova, an inalienable right of the Albanian people, can no longer be overlooked and trampled upon. The Albanians will never surrender their legitimate right to national unification and will not allow any bargains to be made at the expense of the cause of Kosova and the Albanian people.

"5. The PNDSH informs the international democratic public that the lives of more than 2 million Albanians are daily becoming intolerable as a result of the savage Serbian military and police violence that has assumed unprecedented genocidal dimensions in its aim, at the end of this century, to once more divert the Albanians from their path towards independence.

"6. Albania must today be the Piedmont of the movement for solving the Albanians question. We therefore unreservedly support the coordination of the political work of President Ibrahim Rugova and the government of Kosova with President Sali Berisha and the government of Albania. Such coordination is more than necessary, and we must therefore avoid the traps and political divisions imposed on us by anti-Albanian circles interested in instability.

"7. The most recent political circumstances in connection with the Kosova issue force upon us a more advanced strategy of political activity to enable us to break the closed circuit of peaceful resistance. Any delay will cost our movement for self-determination and national unification dearly, and will leave us once again with the status of a minority people that Serbia wishes for us, a people seeking merely the protection of its human rights. Thus concludes the statement of the PNDSH Presidium, signed by its chairman Rexhep Abdullahu."

Joint Bank With Greece To Open in Tirana 'Soon'

AU1812175495 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 15 Dec 95 p 4

[Report by "A.H.": "Joint Bank Opens Soon"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Joint Albanian-Greek Bank [Banka e Perbashket Shqiptaro-Grek] will soon be opening in Tirana, at the request of both sides and after long discussions between officials from the two countries. An official of the Greek National Bank has confirmed this news. In the new year, all Greek and Albanian businessmen, economic migrants, etc. will be

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able to transfer their capital safely. "The branch of the Greek National Bank will start work before the end of February 1996," said Mr. Aleksander Kacouris, a director of this bank and manager of the Ioannina branch. Premises of 400 square meters have been rented in the Tirana Business Center and work is under way to equip the offices and to train the staff, who will all be Albanians. Greece is in second place in the list of states investing in Albania and an urgent need to create a bank has long been felt in Greece, too. Greece's two largest banks, the National and the Ionian, head the long list of Greek banks aiming to expand into Albania. Kacouris explained, "The creation of a branch of the Greek National Bank in Tirana will greatly assist Greek businessmen currently active in Albania, because it will cut out all the rigmarole for transferring their earnings. The creation of such a bank will also help Albanian economic migrants who live in Greece and wish to transfer their earnings to Albania." Besides the National and the Ionian, the Credit Bank and the Bank of Piraeus are also about to submit applications to open branches in Tirana.

Article Deplores Albanian Youth 'Exodus'

AU1912100995 Zofingen RILINDJA in Albanian 12 Dec 95 p 2

[Article by Z. Bekolli: "The Tragedy of the Exodus Should Prick the Consciences of Us All"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The uncontrolled exodus that is increasingly breaking down the "walls" of the nation must be a serious burden to Albanian consciences and a daily responsibility for us all. The departing tides are a sign of the grave position of the Albanians in the enslaved portions of the ethnic territories, but there is nevertheless a kind of inertia and a failure to organize to combat this evil. The abandoned homes, absent young people, and divided families are adequate evidence of the consequences that this highly topical phenomenon has brought. The present situation, the merely formal measures taken against it, and the tragic incidents that occur should prick the consciences of Albanian political parties. The last five years have been full of the most various cases that call for a serious and concrete approach. However, all we have are floods of communiques, roundtables, tribunes, and appeals unaccompanied by specific action. Individuals, associations, and political parties imagine that they are doing their duty with this paperwork, but take no specific measures. Those few concrete initiatives such as that of the young people of Polac in Drenica have melted away in the atmosphere of lassitude, ignorance, and neglect created by our political parties and associations. So far, nobody can produce any specific measures to help stop the exodus, but on the contrary, many have assisted the phenomenon by issuing certificates! Responsibility for this uncontrolled chaos cannot be shirked by the Kosova Democratic League [LDK] (the largest party) or by the National Unity Party, the Popular Party, the National Democratic Party, the Liberal Party, the Social Democratic Party, the LDK's Youth and Women's Forums, all the minor parties and splinter groups, the Association for the Return of Albanian Emigrants, the Independent Trade Unions, the Forum of Albanian Intellectuals, Kosova's academic and educational institutions, and the media, which might have done a great deal here.

A share of the responsibility also falls to intellectuals, who should have made their presence felt everywhere. This phenomenon is of course connected with Kosova's status, but we can remember a statement by our demographer Dr. Rifat Blaku, "If we have been unable to eliminate the occupier's violence and terror against the Albanians as the main cause of the Albanian exodus, we can eliminate other causes." This idea shows that something can be done, because this exodus is fraught with consequences, apart from its material benefits. Mixed marriages hasten assimilation, and not only occur but have become widespread among our young people abroad. There is a lack of mother-tongue education. Girls remaining in Kosova marry later, which is reflected directly in the birth rate. The solution of the issue of Kosova is delayed.

The phenomenon becomes even more complex if we add the tragic incidents during illegal border crossings, which demand an immediate response from our institutions. For example, our refugees meet tragic ends while crossing the Czech-German border. There have been such tragic cases recently involving large groups on the route that leads through Albania to Italy and the West. During one week alone, 41 passengers were lost in two motorboats, most if not all Albanians. There were not so many victims in the same period on the war fronts in Bosnia and Croatia, which so alarmed the entire world public. Nevertheless, the Albanian public remains largely indifferent to this tragedy. This is perhaps an attempt by our institutions and those of Albania to evade responsibility. But any people in the world would declare national mourning after so many victims, besides launching a vigorous offensive against the transport mafia and those who encourage it. Determination in this direction would help to reduce the present intensity of the exodus and the number of tragic incidents, as well as the considerable material expenditure for such purposes.

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Personnel Reductions Made at Gjader Air Base

AU1912092695 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 15 Dec 95 p 5

[Report by Irfan Rama: "Reform Affects Gjader—70 Laid Off"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Lezhe—The reform in the Army has reached Gjader Air Base, one of the country's most important military points. It was recently decided that 70 fewer people will work at this important place. Although the reductions are not all in servicemen, and those to be removed include many civilian technicians, it seems that the recent measure was approved directly by the Defense Ministry as part of the reform of the Albanian Armed Forces that began some time ago. Not all the candidates for cuts received the news in the same way. Some servicemen's families have anxiously awaited news of the fate of their breadwinners. For many of them, the relatively high pay of the head of the household was the sole substantial source of income. The measure not only affects Gjader's professional pilots, considered to be the best-trained in the country. Civilian staff involved in communications have also been taken from their jobs. A few days ago, the reform also affected Gjirokaster, several hundred kilometers to the south. Cuts were announced in a division here, affecting a number of servicemen. Gjader Air Base is one of the county's most important military sites. It has become especially famous recently, because spy planes monitoring the movements of warring parties in Bosnia took off from its runways. It is one of the facilities that might be effectively used in cooperation with foreign forces, an issue Albania raised long ago, especially before the signing of the peace agreement at Dayton.

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Prospects for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina Doubted

AU2012133495 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 15 Dec 95 p 12

[Editorial article: "For the Time Being, Peace in Bosnia Is on Paper"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The document on peace in Bosnia has been signed, but no one is in a hurry to celebrate, despite the frequently voiced argument that even the worst peace is better than war. Everyone, and most of all the fighting sides, are really tired of the bloodshed.

The people are not hastening to celebrate because the document signed on 14 December does not resolve any of the basic problems. A radically unstable situation has been frozen. Furthermore, the agreement is already being violated in Sarajevo to the detriment of the Serbs. The fact that they did not want to accept it, and signed it under pressure, is understandable.

Instead of allowing the nations in the Balkans to resolve their problems on their own, the great powers are again trying to dictate their conditions in the region. Without the great powers the Balkan nations would have long resolved their problems. Therefore, one cannot escape the feeling that the imposing ceremony in Paris was aimed at freezing the Yugoslav war according to someone's interests. The question only is how long the new cease-fire will hold....

FRY Minister Discusses Telecom Cooperation

AU2012065895 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 2000 GMT 19 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Dr. Zoran Vujovic, minister of transportation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] is visiting Bulgaria at the invitation of the chairman of the Committee on Posts and Telecommunications.

At the talks the possibilities were discussed of normalizing relations in the sphere of post and telecommunications. Practical measures related to constructing a second optical cable between the two countries also were discussed.

Special attention was devoted to Bulgaria's participation in modernizing FRY's telecommunication infrastructure. The idea of constructing a Balkan telecommunications pool was supported. The pool should integrate the telecommunications systems of the region.

Prime Minister Receives Belarusian Ambassador

AU1912185695 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1800 GMT 19 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Zhan Videnov received Alyaksandr Gerasimenka, Belarusian ambassador to Bulgaria, on 19 December, with whom he discussed the possibilities of restoring cooperation between Bulgaria and Belarus, the Government Press Service reports.

Special attention was devoted to the necessity of creating a normative-legal basis for bilateral economic, trade, and transportation cooperation.

Confidence, Security Agreement Signed With Romania

AU1912182695 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 19 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] On 19 December, in Veliko Turnovo, Colonel General Tsvetan Totomirov, chief of the Bulgarian Army General Staff, and Corps General Dumitru Cioflina, secretary of state and chief of the Romanian General Staff, who is visiting Bulgaria, signed a document on mutually supplementing measures on strengthening confidence, security, and military contacts.

The document aims at strengthening security in the area of our common state border and stipulates that no maneuvers will be conducted in a 15-km-deep strip on both sides of Danube River except for maneuvers that involve units smaller than tactical batallions and maneuvers by naval forces on the river and by associated pontoon-bridge units.

Cabinet Adopts Draft Bills, Accords With Greece

AU1912080495 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 18 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] On 18 December, the cabinet held an extraordinary meeting at which it adopted two new draft bills: The State Property Bill and the Municipal Property Bill.

In connection with the upcoming visit to Bulgaria of Greek Foreign Minister Papoulias, the cabinet adopted the drafts of two accords as the basis for conducting negotiations. They are the draft of an intergovernmental accord with Greece on opening new border checkpoints and on constructing the related roads in the directions of Kurdzhali-Komotini, Gotse Delchev-Drama, and Rudozem- Xanthi. It has been envisaged that those roads will be completed by the end of 1998.

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The second draft accord with Greece is related to the water of the River Mesta. It envisages allowing our southern neighbor to use up to 29 percent of the river water during the next 35 years. It has been proposed that a specially established commission on water economy should control the implementation of the future accord.

The cabinet finally adopted the framework program on stabilizing and reconstructing the banking system. The program points out the reasons for the current situation of the banks and determines the mechanisms of influencing the system and on cooperation between the banking system and the real [realniyat sektor] sector. The program also encompasses the resources needed for the stabilization and reconstruction.

Zhelev Denounces Dismissal of Radio Journalists

AU1912185495 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 19 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] On 19 December in Lisbon, in connection with the dismissal of seven journalists from the Bulgarian national radio, President Zhelev spoke at an improvised news conference about the freedom of press and censorship. Because of the poor telephone line, we cannot air the actual recording of his statement.

Two days ago, Bulgaria submitted its official application for EU membership, President Zhelev said. However, I find it difficult to believe that anyone would seriously talk to us if a national medium like the Bulgarian radio allows itself to dismiss leading journalists in such a brutal manner. Everyone should react against this, but not from mere narrow party positions or in an attempt to gain political benefits, but as a protest against an attempt to undermine one of the basic civic rights and liberties that exist in every democratic state—the freedom of speech. This act conceals a great danger. It confirms that Bulgaria does not have national media and that the national media are turning into unique party institutions that are commanded directly by the party headquarters of the ruling majority. This in itself is a very dangerous phenomenon.

Therefore, everyone should react, regardless of political convictions and sympathy and party affiliation. The most basic civic freedom, the freedom of speech, is being jeopardized. This right is in the foundation of all other civic rights, President Zhelyu Zhelev pointed out in his statement.

Comment: BSP Infighting Led to Cancelled Visit

AU2012133295 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 16 Dec 95 p 1

[Commentary by Ivo Indzhev: "Fraternal Whitewash"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Socialists are about to implement within one year the five-year infighting plan.

The rift between the clans of Videnov and Lukanov is developing into a public scandal. Deputy Prime Minister Tsochev, who is connected with Lukanov, hints on television that everyone must be held responsible for the grain crisis. BSP National Assembly member Angel Dimov ever more fiercely attacks high-ranking leaders of his party from purely communist positions, and accuses them of various crimes (unprecedented comradely criticism). The no-less known red politician Todor Pandov, replies to those accusations with counteraccusations from precisely the same blood-red positions. The polemic is rapidly developing into a family feud, in which one already can identify the opposing names and groups.

This is the real "internal-political reason" that prompted the first party and state leader, Zhan Videnov, to cancel his trip to the EU Madrid forum, which was so important for Bulgaria. This is so because it is necessary to salvage, pardon, and whitewash the situation, in the spirit of the traditional fraternal whitewash. The left hand washes the right, and both hands—the face, something which turns Videnov's face ever sadder.

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Klaus on Budget, Price of Gas, Social Peace

AU1912092995 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 15 Dec 95 p 3

["Regular" interview with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Petr Stiegler in Prague on 14 December: "I Am Glad a Balanced Budget Was Approved"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Undoubtedly the most important event of this week was the approval of the state budget for next year. Therefore, we also dedicated a part of the regular interview with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus to an assessment of the budget.

[Stiegler] How would you assess the process of approving the state budget and its result?

[Klaus] First of all, I am glad the budget was approved, and especially that a balanced budget was approved. All other questions are secondary. Nonetheless, this does not mean I underestimate them. On the whole, I am a little sad that the parliament makes such great changes in the budget, and that the point of departure for the vote in the Chamber is not the government proposal but rather a text rewritten by the parliamentary Budget Committee. The Budget Committee maintained the balance, but some of the changes it introduced amount to millions, even billions [of korunas] in volume, and I consider that a bit problematic. In the end, not the committee but rather the government will have to fulfill the budget, and the introduced changes may cause difficulties for some ministers.

Another thing entirely is the fact that some political parties pretend in front of the TV cameras, act as supersocial or vice versa, or would like to scratch all the spending. These are such "ritual dances." I have no idea whether they fool anyone, but they make me and the finance minister nervous, because we have no idea how serious these people are and to what degree they are only playacting.

[Stiegler] Among the government members, the education minister — in whose sector the spending on school boards has been reduced — was the least satisfied. According to him, there is a danger of a crisis in the entire education sector. Will the government deal with his complaint?

[Klaus] I consider the minister's statement as something of an exaggeration. Of course, he could breathe better had he received the 150 million [korunas] for the school boards, but to speak about a collapse was not necessary. There are some question marks over the existence of the school boards, that is no secret. If that came out in the budget debate in the parliament, it is a reason for dealing with it; but let us not make a drama out of it.

[Stiegler] The unleaded gas affair seems rather unfortunate. Everything points to the price of this type of gas going up on 1 January, and perhaps unnecessarily so. Would you say that somewhere a mistake has been made?

[Klaus] The government is vilified for inciting tax evasion in instances where a product with a lower rate can be used instead of one with a higher tax. These are the famous instances of light heating oil, and also the instance of individual types of gas. The cabinet faces two possibilities: either to continue attempts at colorizing certain gases, or solve the problem by imposing the same tax rate on all these products, thus removing the reason for fraud and changes. After several years of attempts at colorizing, the government and the parliament opted for the second solution. The ensuing criticism acted, however, as if it forgot why we took this step. It certainly was not just to raise the price of gas that is environmentally better for some cars. People should also realize that in the economy and, in the final analysis, also in life everything costs something. This also applies to the environment. Production of something that saves the environment is more expensive rather than cheaper. I do not mean that the government should not somehow make it more attractive but it simply is so: Production of environment-friendly gas is more expensive than that of normal gas. This, however, is not directly connected with our specific problem. Here what I said at the beginning of my answer applies.

[Stiegler] Despite all the discussions about health care, railroads, and pensions we have experienced recently, it can be said that social truce rules in this republic. That does not apply to France. How would you explain that we have managed to implement the reforms in peace, while in France they caused such a strong wave of disturbances?

[Klaus] There actually is a relative stability in our country. When I read that trains, streetcars, subways, etc. have not been operating there for 20 days, I get scared of the idea that something like that could happen here. If the transport here failed to operate for just a week, we would think it was the end of the world, and France goes on living even under such conditions.

I do not believe I should judge a situation in another country, but I have the feeling that France did not manage to demonstrate to the citizens the need for radical reforms. Another question is whether that would be at all possible. The French citizen fights against measures, which — albeit temporarily, as I believe — worsen the situation. I have no idea what to advise France. It is necessary to obtain an elementary social consensus for such steps, as Prime Minister Juppe is

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implementing, and — I believe — France has not managed to obtain it.

[Stiegler] Mr. Prime Minister, we can see that the flu epidemics did not hit you, but what about your environment? Are you going to declare flu holidays in the cabinet?

[Klaus] I have to say that the flu epidemics have fortunately hit neither myself nor my immediate environment. For me, it is hard to believe that the situation is so drastic as to require the declaration of extended holidays for the children. I almost feel that this decision may have been made a little too quickly.

RDP Group in Trouble Over Illegal Negotiations

AU1812173595 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 15 Dec 95 pp 1-2

[Report by "(km)": "The RDP Group Has Problems Because of Its Contacts With the Fotona Company"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague — The only arms consortium in the republic, the RDP Group, has found itself in difficulty once again; this time, because it linked up with the Slovene Fotona company last November. Following the controversial business activities that the RDP Group conducted with Iran two years ago on possible supplies of equipment to repair the T-72 tank, this is the second time that the authorities are investigating this company's activities.

At the moment, the Trade and Industry Ministry is just trying to ascertain whether or not the RDP Group broke the law on foreign trade in military material by signing a cooperation agreement with the Slovene company; it has announced in advance, however, that the RDP Group's course of action can be described as odd.

That is, the company's director general, Viktorie Hradska, signed a cooperation agreement with Fotona on 24 November 1994. The RDP Group consortium, however, did not obtain a license to conduct trade in arms — which would have facilitated this activity — until a few days later, on 5 December. Despite the fact that the actual import or expert of weapons was not involved in this incident, the relevant law does not make it possible for companies that do not have a trading license to conduct precontractual or any other kind of negotiations.

Moreover, the consortium would not have been able to cooperate with the Slovene company even if it had the license at that time, because it did not have this country listed among the 65 territories in which it wanted to conduct business.

Viktorie Hradska has distanced herself from possible cooperation with the Slovene company. "I have not cooperated with this company since becoming director general; I have not conducted negotiations with it and have not empowered anyone to do so," she s

Hradska claims that the document giving an account of the contacts with the Fotona company is not binding and, therefore, that the law on foreign trade in military material has not been broken.

The document — which is written in English and signed on behalf of the RDP Group by Viktorie Hradska — says in its letterhead, however, that it is a "letter of intention," that is, an agreement on a future agreement that outlines a document binding the two sides to further cooperation.

In this agreement, the RDP Group consortium has committed itself to arranging contact meetings for Fotona and to cooperating with it — among other things — on a fire-control system for anti-aircraft weapons and on a fire-control system for the Soviet T-72 tank.

"The Fotona company and the RDP Group A.S. are exploring joint activity in the sphere of cooperation concerning a fire-control system for anti-aircraft weapons, a fire-control system for the T-72 tank, and electro-optical components for the artillery command and control system in the Czech Republic," states the agreement. It was concluded a few days before the RDP Group consortium received the appropriate permission.

"Such a course of action can be described, to say the least, as odd and inappropriate," said Miroslav Konvalina, the Trade and Industry Ministry's press spokesman. He was unable to say at the moment, however, whether the law has been broken or not.

In the event that an infringement of the law is proven, the RDP Group faces an administrative fine at the very least. The law, however, also takes into consideration the possibility of criminal proceedings against those responsible for the illegal negotiations.

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Meciar on Rift Between Kovac, Parliament

MS2012100195 London FINANCIAL TIMES in English 20 Dec 95 p 2

[Interview with Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar by Kevin Done and Vincent Boland; place and date not given — from the FINANCIAL TIMES survey on Slovakia]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Question: What issues lie behind the battle between you and President Kovac?

Answer: It was parliament that first voiced no confidence in the president. Followed by the government, by the heads of all the central government agencies and the chiefs of district offices. This process of voicing no confidence in the president continues.

I believe that the shortcomings are to be sought not in the contents of the constitution but rather in violations of the constitution. The President is not impartial and he has taken on the role of leader of the opposition. He speaks openly of his ambition to reshuffle the government and has even shown a personal wish or ambition to determine the contents of policy.

The President rejects and turns his back on communication with parliament and with the government. At the same time he keeps disclosing abroad all kinds of information and not all of them are true. They are untrue.

Moreover parliament has obtained evidence of how he abused his powers, when we were in opposition. A link was revealed between the President and the Slovak intelligence service, the SIS.

The President has also accused the government in public of criminal activity. The whole government was accused by him. Although he had no concrete piece of evidence to support this statement. By doing so, he has cast doubt upon the entire democratic system in Slovakia.

What does Slovakia need in fact? It should be a person with a clear record, an unimpeachable person, who has high morals. That's what Slovakia needs.

The President has stopped being the guarantor of democratic development in Slovakia as far as the government is concerned. That's the way the government perceives him.

Question: There has been a lot of speculation about the way in which the President's son was kidnapped and taken to Austria. Was the intelligence service behind that action?

Answer: First, it has not been proven that he was abducted. We do not have the evidence.

There was an action of the SIS going on at the same time (as the alleged kidnapping), but that had nothing to do with Kovac junior (the President's son). This was an action conducted against a person suspected of smuggling weapons and suspected of various frauds. Kovac junior was in direct contact with this suspect.

In other words this was a parallel event linked with Kovac junior and some of the facts were more or less transferred from one case to another. The investigation is still going on, it has not been finalised and for that reason it's premature to make any final conclusions from the investigation.

The director of the SIS has given written testimony that he was not involved in the abduction.

Question: Why were the police officers investigating the kidnapping changed three times?

Answer: That is not quite the right formulation. There was a team of investigators assigned to the case. After visits to President Kovac one of the investigators claimed that he would become a general. He became negligent. He did not fulfil his professional duties.

He tried to compel the prosecutor to take similar action. He tried to convince the prosecutor that the current government would be toppled in a few days. And that they would achieve their goals and be promoted.

And shortly after that he filed his request to be released from the police service and then started investigating on his own behalf. So let me reiterate the fact that he was not the head of the investigation, he was one of the staff.

So a decision was then made to dissolve this group of investigators and have it replaced by another team. The head of this team paid a visit to the president. After this visit several officers involved in the investigation called on the SIS staff. And nine people of the SIS were persuaded to say that if they testified that the SIS was behind the abduction they would be rewarded for that and would be promoted.

The prosecutor in charge of the oversight of the whole case did further investigation. And this investigation has not been completed yet.

For the very reasons I have mentioned the prosecutor has decided again to hand the whole case to a new group or team of investigators. The investigation is still underway. The chief investigator has made a public statement that he has not been brainwashed nor has any pressure been exerted upon him to state certain ideas or things.

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Question: We have heard that civil servants are being asked to sign statements that they feel that the President is acting against the interests of the country. Is that true?

Answer: No. I haven't heard this piece of information. As far as I know all those who have made statements have made them of their own free will.

This issue may be resolved by inviting a referendum on the President. I believe that Slovak society is very sensitive to all issues related to justice.

Question: Do you intend to hold a referendum on the question of the President?

Answer: This is an issue to be resolved by parliament. We have to take into consideration the demarches that have been sent to Slovakia. To date no political decision has been made on whether to hold a referendum. I believe that a referendum would be one democratic option for resolving this issue.

Question: The demarches were very critical of the battles between you and the government and the President. Do you intend to change your policies towards the President?

Answer: Every policy step taken is measured by the achievement, by the result.

Let me pose some questions: Do the ones who sent the demarches take over responsibility for internal developments in Slovakia? Do you think it fair on the one hand to send demarches and on the other to fail to listen to the other party?

We have signed an association agreement with the European Union, and in it are stipulated the commitments made by Slovakia, and also stipulated is the procedure that should be resorted to in the event that conflicts emerge. I believe that this agreement has been breached.

It really does not give a very good impression if the European Parliament adopts a resolution and threatens us with sanctions, and then, two weeks after sending the demarches, the MP's of the European Parliament come to investigate what is actually going on.

We want the public to support the concept of Slovakia becoming a member of the European Union. It is not only the EU countries that will vote their opinion on whether Slovakia should become a member of the EU, however. It is also the people of this country that must decide. In this respect the actions taken are counterproductive.

Kovac on His Rift With Meciar

MS2012101795 London FINANCIAL TIMES in English 20 Dec 95 p 2

[Interview with Slovak President Kovac by Kevin Done and Vincent Boland, place and date not given — from the FINANCIAL TIMES survey on Slovakia]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Question: The respective powers of the President and the Prime Minister under the constitution appear quite clear. Why is this battle going on between the two of you?

Answer: In the course of several discussions with the Prime Minister it emerged that he does not like the President to be another power centre. I say the office of the President does not represent any other political centre. But I understand the function of the President to be an active one.

The real reason for the conflict is that the President is taking a critical approach to some of the actions of Mr Meciar's government.

I would be very happy if we were of the same opinion on how a government should function under the constitution in a democratic state. But I think there is a different understanding of what is democracy.

The most obvious example is what happened during the parliamentary sessions of November 3-4 last year.

I believe that many things happened, which were in conflict with standard democratic principles and were also in conflict with the constitution.

Question: What were your main concerns?

Answer: Until then the principle that had been adopted in parliament was one of proportional representation. That meant that the opposition also had the possibility of providing one of the deputy speakers and also some chairmen and deputy chairmen of parliamentary committees.

But this basic principle was not followed that night. For example, the OKO [expansion unknown] committee, the special body which controls the secret service — its members were only drawn from the government coalition, and this is still the case today.

Or take the state radio and television councils — they only have members proposed by the government coalition. They also appointed new directors for television and radio. The result is that television is fully controlled by the government.

Question: You were once a close ally of Mr Meciar. What has happened to undermine the relationship that you had with him previously?

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Answer: We had good personal relations, but it was never a relationship of friends. At the time I was convinced that we shared the same idea of what democracy is and the same idea about the role of ethics in politics. And I was convinced that Mr Meciar would try to gather around him people who are very able, morally clean and highly professional.

The situation has developed differently, and the mutual trust has been undermined.

Question: Is the Prime Minister now undermining the office of the President?

Answer: Yes, very much. In the budget for 1995 we were given much less than in 1994, and I was forced to release 35 people from my office (cutting my staff) from 95 to 60. At the same time we were not given the money to finish the reconstruction of the future seat of the President the Grassalkovich Palace. The premises we are in now belong to the city of Bratislava, to the mayor, and we are just tenants here.

In the draft budget for next year they are going to cut our money again, and if it is approved by parliament like this, we will be forced to release another 10 people.

Members of the government try not to meet the President. The coalition MPs behave in the same way.

Question: In what ways do you feel that the Prime Minister is abusing the constitution?

Answer: He has proposed several laws, five or six, which were adopted by parliament, but when these laws were later presented to the constitutional court, in almost all cases the court found that they were unconstitutional.

It is also known that the Prime Minister has been criticising the constitutional court's decisions. In one of his statements he said the constitutional court was "a sick element on our political stage".

Question: Could we move to the kidnapping of your son. Who do you believe was behind this act?

Answer: I am of the same opinion as the largest part of our society. There are really many direct and indirect indications that prove that the kidnapping of my son to Austria was organised by the Slovak security service.

As you know the investigation is still going on, and during this investigation there have been several very odd interferences. It showed that there was an attempt not to find the real criminals, those who did it.

I am worried in particular about one thing. Any citizen of the Slovak republic has rights in the case of such kidnapping by force to a foreign country.

The Slovak government has still not asked the Austrian authorities to return this kidnapped citizen back home.

Question: Why do you think it has not done so?

Answer: The government says officially that there is an international warrant issued for my son. If he should be charged or accused of some criminal activity at home, then it would immediately ask for the return of this kind of citizen, but because my son is suspected of some criminal activities in Germany the government does not see any reason why it should demand his return.

The Prime Minister is always stressing that it is still not clear whether he was really forcibly kidnapped to Austria or whether he was kidnapped voluntarily by some group of people.

Question: What is actually happening with your son now? Will he go to Germany to give evidence to the prosecutors there, or is he waiting to be extradited?

Answer: We are trying to make it possible for my son to give evidence and testify in front of the German prosecutor. If they find that this is impossible to organise in Austria, my son is ready to go and testify.

Question: Do you think you have aligned the office of the President too closely with the fate of your son?

Answer: I didn't do that. My political opponents have done that. I always claimed that I am not responsible for my son's deeds. And if my son really committed some criminal act, he must be sentenced and punished like any other citizen. But when I see that somebody is misusing this affair as a means of political struggle against the President, I cannot be silent.

We see that my political opponents need this case to be always alive. It does not matter whether or not my son is guilty or how his family suffers. The important thing for them is that this is the case by which they can discredit President Michal Kovac.

Question: Given the pressures that have been applied have you ever considered resigning?

Answer: No. Just the opposite. Everything that has happened has convinced me that I must not resign, and that I am obliged to defend clean politics, democracy, the constitution and the law against attempts to undermine them.

Question: How do you think this battle can be resolved?

Answer: There are many ways, but they are mostly in the hands of the Prime Minister and the MPs of the government coalition.

The government coalition must stop taking steps that damage the image of Slovakia abroad. It must allow the

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opposition to have a role in the control of executive power. The public media, television and radio, must be under the control of a wider political and social spectrum. They must get away from the influence of the government coalition. But I have no demands for this or that person to resign.

Of course I have the right to express publicly my opinions, when I am concerned that our democratic system has been damaged or that rules are being adopted which are in contradiction with the constitution, especially when freedom of opinion and freedom of expression are threatened.

Today we find that more and more people are afraid to express their opinions publicly, because they fear their existence will be threatened, that they could could lose their jobs. I cannot close my eyes and ears to that.

Commentary Analyzes Outcome of Russian Elections

AU2012113395 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 19 Dec 95 p 12

[Commentary by Ivan Drabek: "Russian 'Primaries'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After four years, the Communist Party is again the decisive force in the Russian parliament. How is one supposed to interpret this? As a normal phenomenon demonstrating that democracy is functioning in Russia or, quite the opposite, as a serious threat to the young Russian democracy? Is it the beginning of a revanche, a step toward "brighter tomorrows?"

In spite of the great electoral success of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation [CPRF], its freshly won positions should not be overestimated. Sunday's elections to the State Duma do not give their winner any chance to change state policy to his ideas.

The Constitution, tailored in 1993 to fit Boris Yeltsin, gives the president sufficiently strong powers to control the situation even in the face of the most hostile parliament conceivable. To use the words of CPRF leader Gennadiy Zyuganov: "Our president's powers are greater than the combined powers of the Russian tsars and Soviet general secretaries."

It is precisely over these powers that the struggle in the new State Duma will begin. It was no accident that U.S. journalists in Moscow gave Sunday's parliamentary elections the working title "primaries." The presidential elections have been called for 16 June next year.

The elections to the State Duma have dealt the cards for June's big game. How many trump cards have been dealt to individual future candidates for head of state will not become definitely known until mid-January, when the State Duma holds its inaugural session. This is because half of the 450 parliamentary seats have been distributed in single-seat constituencies and the winners of these include a fair proportion of independent candidates, who may still be considering whose side to join.

The greatest possible rivals to Boris Yeltsin, who will not announce whether he will be seeking re-election until February, will emerge from the leaders of the electoral blocs that have succeeded in getting into parliament. Among the four main factions in the new State Duma, three are opposition factions with each having its own ideas about who should be the next president. The CPRF will undoubtedly be backing Gennadiy Zyuganov. Vladimir Zhirnovskiy, leader of the ultranationalistic Liberal Democratic Party of Russia [LDPR], and Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, leader of the liberal reform bloc Yabloko, are making no secret of the fact that they regard the present elections as a means toward the fulfillment of their presidential ambitions.

The modest result of Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, who, as the only leader among the new parliamentary quartet, expresses his first loyalty to the president, is from this point of view undeniably a disappointment for the Kremlin. On the other hand, there is good news for Boris Yeltsin, who is recuperating in a sanatorium near Moscow: The charismatic General Aleksandr Lebed, whom observers until recently regarded as the hottest favorite for the presidential elections, failed. While he himself got into parliament through a single-seat constituency, his Congress of Russian Communities [KRO] did not reach the 5 percent threshold. The KRO's failure, which is associated with the relatively good performance of the LDPR, is, by the way, one of the biggest surprises of the elections. While the Zhirinovskiy phenomenon did not score such a triumphant success as two years ago, its appeal is not yet exhausted. The KRO's efforts to attract nationalist voters to its "patriotism" did not come off.

Nor can Yeltsin be pleased with the strengthening of Grigoriy Yavlinskiy's position. The fact that, of seven electoral blocs of opposition democrats, only Yavlinskiy's Yabloko managed to win seats in parliament will make this moderate reformer even stronger. For the June elections, this means that the majority of votes of the so-called "democratic voters" will go to Yavlinskiy.

Of course, it is the communists who are the main rivals in the struggle for the Kremlin. Their pressure on the president through the Duma will surely be strong. Moreover, Yeltsin has the disadvantage that, unlike the preceding electoral term, he now lacks the possibility to disband parliament. The new State Duma cannot be dissolved one year after its elections and six months prior to presidential elections. For the communists, this means double immunity.

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Ex-Official Discusses NATO Mission in Bosnia

AU1912210695 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 19 Dec 95 p 6

[Interview with Zoltan Pecze, former Defense Ministry deputy state secretary in charge of international contacts, by Laszlo Meszleny; place and date not given: "Why Are Our Soldiers Going to Bosnia? Smiling Politicians, Community of Interests, and Tomahawk Missiles"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Russian troops only left Hungary a few years ago, and here are the U.S. troops now. Moreover, Hungarian soldiers are preparing to leave for an ominous country: Bosnia. We asked Zoltan Pecze, former Defense Ministry deputy state secretary in charge of international contacts in the Antall and Boross cabinets, about the less well-known forces behind this decision.

[Meszleny] Is it necessary for Hungary to participate in this action?

[Pecze] Perhaps it would be better to stay away from it, but it is very naive to think that this is possible. After long deliberations, the decision emerged in the United States: They will put an end to the fighting in Bosnia, and they are also ready to send ground troops to do so. The U.S. politicians are now putting the life of their own soldiers at risk, as well as their voters' favor, something that is even more important for them. Therefore, they are not leaving anything to chance; they want absolute success. According to the well-tested doctrine in the Gulf War, they are preparing a huge power superiority and also guaranteeing an international background for themselves by involving as many countries as possible. The U.S. troops also played the leading role in liberating Kuwait, but they also saw to it that, in addition to Western countries, Arab countries also participate in the operation. Thus, they neutralized the opposition of Islamic fundamentalism. This time too, in convincing the senators, one of President Clinton's main arguments was that the United States would not be alone in creating order in the Balkans. Every NATO country will join the United States, including Germany with its sensitive situation, as well as neutral countries like Sweden, and even former enemies like Russia. After all this, it is understandable that the small Luxembourg will also send 300 troops to Bosnia. Hungary, a neighbor that will be one of the main countries to profit from peace, cannot exclude itself.

[Meszleny] Is it a unilateral approach to always mention the Americans?

[Pecze] No, because the war in Bosnia proved once again that there is no security without military power, and Europe is unable to produce such power without the United States. Back in 1991, it still seemed that the Yugoslav crisis would be the first crisis in the post-Cold War era that the European themselves would solve without U.S. participation. The European institutions, the EU, the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], and the WEU [Western European Union], plunged into settling the crisis with a certain amount of enthusiasm, but then registered a number of failures, together with the United Nations. It became clear that the hidden German-English-French discord and the Russian countermaneuvers blocked every European solution. We can still remember the frequent images on the evening television news of smiling diplomats emerging from their limousines and hurrying to the location of yet another unsuccessful meeting. The whole world was expecting the big powers to finally do something. And now the U.S. decision on getting involved has emerged, and let us not ponder whether this decision came out of humanitarian, electoral, or geopolitical considerations. For years, it has been impossible to make the Bosnian Serbs agree to some kind of reasonable settlement at the negotiating table. Then, the arming of the Croats and the air attacks of the NATO that supported the Croats forced the Bosnian Serbs to agree to a settlement in a matter of weeks. Those who only understand the language of force had to receive messages in the form of Tomahawk missiles. The value of views according to which peace can be guaranteed through unilateral disarmament have again become clear. As for what could happen to Hungary if we listened to such voices, Muslim women in Bosnia could tell us if they felt like talking about it.

[Meszleny] Could Hungary's participation harm the ethnic Hungarians living in Vojvodina?

[Pecze] This is the most difficult question indeed, but peace is the major interest of the ethnic Hungarians living there. The pressure on them might ease, and new Serbian refugees will probably not arrive in Vojvodina. Unfortunately, we can count less on the possibility that the people sent there will move, because most of them obviously do not want to live under Croatian jurisdiction or to return to the destroyed territories in Bosnia. In any case, the end of the embargo will also improve the economic situation of the ethnic Hungarians there. Milosevic is in firm control of Serbian power, is one of the signatories of the Dayton Agreement, and profits the most from the lifting of the embargo. With the exception of some extremists who want to continue the war and some war criminals, everyone is interested in peace now. Taking this into consideration, Gyula Thurmer, the biggest Milosevic-follower in Hungary, cannot have any reservations regarding the NATO troops arriving to supervise the Dayton Agreement. The leaders of the

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organization of the ethnic Hungarians in Vojvodina are not against our participation either. However, I regard the position of the Independent Smallholders' Party [FKGP] as contradictory. While they mentioned the possibility of border modification for Hungary's benefit in the framework of an overall settlement in Yugoslavia, they are the ones who are afraid of sending 500 Hungarian troops there. The propagandistic mentioning of border modifications could do much more harm to the ethnic Hungarians in Vojvodina than the deployment of a Hungarian engineering unit in the framework of the peace agreement also signed by the Serbs.

In the current situation, allowing NATO troops in this country and sending Hungarian engineering troops into Vojvodina [as published] do not represent a threat, but we must be also prepared for the worst. This could happen if Milosevic falls and radical forces come into power in Serbia, forces that are dissatisfied with the Dayton Agreement. The situation would become especially serious if this were accompanied by a similar development in Russia, and Russia would no longer support the peace process in Bosnia. Even in this case, it would still be the best for Hungary to be firmly in the NATO camp and to receive support from them.

[Meszleny] If Hungary joins NATO, will this membership represent a guarantee against a possible attack? Will this lead to Hungary losing its independence? How much will all this cost us?

[Pecze] Common defense is the essence of NATO. If a member state comes under attack, the others will also regard this as an attack against them. They never had to try out the power of NATO solidarity in war because, precisely because of the alliance, nobody dared to attack even the smallest member state. The Soviet Union dared to invade Afghanistan, but it did not even try to do the same with Denmark, for example. Nobody dared to risk facing the joint military forces of countries like the United States, Great Britain, France, and Germany, to mention only the bigger ones. Besides, it is ridiculous to speak about losing independence. Who would claim that Germany, the third economic power in the world, the nuclear power France, or even the small Netherlands are not independent just because they are NATO members? On the contrary, we are in a state of unilateral dependence, because we are not members. Every country in this part of Europe depends on NATO, because only NATO has the military power to guarantee peace. If NATO makes a decision on something, this decision can also affect our security. As members, we could have a say in those decisions. If a country wants to take care of its defense alone, this costs more than doing it together. During the Cold War years, Sweden, a country that chose to be militarily neutral, spent 5 to 6 percent of its GDP on defense, while its NATO-member neighbors, namely, Denmark and Norway, only spent 2 to 3 percent on defense. It is obvious that the Swedish Grippen combat aircraft, of which they plan to produce 140, will cost more than the F-16 models used in NATO, of which some 3,500 have already been produced. Of course, NATO membership would mean extra expenses for Hungary, because we have not been spending enough on the army for years. We are now putting our security at risk because of a lack of funds, but this cannot last forever.

[Meszleny] We frequently hear that, with the NATO base in Taszar, and the Hungarian engineering unit to be sent to Bosnia, we can get "good points" for the desired NATO membership.

[Pecze] I think it is a big mistake on the part of the government to "present" this in such a way to the public. People are already fed up with the alleged "plus points"; whenever we get them, the government takes measures that radically reduce our living standard. People do not like sucking up to the West. Gratitude is not a political category; therefore, it is doubtful that NATO would reward us with anything. On the other hand, Hungary's strategic situation has gained in importance. It became clear that Hungary will be needed to keep an eye on the war hotbeds in the Balkans. South Dunantul is an ideal home front for the operation in Bosnia. The Americans can prepare close to the operational theater here, but behind the defenses of the Hungarian border. It is not surprising that AWACS aircraft have been patrolling above the Kaposvar-Dombovar region for years. They can have the best view of northern Bosnia from here. Several formerly backward countries, like Greece, Turkey, South Korea, and Taiwan profited a lot from alliance with the United States and underwent great economic development. It is not accidental that the Romanians, who achieved their territorial gains in this century by always choosing their allies skillfully, almost panicked at the current rise in Hungary's evaluation. They quickly offered to set up a base in Temesvar [Timisoara] similar to the one in Kaposvar, as well as to send a 500-men engineering unit, just like the Hungarian contingent. They do not want to lag behind us in anything. They are scared to death of the possibility that Hungary might get into NATO and the EU before them. They know very well how they would "treat us" if they made it into these organizations first. It is in the interests of the ethnic Hungarians living beyond our borders, as well as in the interest of the Hungarians living within Hungary's borders to, see Hungary make it into the European integration organization in the first group. NATO membership does not mean giving up our national interests. On the contrary: It means an oppor-

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tunity to assert our national interests. The way Greece made use of, or more precisely, abused its NATO and EU membership in hindering Macedonia's [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] recognition is a good example.

[Meszleny] So you support the idea of joining NATO and sending Hungarian troops to Bosnia?

[Pecze] It is not good when people who, a few years ago, wrote anti-NATO booklets are "exaggerating" things now, like the former political officer who has turned into our present defense minister. We must evaluate our interests with a sober head and make the most possible out of the interests that have now emerged between Hungary and the NATO. The government might give in too easily to compensate for the anti-NATO gestures like the NATO referendum issue in the election program of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], an idea also taken up by the Workers' Party later. The modifying proposals of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] in the Bosnia-debate in parliament were aimed precisely at having more guarantees for the deployment of NATO troops here, and thus strengthening the negotiating positions of the Hungarian Government. Unfortunately, the government majority voted these proposals down. One should not fall on all fours in front of the U.S. soldiers. There is no obligation to love the American way of life and culture. One must take into consideration the possibility of accidents and disciplinary problems in places with so many people. One must be prepared for that, but think of the number of mafia people and murderers like Marinko Magda that the war in the Balkans have produced. The most important thing is that it is perhaps possible to put an end to this war now, and if, in the meantime, the correct cooperation based on mutual interests brings us closer to NATO, we might even call ourselves fortunate in the end.

Troop Strength for Bosnia Role Cut by 100

LD1612114995 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 16 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Hungarian technical unit, which is to participate in the Bosnian peacekeeping operations under NATO's auspices, will only have 400 members.

Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti has explained the decision — that the number of soldiers in the unit will be 100 less than authorized by parliament — with austerity and security reasons. It is mainly the number of auxiliary staff that has been reduced by replacing their work with modern technology.

Committees Reject Referendum on NATO Entry

LD1812203995 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1900 GMT 18 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The parliamentary debate on whether or not to hold a referendum on Hungary's entry to NATO has started, after the Workers' Party collected more than 100,000 signatures demanding a referendum. Andras Domany reports from the National Assembly.

[Domany] The debate started and also ended within a surprisingly short time. The Constitutional, Foreign Affairs, and Defense Committees have unequivocally proposed not to hold a referendum.

It was said at the meetings that a decisionmaking referendum could not be held anyway, for the outcome of such a referendum would be binding for the National Assembly, although the parliament could not carry out the obligation in the event of a positive vote.

Another type of referendum is one which expresses an opinion. However, according to the committees this is not topical either, because a decision on entry into NATO is not on the agenda for the time being; the conditions of a future possible admission are not yet known.

According to the Foreign Affairs Committee, it would not be fortunate if our partners felt that we were trying to put pressure on them. The question of whether foreign troops will be stationed on or nuclear weapons will be kept in Hungary's territory if we become a NATO member will also be subject to talks, only to be held later. A positive answer to these questions is not at all certain.

Following all this, there were no contributions by deputies at all. This makes it likely that the committee's proposal on rejecting a call for a referendum at present will be approved tomorrow when the voting takes place.

However, the proposal also says that, as soon as the exact conditions necessary for the decision become clear, a referendum will have to decide on our entry into NATO.

Ethnic Leaders From Slovakia, Romania Hold Summit

LD1912185095 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 19 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The leaders of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR] are holding talks in Budapest and have been informed of the Hungarian Government's stance on Romanian President Iliescu's reconciliation proposal. The summit meeting of the ethnic Hungarian minority organizations beyond the

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border was held in the prime minister's office. Attila Peter Nagy reports.

[Nagy] According to the executive chairman of the UDMR [Csaba Takacs], the Hungarian Government has at last realized that the situation of the minorities does not depend on the openness of Hungarian foreign policy. Csaba Takacs believes that minority rights must also be guaranteed by Romanian laws and added that the agreement on historic reconciliation cannot substitute the basic treaty. [passage omitted]

The leader of the Hungarians living in Slovakia [Miklos Duray] said that 1995 has been one of the most difficult and unsuccessful periods of the last 50 years for the minorities living there. According to Miklos Duray the recently adopted language law not only restricts, but makes impossible the use of minority rights. The politician believes that the only glimmer of hope for the Hungarians of Slovakia is the fact that the language law was received with indignation internationally. [passage omitted]

Trade Unions Join Forces in 'Action Alliance'

LD1612213995 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1830 GMT 16 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The National Federation of Workers' Councils [MOSZ] and the National Federation of Christian Trade Unions have formed an action alliance. The heads of the trade unions are of the view that there will be a united trade union movement in Hungary within a couple of years and the two unions that have formed an alliance now will play an important role in this. MOSZ Chairman Laszlo Palkovics said the unification of the two trade unions, which hold similar principles, was made necessary by the fact that left-wing trade unions have also joined forces. The chairman of the National Federation of Christian Trade Unions said that, through the new alliance, they would be able to protect the interests of their members more effectively.

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TANJUG Views Problems Facing NATO Troops

LD2012111695 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0924 GMT 20 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brussels, Dec 20 (TANJUG) — A new stage will begin in ending the Bosnian war at Sarajevo on Wednesday when the peace Implementation Force (IFOR) under NATO's command takes over from the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR).

NATO sources in Brussels said the first IFOR task would also begin on Wednesday. Troops under the command of Admiral Leighton Smith will separate the warring armies in Bosnia by deploying as many troops as possible in the buffer area between them. Admiral Smith has been given one month to accomplish this mission.

The NATO Headquarters in Brussels said the most difficult job would be that of troops stationed in Sarajevo and Mostar, where the bulk of the multinational force will be French troops.

The unresolved status of the Serb municipalities of Sarajevo, the difficult process of the reconciliation of Muslims and Croats in Mostar, and the maintaining of the corridor toward Gorazde might all cause unexpected problems, military experts and NATO have estimated.

A French colonel of the IFOR was quoted as saying that everything had begun in Sarajevo and that everything would end there.

A U.S. corps and a Russian brigade are stationed in the so-called northeastern sector of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and their job will hardly be less difficult. British troops are stationed in Sector West, where they will have to expel Croatian troops from much of Republika Srpska (Bosnian Serb Republic) territory which they captured after attacking and taking Krajina last summer.

Prlic Views Accord, Reconstruction, Refugees

AU2012101195 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 18 Dec 95 pp 4-5

[Interview with Jadranko Prlic, ethnic Croat deputy prime minister and defense minister of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Veso Vegar; place and date not given: "One Cannot Set a Deadline for the Abolition of Herzeg-Bosnia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dr. Jadranko Prlic was a well-known politician even in prewar times. During the war, he headed the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] at its foundation and later became prime minister of the Croatian community of Herzeg-Bosnia and deputy prime minister of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, he came to the center of attention when he initialed the peace accord in Dayton, Ohio, on behalf of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, after President of the Federation Kresimir Zubak had refused to do so. Right at the beginning of our conversation we asked him about his reasons for initialling the Dayton accord.

To Make Use of the Agreement

[Prlic] If I had not initialed the agreement, there would have been extremely severe consequences for us and for the Republic of Croatia. This has been clear ever since Dayton. The Serbs, for example, did not initial it, and you can see what they have had despite their vociferous protests. They have had nothing. Our position would have been particularly difficult, because everything that the peace agreement gives us would have been thrown into doubt by our refusal to initial it. I, Jadranko Prlic, would never have done that. I personally disagree with the maps proposed, because some regions that belong to Croats have not been added to the Federation, but, as a representative of the Croatian people, who bears his responsibilities toward that nation, I signed the Dayton accord. And I would do so again. I am extremely happy that after that the parliament of Herzeg-Bosnia, the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Constitutional Assembly of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina accepted the agreement themselves, thus confirming that I made the right move by initialing the document. Of course, I have told the representatives from the Posavina region that neither I nor anybody else expects them to endorse this agreement. It is normal that they will not. We are in the situation in which we find ourselves and we have to start thinking how we can make the best use of the agreement for ourselves. Globally, this agreement produces a political settlement, but whether or not it is the final political settlement is another question. The position of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina depends on our degree of good organization, our ability to organize life where we live, particularly in those parts of Posavina that are to remain within the Federation, and, let me be quite frank, it depends on whether we make it possible for Croats to return to those regions that are not currently part of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Vegar] Do you believe that the return of refugees and displaced persons is the crucial question of the entire process?

[Prlic] The starting point of the Dayton agreement is, of course, the many declarations and resolutions that the international community issued on the observance of human rights and other things that should be done for the human race to be really human. However, the question lies in how this can be done and implemented

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here after two severe wars. This means that as a major policy guideline we have to take the right of every man or woman to return to his or her home, or to appropriate compensation. This compensation clause embedded in the Dayton agreement may mean many things, but the first thing that we ought to do is to ensure everybody's right to return to his home. However, whether he would want to return there is a matter for individual decisions.

[Vegar] Who is supposed to provide the material conditions for their return?

[Prlic] The UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] will be setting up an appropriate fund for the reconstruction of destroyed houses and the construction of new ones. Part of the funds will be approved at the conference in Brussels on 20 and 21 December this year. Those funds, amounting to between $500 million and $550 million, will be jointly donated by the EU and the World Bank for the repairs of houses, investment in farming, the renovation of the infrastructure, and other most urgent needs. We shall endeavor to see to it that the regions with Croatian majorities are part in all that. It is precisely for this reason that a number of Herzeg-Bosnian officials and possible officials of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Sarajevo are engaged on these matters. That is to say, the initial funds of $5 billion for Bosnia-Herzegovina will be provided for the first three years, of which $4 billion is intended for the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Arms Control

[Vegar] You took part in the London conference where it was decided who would implement the Dayton accords and how it would be done. What are your assessments of the success of this conference?

[Prlic] The success went beyond my expectations. It was a prominent gathering involving all the relevant international players. At the conference a Council for the Implementation of the Agreement was designated, which will meet twice yearly and review the results achieved in the implementation of the Dayton agreement. There was a great interest in participating in that body, but only the major world powers were given the opportunity to do so. In London, none of smaller countries managed to enter the body. Eight countries did, namely: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, Great Britain, the United States, the EU Presidency, the European Commission, and the Organization of Islamic Countries. As is known, the top envoy Carl Bildt heads this body.

[Vegar] How great is the authority of Carl Bildt?

[Prlic] I can say that this top envoy has greater authority than any other legal body in Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is to say, we shall be under a sort of protectorate in this period and we have to understand this. The top envoy heads it and on the ground in Bosnia-Herzegovina there will be 60,000 NATO troops, who will have power and authority to implement everything anticipated by the agreement. The governor of the Central Bank will be appointed by the IMF, while 250 experts from the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] will be sent to 30 towns in Bosnia-Herzegovina to prepare elections for six or nine months after the signing of the agreement in Paris. In addition, after Paris a meeting will be held in Bonn to discuss measures to maintain stability and arms control.

[Vegar] The Dayton agreement also modified to a degree the Washington agreement. Are these changes to the Croats' advantage or disadvantage?

[Prlic] Yes, it does change the Washington agreement to a degree, because its intention is to keep Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state, so for that reason some powers have been transferred to the central state authorities. This need not be so bad as some people say, because Croats take part in the central state authorities as well. They have all the rights as a constituent nation and on many bodies have a third of the representatives, starting with the peoples' council in the future parliament to the three-member presidency. One of the changes is that foreign affairs are entirely run by the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it can generally be said that the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been given those functions that it needs to fulfill its international commitments.

[Vegar] Has agreement been reached at the talks between the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] and the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] regarding the sharing of functions in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina between the Croats and the Muslims?

[Prlic] No, it has not, because we are awaiting the relevant laws to be passed to see what the government will be like and how many ministers it will comprise, and only then will we agree on the distribution of ministerial functions. We have just held general talks and not only general ones, because those talks were at an advanced stage before the initialing of the Dayton treaty, but, unfortunately, agreement failed to materialize.

Functions Have Not Been Assigned

[Vegar] You are being referred to as the future foreign minister?

[Prlic] The HDZ Presidency has put me forward for that position and we shall see how this develops further. It is a very important position and I can tell you that I will carry out any job that I am entrusted with. I went to war as a man who should stand by his people. I carried

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out some important duties and, as long as the revolution goes on, and it still is, I am available, and after that I shall be in a position to make decisions myself.

[Vegar] You were the first HVO chairman and later head of the government of the Croatian republic of Herzeg-Bosnia. How long will you stay in office or, in other words, how long will Herzeg-Bosnia function?

[Prlic] It is impossible to set a deadline in that respect. That will depend on the entire process. When all the rights are guaranteed to the Croatian people and when the Federation proves itself able to take on all the functions that Herzeg-Bosnia had, then Herzeg-Bosnia will be transformed, probably into a sort of political community. Then state jurisdiction will be carried out through the counties and the entire system of the Federation.

Obstacle

[Vegar] How will you protect people's rights in Herzeg-Bosnia then?

[Prlic] The Herzeg-Bosnia authorities are working on this very hard now. On the other hand, some things have already occurred that violate agreements. The Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is making decisions that are within the jurisdiction of the Assembly (when it meets) by which it is promising members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army monthly salaries of up to 400 German marks and even more, which in advance is discrimination against all the Croats and all the Serbs who are supposed to live in that common society. This is all sheer political manipulation and launching of an election campaign, as well as an attempt to plant yet another obstacle to relations among the nations of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is absolutely unacceptable. Our attitude is definitely clear: Herzeg-Bosnia will enter into this process without a single kuna [Croatian currency], dollar, or German mark of debt to anybody. Similarly, we shall be demanding the same kind of correct behavior is adopted by other members in the future joint state. Otherwise, we shall not behave in such a way, either.

[Vegar] In such a case, is this to be understood that the Croats will again be against Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Prlic] We are often said to be against the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is not true. We are for an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina, but we are against a state in which certain leaders of the Muslim nation have the exclusive right to decisionmaking. There are no decisions that will be made exclusively by a representative or representatives of just one nation.

[Vegar] You have been defense minister in the Governments of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina for quite a long time.

[Prlic] Yes, and I have been very successful. You know that the Federation used to control just a third of the territory when I was appointed minister, but we arrived in Dayton with 52.6 percent of the entire territory under our control. Nobody can question that result, formally or legally. However, it ought to be pointed out that all the time there were actually two states and two armies. But there was also a certain form of cooperation and we achieved results, principally thanks to the assistance of the Croatian Army and the Croatian state. Today some people try to deny that factor, among them even some powerful international players.

[Vegar] Who denies the assistance of the Republic of Croatia?

[Prlic] Some important circles in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as in the Republic of Croatia and part of the international community, are trying to create a situation in which, as they put it, they would isolate the Bosnian Croats from the current leadership in Zagreb as much as possible. I hope that this process will fail. We are one nation and so we shall remain. We are a constituent nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in our efforts to obtain our rights we shall demand help from our mother country, Croatia. We shall establish such relations with the Republic of Croatia as the Federation and as the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but we shall set up a general relationship with Croatia in terms of dual citizenship, which almost all the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina have, whether people like it or not.

Dual Citizenship Remains

[Vegar] Are there attempts on the part of the international community to deny the right to the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina to dual citizenship?

[Prlic] No. Some Muslim representatives tried to deny us that right during the talks in Dayton, when the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina was being worked out.

[Vegar] When can we expect the passing of system legislation regarding the Federation, such as the law on defense?

[Prlic] Perhaps even by the end of this year. Differences in attitudes have remained the same since the beginning. The current attitude of the Muslim leadership is that the Dayton agreement should not be put into force before the elections, which actually means that the existing authorities of the republic will make all the decisions until the elections. This is absolutely unacceptable to us,

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as well as to the international community. That means that we demand prompt implementation of the Dayton accord and the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, upon which the entire process will depend.

[Vegar] To conclude, are you in conflict with Zubak?

[Prlic] I am not in conflict with anybody. Over the past four years of war I have never been in conflict with any Croat. In Dayton, all of us were members of one and the same delegation and we defined our attitudes and wrote amendments to documents together with minister Mato Tadic, keeping in mind the interests of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats in the first place.

LBO: No 'Clear Concept' for Implementing Accord

AU1812171095 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 18 Dec 95

[Report by Senada Cumurovic on news conference by the Liberal Bosniak Organization in Sarajevo on 18 December — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] The issue that arises following the signing of the peace agreement in Paris is that the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities do not have a clear concept for implementing the accord. This is the main complaint and stance of the Liberal Bosniak Organization [LBO] as presented to correspondents by Salih Foco, the vice president of this opposition party.

Based on the signed agreement, it is clear that Bosnia-Herzegovina no longer exists as a republic; it is now a new entity, something between a union and a federation. However, the end of the war and the reintegration or disintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina will depend on the internal [word indistinct] and behavior of the signatories. However, regardless of how unprepared we were for the war, we are just as unprepared for peace, Foco claims.

Naturally, today's news conference also broached the issue of Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic's remarks regarding the work of Muhamed Filipovic, our ambassador to Great Britain, who also happens to be the president of the party.

The LBO believes that the objective of statements such as Minister Sacirbegovic's are to disqualify an important Bosniak, Professor Filipovic, who could be a significant opponent in the next elections. It was stressed that the party asked for Minister Sacirbegovic's resignation following the signing of the Geneva document, and that this was Sacirbegovic's answer.

Correspondents at the press conference were given Ambassador Filipovic's statement in which he dismisses, point by point, all remarks directed at him by Minister Sacirbegovic. And finally, one very interesting piece of information from today's LBO press conference. According to the publication (?DIPLOMACY), Professor Filipovic has been elected ambassador of the year for 1995.

Banja Luka Patriotic Front Accepts Peace Accord

AU1912114395 Banja Luka Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 18 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Serb Democratic Alliance — the Banja Luka Patriotic Front — accepts the global peace agreement for former Bosnia-Herzegovina as the necessary solution to this war. In today's announcement, this organization expresses the hope that, if the democratic basis of the agreement is taken into account, a fair solution will be found for controversial issues regarding the demarcation between the two entities. Furthermore, the Patriotic Front insists on an exchange of all prisoners of war and proper care for refugees, so it appealed to municipal authorities of Bijeljina and Prnjavor to provide temporary accommodation for refugees from Drvar and other occupied western Krajina municipalities.

Serb Prime Minister on Cooperation with IFOR

LD1912234295 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2145 GMT 19 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 19 Dec (SRNA) — Rajko Kasagic, prime minister of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, said this evening that the international sanctions against the Serb Republic will be lifted after the borders with the Croat-Muslim federation have been drawn.

"In spite of our dissatisfaction with some parts of the Dayton agreement, we will have to cooperate with the Implementation Force, because the future of relations between the Serb Republic and the international community depends on this," said Kasagic, appearing as a guest in the [Bosnian] Serb TV program "The Open Screen."

The new prime minister of the republican government said that the Serb Republic is not at this moment ready to accept 140,000 new refugees if there is an exodus of the population of Serb Sarajevo, and he expressed hope that the world, aware of that danger, will offer a more just solution.

The prime minister said that payment operations will shortly be resumed with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and will operate until the possible setting up of a central bank in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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U.S. Envoy Tells Serbs: No Map Changes

LD1912171995 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1606 GMT 19 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 19 Dec (SRNA) — John Menzies, the U.S. ambassador in Sarajevo, and Antoine Pedauye, head of the UN Protection Force's civilian sector, told the leaders of the Serb municipality of Novo Sarajevo today that there will be no changes to the Dayton maps and that the Implementation Force [IFOR] and the international police are sufficent guarantors for the security of Serb Sarajevo.

"Mr. Menzies told us that IFOR and the international police are guarantors, and that the United States does not want the Serb people to abandon this area and leave it to the Muslims. Their guarantees are valid for 90 days," Milorad Katic, chairman of the Novo Sarajevo municipality, said after a one-hour meeting with the U.S. ambassador.

Stressing that the Serb side is seeking specific and firm guarantees from the United States and the international community, Katic said the high-ranking guests were warned that, unless these are forthcoming, burning and chaos will appear in this area in three months' time.

"The Serb people only trust the Serb army, police, and authorities. We shall stay here only while we are together. The Serbs are aware that there will be no changes to the plan but they want time in order for chaos, panic, and a mass exodus to be prevented," Katic said.

Mr. Menzies refused to talk to journalists, but in an exchange of greetings with his hosts he expressed the hope that in three months' time, when he intimated he will return to Grbavica, he will find the Serb people there then as now.

Bosnian Serbs 'Nervously' Watch IFOR Arrival

AU1912171995 Paris AFP in English 1706 GMT 19 Dec 95

[By Ruzica Gavrilovic]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Pale, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dec 19 (AFP) — Bosnian Serbs looked on nervously here Tuesday as the multinational peace implementation force for Bosnia prepared to take over control from UN peacekeepers, bringing the settlement so distasteful to many Serbs a step closer.

The United Nations is to transfer authority to the 60,000-strong NATO-led force on Wednesday in a handover which for many in this mountain retreat east of Sarajevo symbolises the irresistible advent of a peace deal which ushers in an uncertain future.

And although the Bosnian Serb assembly has approved the deployment of NATO troops in Serb-held territory to oversee the peace, most Serbs are still worried about certain key provisions in the peace deal which the force is to implement. [passage omitted]

The Serbs are particularly sour about the clause in the peace accords which provides for the reintegration of Serb-held suburbs of Sarajevo into a unitary Bosnian capital under government control.

They are also indignant over some of the territorial concessions such as that of Praca, a small town on the Sarajevo-Gorazde road which reverts to Bosnian government control as part of the peace deal which provides for a corridor between the east Bosnian enclave and the capital.

"No Serb worth the name would have ceded the town of Praca to the Moslem-Croat Federation," the "mayor" of Serb Sarajevo, Vojislav Maksimovic, said in an undisguised attack on Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic who negotiated the peace agreement on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs.

"The road (on which Praca lies) is a vital communication link for all the people of the region," Maksimovic said in comments relayed by Radio Pale Tuesday.

The Bosnian Serbs have accused Milosevic of everything from self-interest to treason for securing a deal which their leader, Radovan Karadzic, has described as "disastrous."

Tuzla Expects Troops To Stimulate Economy

AU2012092995 Sarajevo DNEVNI AVAZ in Serbo-Croatian 10 Dec 95 p 4

[Commentary by Samir Kahrovic: "A Ticket to Disneyland"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "NATO fever" in Tuzla is gaining in strength. In the offices and lobbies of Tuzla's municipal authorities two words are most frequently used: instantly and urgently. There is so much work that "it hurts," there is little time, and "we have only just emerged from war."

Of course, the Americans are "guilty" for everything.

With the elements of the military force that will accompany this part of the IFOR [Implementation Force] tasked with implementing the peace agreement, a kind of spectacle is also coming. It is already known that the Americans will be bringing several thousand

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"tickets" to Disneyland, in the first place for those locals who have a better knowledge of English.

The entrance to the "fairy tale world," which will last for at least a year, will principally be for those who live nearest to the location planned to be the center of events: Dubrave Airport. To have a house there and one "with the view of the runway" is exceptionally prestigious, and is already worth up to 10,000 German marks [DM]. The inevitable purveyor of all spectacles, CNN, is already here, waiting. It is being followed by everybody else who counts in the media world.

Thus, Tuzla's "tourist season" has already started, in the middle of the winter. However, its "capacities" are far from satisfactory. The war has left a lot of scars and, besides, it was never "planned" that, all of a sudden, such a large number of "guests" and so much "capital" would come. Some calculations speak of DM1 million per day.

Colleagues from the foreign media, in their reports, are trying to paint a picture of people being "intoxicated" with the arrival of the Americans, with their appetites growing at the sight of so many dollars or German marks.

Of course, to use simple mathematics, the expectations are far from insignificant. "IFOR's bread and butter" will be directly feeding around 4,000 translators, times four, that makes around 16,000 with a "ticket" to Disneyland. And indirectly, around 1,000 shops in Tuzla alone will be doing better business.

Once the repair of the local infrastructure starts, together with the U.S. engineering units, local companies are also expected to appear. These "calculations" are of course by no means final, because there will be work for many more people, but it is also certain that not everybody will be able to join in the "American game." The remaining, more numerous, part of the population is longing for a rapid implementation of the Dayton agreement, the IMF, the final implementation of the Federation, and government guarantees for foreign capital, with whose help we hope that the domestic economy can start functioning again. They are also waiting for their pensions and for their salaries to become somewhat more generous. And they are looking forward to job prospects most of all.

The first "feeling of the pulse" of the domestic economy by various international experts will doubtless show that money will only be there for those who have chances of success on the market, which means kissing goodbye to many jobs.

A solution will most probably be sought in a new economic model and the international experts are saying that the dominant model in the new Bosnia-Herzegovina will be the concept of small and medium-scale enterprises. People dream of their own, quiet little business after turbulent times.

UK's SAS Expected To 'Stop' Muslim Units

AU1912180695 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 15 Dec 95 p 52

[Report by Sarajevo Correspondent Zdravko Latal: "British Special Troops Expected To Stop Mujahidins"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 14 December — It is probably not a coincidence that the U.S. congressmen who visited Sarajevo prior to the signing of the Dayton peace accord in Paris demanded assurances from President Alija Izetbegovic that all foreigners who are currently fighting in the Bosnian Army will leave Bosnia-Herzegovina within a month after the signing of the agreement. Izetbegovic promised this; however, the U.S. congressmen repeated the demand over and over again. By foreigners, the Americans as well as the representatives of Great Britain and France — thus the countries that will contribute the most soldiers to IFOR [Implementation Force] troops — meant mujahidin. The Western sources claim that there are about 2,000 mujahidin in Bosnia who are active as a part of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 3d Corps with its headquarters in Zenica.

The El Mujahid unit, which means "a warrior on the path of Allah," is active within the 7th Muslim Brigade of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 3d Corps. It is rumored to be one of the best armed and most elite units of the Bosnian Army. [passage omitted]

According to the Bosnian papers, the El Mujahid numbers about 300 soldiers. There were 130 more a month ago, but some of them have already left Bosnia. Thirty-five soldiers from Saudi Arabia, 21 soldiers from Jemen, and 12 soldiers from France, who were Muslims with French citizenship, have already departed from Bosnia-Herzegovina. The most numerous foreigners in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army are the Pakistanis, the Afghanis, and the Iranians; however, there are also men from other, primarily Islamic countries, but also from western Europe, for example the Netherlands and Germany. The Europeans are fighting in various units, although there are none in El Mujahid. The motives of the foreigners who came to Bosnia vary, but they are allegedly definitely not fighting for money. [passage omitted]

Fifty NATO transport aircraft have landed at Tuzla airport so far. With them arrived 100 members of the British Army special brigade for combating terrorism

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(SAS) [Special Air Service] and experts for communications, that is, bugging. The members of this unit are forbidden to communicate with the media, and their mission is a secret for the time being. As we have learned from well-informed sources, however, their task is to stop the mujahidin who might threaten the Americans. On the other hand, one can also hear that the SAS members will undertake the task of hunting down war criminals.

Departure of Volunteer Islamic Fighters Viewed

AU2012090795 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian 13 Dec 95 p 7

[Commentary by Sasa Rukavina: "Allah Is Calling Them to Another Place"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At one of the meetings with the people from the "El Mudzihidin" [name as published] squad of the 3d Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, we asked them what would happen when the war in Bosnia was over and there was no longer any need for the "protection of weak Muslims." Because the task "given to them" by Allah was, as they claimed, to help the weak "anywhere in the world." They told us that "there are weak Muslims all over the world," and mentioned Chechnya, Somalia, Indone .... They mentioned that already then a number of their brothers had left Bosnia to go to Chechnya, and that once there was no longer a need to help their Bosnian brothers, they would leave.

That was at the beginning of this year, in the time of the preparations for the continuation of the war, during some of the countless cease-fires, when in Bosnia-Herzegovina peace was only a subject matter of stories that started with "what would happen if...." Some 10 months later, everything looks much brighter, and according to the recently published data of the Croatian Embassy in Sarajevo, the people from this squad also believe in that bright future. Simply, they are leaving. Where to? That is of no importance for this story. They have their task, and their God will judge their work....

As for earthly things, they are lately being judged hard by people — mostly the people from opposing sides, both on the occupied territories and in the world. The latter see this squad as the main danger for their soldiers who are coming with the IFOR [Implementation Force], and the former use them for their media, in their propagandistic attempts. If the fears of the world and the manipulations of the occupiers are understandable, it is puzzling why those who were really very much helped by the "El Mudzahidin" are silent now. Because if these people fought for their place in heaven, they have at least deserved to be mentioned in this life for the things they have done here.

The more stable the peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina becomes, the more of those soldiers will leave Bosnia: foreign soldiers, but also young Bosnians who have chosen Allah's way. What is left behind them are the graves of their brothers throughout the country, what is left is a number of hills and summits they have liberated, what is left are at least the rules of the code according to which they fought. Those rules are perhaps somewhat archaic and hard to understand for Europeans, but they are soldiers' rules. What is left are also some unclarified "details," like the murder of one of them near Donji Vakuf.

And perhaps that is one of the ways to thank those people in this world. Perhaps it should (finally?) publicly be said why the British soldiers from UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] literally massacred that man. Just like it should publicly be said what is the law, human or divine, according to which the people from the "El Mudzahidin" squad tried to impose some regulations, strange and unclear, on this land. Because they will leave, and the soldiers of the IFOR have no reason to fear. As for the manipulators from the occupied territories, for them that is not important anyway: For them we are all "El Mudzahidin." What is left behind them are we, the people whom they used to help.

Perhaps it is really time to admit to ourselves that after them some things will not be the same!

Speaker Wants Assembly as Highest Authority

AU1912172995 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 19 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Miro Lazovic, president of the Republican Assembly, told the B-H PRESS news agency that all the conditions have been created for the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly to be reinstated as the highest institution in the country that will pass the most important decisions.

According to him, the assembly has already taken back some of its incumbencies from the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina that it had bestowed upon the Presidency as a result of the state of war and the lack of possibilities for regular sessions. These incumbencies have actually never been transferred to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency with a decree. Article 309 of the statue on the assembly's functioning allows that, on occasions when it is not possible to call the assembly, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency would be authorized to pass some of the legal decisions in its purview, Lazovic said.

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Lazovic also commented on the stand of the ministers of Croat ethnicity not to support the proposed laws about amendments to the law on the Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and other republican authorities, which the government forwarded to the assembly to be passed. He emphasized that such things must, above all, be resolved within the government. If this is not possible, then it is logical than such a hot chestnut should be thrown into the hands of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly, which is the only competent authority to deal with it, Lazovic said. The speaker of the Republican Assembly is of the opinion that we should not be afraid of this stalling the work of the assembly and the government, and consequently extending the deadlines set by the peace agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, the first man of the Republican Assembly could not remove the impression that this is again a reflection of differing political wishes and approaches regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina's future constitution.

MBO on Future Tasks; Announces Leader's Return

AU1512184095 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 15 Dec 95

[Report by Velida Kulenovic]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Main Committee of the Muslim Bosniak Organization [MBO] today held a news conference in Zenica. The journalists were addressed by Muris Dizdarevic, president of the party's regional committee; Ahmet Hodzic, member of the MBO's Main Committee; and Fuad Tabak, head of the party's municipal committee. Velida Kulenovic has the details:

[Kulenovic] The MBO has accomplished one of its main aims: The real historical national name of Bosniaks has been reinstated. The next task is to strengthen the sovereignty of the Bosniak people and stop the violence against people, culture, tradition, and history. The party is in favor of strengthening the rule of law, democracy, and wants able and qualified people loyal to unified Bosnia-Herzegovina to be appointed to responsible posts. This was stated among other things in the statement issued for the public at the news conference.

The armed forces of our country are the guarantor of the integrity and independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina and, in addition to paying tribute to the army, we want it to develop further, have modern weapons, and be independent from political parties in order to increase its combat strength.

The MBO also demands consistent respect for human rights and freedoms, and above all the creation of conditions for the survival of those in need.

The Main Committee today condemns the manipulation of the Serb population in the temporarily occupied territories, as well as the pressure exerted on them to leave these areas. In that sense the MBO wants to see the media's greater involvement so that the Serb population realizes that they will enjoy all the rights and freedoms in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina as do the Bosniaks and Croats.

Ahmet Hodzic, member of the Main Committee, congratulated the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the peace, which is not just, but offers a chance to carry out the reintegration of the country in peace. Hodzic said that the MBO's view is that the main task is to create the conditions for the safe return of refugees to their homes, and to have the correct [pravilan] disposition of NATO forces.

Dissatisfaction has also been expressed with the silent agreement by the international community and the United States that has enabled the presidents of the neighboring countries to divide the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, despite the fact that it had been recognized by the international community as a unitary state.

Asked when Adil Zulfikarpasic, president of the party, will return to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the party representatives said that this would happen soon. They also said that the Main Committee will hold a meeting in Zenica.

Silajdzic: Croats Hindering State Revitalization

AU1812194495 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 18 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Prompted by the statement issued by the ministers and deputy ministers of Croatian nationality in the Government of the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which claimed that essential laws for the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina were passed through outvoting [preglasavanje], Republican and Federal Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic told B-H PRESS:

Debates of this sort belong in the Government of the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Assembly and Constituent Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina. If things continue at this pace, it is debatable whether the laws that form the essential framework for the functioning of the complex state of Bosnia-Herzegovina will be passed by 20 December. This has been envisaged by the Dayton Agreement on the revitalization of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and constitutional provisions in the Bosnia-Herzegovina peace agreement signed in Paris on 14 December.

If the ministers of Croatian nationality fail to approve the draft laws by 20 December of this year, when both

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assemblies are expected to adopt them, it is likely that the Croatian deputies in the Constituent Assembly will refuse to vote on the proposed draft laws. In that case, a vacuum will ensue that will hinder the implementation of provisions on the revitalization of the Federation.

Corps Commander: Zepa Could Have Been Defended

AU2012105095 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 14-21 Dec 95 p 13

[Interview with Brigadier Sead Delic, commander of the 2d Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Sefko Hodzic; place and date not given: "Commander Is a Guide, Not a Cattle Driver"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The fighters of Posavina, Brcko, Doboj, and Podrinje will certainly return to their homes. They will return by hook, that is, by the implementation of the Dayton agreement, and if that fails, then by crook, with guns in their hands. There is no force that can stop them. Those are the words of Brigadier Sead Delic, commander of the 2d Corps of our Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. He uttered them in a militarily categorical way at the beginning of our interview, which has lasted for more than three hours "in two turns." Even after Dayton, I was told similar things by the fighters of the Second Corps whose homes remained "over there." True, by taking a great risk, Sead Delic can even now come to his burned home in Gorazde, where he was born in 1954. But there is nobody to welcome him, because the Chetniks burned his father Edhem and his mother Raza. They do not even have their gravestones.

Otherwise, in the former JNA [Yugoslav Peoples' Army] Sead Delic graduated from the Ground Forces Military Academy, as well as from the Ground Forces Command Staff School, and a number of additional courses. He joined the defenders of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Tuzla early in April 1992, a couple of days before Sadic and Knez. By chance, he checked in at the Tuzla Municipal Headquarters of the Territorial Defense, and Knez and Sadic checked in at the District Headquarters. The District Headquarters has later provided the commanders of the 2d Corps, the Municipal Headquarters the commander of Operation Group 5.

Chetniks Heal Their Wounds

Otherwise, Sead Delic rarely appears in public. Recently, during the course of that brilliant operation on Mt. Ozren, he refused to be photographed, while he was literally giving orders from the first line. His motto in this war is, he says, that a commander "must be a guide, not a cattle driver." Delic is satisfied with the situation on the front lines. The Chetniks have been respecting the Dayton agreement much more than in the previous twenty-six, twenty- seven "peaces and truces."

[Hodzic] Why are the Chetniks more peaceful now?

[Delic] It is simply because they have recently suffered heavy losses both in the 2d Corps area of responsibility and throughout the country. They favor this peace much more than we do. And now they are pulling themselves together, healing their wounds.

[Hodzic] And what are the soldiers and officers of the 2d Corps doing now?

[Delic] Our soldiers and officers, as well as all the levels of command are training and making themselves qualified for a possible continuation of offensive combat activities. So, if the Dayton agreement is not implemented, we are ready, if ordered by the General Staff, to continue the liberation of the whole occupied territory in the 2d Corps area of responsibility. That means that this peace cannot trick us. Otherwise, my motto is — the more sweat in the time of truce and peace, the less blood in the offensive combat activities.

[Hodzic] You often point out offensive combat activities. Why?

[Delic] Simply, we entered the phase of offensive combat activities, that is, the phase of liberation of the occupied parts of our country. Unfortunately, the Dayton agreement stopped us. It is a pity, for if the world had allowed us to continue our activities, and even armed us, we could have liberated the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina and established a rule of peace, democracy, freedom, and justice for at least another hundred years. It is a pity they did not allow as to do that. I have had a presentiment that the superpowers would stop the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the moment we had liberated 51 percent of the territory. They did that. In fact, they have helped the Chetniks.

[Hodzic] And had they not helped them, where would the fighters of the 2d Corps have been today?

[Delic] I think that we would have been, at least, facing Doboj, or even in Doboj.

[Hodzic] And when would the war story about the Chetniks be over?

[Delic] I think that we would have the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina liberated by the summer next year. The Chetniks were, simply, on their knees.

Turning Point of the War

[Hodzic] Are you satisfied with what the 2d Corps, since you have been its commander, has done for the defense and liberation of our country?

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[Delic] You see, in my opinion, the 2d Corps has done a lot, both in the defense and in the liberation of the country. We have constantly been under attack of three Chetnik army corps, and throughout this period only one company of "Black Swans" has come as reinforcement. Meanwhile, the fighters of our corps have participated in combat all over our country. First, our success lies in the fact that we have preserved, that is, defended the largest part of the free territory of our country, and the Chetniks, only this year, have launched six, seven offensives. We have not allowed the Chetniks to widen their corridor, so that it has remained their "sword of Damocles" at their neck. We have defended the Teoka ["teocanski" — as published] pocket, Gradacac... Only this year we have liberated about 300 square kilometers of occupied territory. And here, because of the concentration of the Chetnik forces and equipment, and the persistence of their defense, it is harder to liberate one kilometer, than one hundred kilometers in some other place.

Do not forget, by the victories in Mt. Ozren and the liberation of Vozuca, and by linking up with the 3d Corps, we were the first to inflict heavy losses to the Chetniks, we destroyed several elite units and thus, practically, created a turning point in this war. Later on, there were those brilliant victories of the 5th and 7th Corps, as well as the others.

[Hodzic] All right, is there any place where it has been, in your opinion, more difficult to defend and liberate our country?

[Delic] There is! It is Sarajevo. In my opinion, it was more difficult to liberate one square kilometer there than here couple of dozens of square kilometers elsewhere.

[Hodzic] The public raises a question: Could the 2d Corps really have helped Srebrenica and Zepa?

[Delic] The 2d Corps has had no chance at all to help Srebrenica and Zepa for a simple reason that the shortest air distance between our first lines over here and those of Srebrenica was 30, 40 kilometers. On the ground, it is around 80 kilometers. So, we have had no artillery pieces to give them any support, let alone any other kind of cooperation. When the fighters from Srebrenica and Zepa moved toward the free territory, we helped them by breaking through the Chetnik lines from our side. I will also say here that, four, five months before the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa, at one of the meetings of the General Staff and the commanders of all the army corps, at which President Izetbegovic was also present, I suggested that Srebrenica and Zepa should be under direct command of the General Staff, because only the General Staff only was capable to help them in the way it actually did.

[Hodzic] Has there ever been any consideration of breaking the blockade of Srebrenica and Zepa — by fighting?

[Delic] Yes. There were plans to try to break militarily the blockade of Srebrenica and Zepa. It was at the very same meeting when the decision was made to start breaking the siege of Sarajevo this year. So, there was a dilemma whether to go toward Srebrenica and Zepa, or toward Sarajevo. The decision was made to try to break the siege of Sarajevo. The reasons for such a decision were that Srebrenica and Zepa were protected areas, and Sarajevo had a strategic significance for our country, and the breaking of its siege was a priority.

[Hodzic] Do you feel personally responsible for the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa?

[Delic] Look, all of us from the region of the Drina River basin, in a certain way, feel responsibility for the fall of not only Srebrenica and Zepa but also of all other towns that have fallen in the Podrinje [Drina River basin] region. Meanwhile, I repeat — the 2d Corps alone really could not help militarily in Srebrenica and Zepa. I am talking about the period since I have been the commander of the Corps. However, I want to say something. Srebrenica has fallen on the psychological field. The Chetniks had a long time ago opened a corridor for the inhabitants of Srebrenica to leave the town, and they had been leaving it. It even happened that the Chetniks waved at those fugitives from a distance of 20, 30 meters. It was easy to get out of Srebrenica, but nobody was able to get into it. As early as last year, there were plans for the evacuation of Srebrenica and Zepa. I think we can also talk of betrayal.

[Hodzic] Can you tell us precisely who is responsible for the betrayal?

[Delic] I cannot, for the time being — until the authorized bodies finish their investigation.

[Hodzic] But, some people think that Srebrenica and Zepa would not have fallen if Naser Oric and those officers who were withdrawn for schooling had stayed?

[Delic] The same would have happened. But, I make a difference between Srebrenica and Zepa. Srebrenica was the first to fall, although it could have been defended militarily, perhaps for another 15, 20 days. Had Srebrenica been defended, Zepa would certainly not have fallen.

Commanding Personnel

[Hodzic] You have been reproached for having removed from the command of the Corps a couple of Croats who had been holding significant positions. For instance, your deputy Andjelko Makar?

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[Delic] First, it is absolutely out of question that I removed Andjelko Makar, deputy corps commander. Simply, the positions of deputy corps commanders have been revoked, so that Makar has gone to a new duty in the Administration for Education. Makar even stayed a long time in the position of my deputy after the decision on the revocation of those positions in our army had been made. Second, it is true that earlier, particularly when Zeljko Knez was the corps commander, there were many Croats in commanding positions. The commander was a Croat, the chief of staff was a Croat, the deputy security officer was a Croat, the personnel officer was a Croat. A half of the command were Croats. And in the units, at the time when those two HVO [Croatian Defense Council] brigades were within the corps, there were not more than 7, 8 percent Croats. There are 1 to 2 percent Croats now. It is understandable that over time the national structure of the commanding personnel has balanced out in line with the national structure of the units. That ratio is harmonized in percentages today.

[Hodzic] One more question: why don't you drink coffee with Selim Beslagic?

[Delic] The first reason is because I have quit drinking coffee. However, I know that you are alluding to something else. Really, Beslagic earlier used to have his coffee with the commanders of the 2d Corps. He did not have coffee with me even then, although I was the commander of the operation group. Mr. Beslagic was, obviously, along with his coffee, informed about all the things that were interesting and important from the military point of view. Meanwhile, I think that civilian structures should know about the Army only as much as is necessary for them to fulfill their obligations toward our Army. That is the second reason that we do not have our coffee together. Otherwise, I appreciate Mr. Beslagic's contribution to the defense of Tuzla, and the wider region.

[Hodzic] So, it is not the "third reason" — that General Sadic favors Beslagic and his Social Democrats, and you favor the SDA [Party of Democratic Action]?

[Delic] I do not "favor" the Party of Democratic Action, I am a member of it. And I am a member for many reasons. The main reason is that this party has organized the people to defend the country. But this is a democratic country, so I respect all of them who fight for the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We do not all have to be in the same party, or have the same views.

'Minimal' Sarajevo Natural Gas Supply To Increase

AU1912122195 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 19 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Minimal amounts of natural gas are entering Sarajevo, so the system is operating under extremely poor technical conditions. These minimal amounts of gas are not even close to satisfying the level of consumption in the parts of the city where it is being directed. Because of this, most of the consumers in the Centar and Stari Grad districts are without gas.

This afternoon, these minimal amounts of gas will be directed to the Novi Grad and Novo Sarajevo districts, but will only be enough to met the needs of a limited number of consumers.

However, during the day larger amounts of natural gas should be arriving in Sarajevo. Saudi Arabia has donated funds for this, Sarajevo Mayor Tarik Kupusovic said today at the Sarajevo Executive Council session. As Mayor Kupusovic said, yesterday additional consultations were carried out with the Russian partners, and today a letter of credit will be determined. According to Mayor Kupusovic, the arrival of additional amounts of natural gas will not guarantee the cancellation of the distribution regime of this energy supplier.

The Sarajevo Electricity Distribution Company has issued a statement that enormous overconsumption of electricity was recorded yesterday. Priority consumers are reminded that it is their duty to continue to comply with the previously approved consumption levels, or else they will be cut off from the network. As for households, they are still entitled to 6 kilowatts of electricity per day.

Owing to the concentration of consumers in the Stari Grad and Centar districts and the technical conditions that are less favorable than those in Novi Grad and Novo Sarajevo, consumers in these two districts are asked to limit their consumption, particularly in the morning.

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Commentary: Serbia Obstructing Mutual Recognition

AU2012093095 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 16 Dec 95 p 4

[Commentary by Branko Tudjen: "Belgrade Is Still in a Hurry"]

[FBIS Translated Text] I learned on the flight between Zagreb and Paris on Wednesday [13 December] that there would be no mutual recognition between Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro. Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg said this on his return from his farewell visit to President Tudjman. The previous day he had visited Milosevic in Belgrade. The Norwegian diplomat said very carefully that Prevlaka was the problem.

All my dark forebodings came true then. Since Dayton, the Serbian media had not mentioned mutual recognition at all. There were things about normalization, but only that the Pancevo oil pipeline, communications, and border crossings should be reopened and trade encouraged. The leitmotif was constantly Prevlaka and succession. This was exactly the opposite of how Croatia was interpreting it: mutual recognition within internationally recognized borders first, and then talks about a possible exchange of territories. And even if these talks had been successful, the mere signature of the Croatian negotiators would not have been enough.

Why did events in Paris unfold (or become complicated) as they did, and what will be the consequences for both sides?

The Serbs have allegedly told the Croats that the signature on "such a formal document" is insignificant. They claim that it is important to normalize relations and this "formality would come about anyway." I would say that this is the way the Serbs handle things. Their intention to cheat the Croats has remained constant in their policy.

It could be concluded from what Milosevic said, however, that the reason mutual recognition did not come about was far from formal. Serbia's recognition of Croatia would certainly have made the Montenegrins angry, since they are very much interested in Prevlaka. They have been especially upset by the discussion in the Croatian Assembly and by the atmosphere among part of the Croatian population, who refuse to entertain any idea of exchanging territories even after recognition. "What if we recognized Croatia, and the Croats gave up any talks?" is probably the logic in Podgorica.

It seems to me that Belgrade has still not given up on parts of Croatian territory, either in the south or in the east. They still hope that they can squeeze out something during long and unpleasant negotiations and pressures. They probably think that with the mutual recognition of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" and Bosnia-Herzegovina they have obtained a certain legitimacy in the world as a serious and tolerant partner, ready to make compromises. And at the same time they want to tell everybody that the Croats do not have all of these qualities and want to gain a tactical and psychological advantage from this.

"We have ridded ourselves of the sanctions and the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina; now we have time." This is what "leaked out" from Milosevic's staff of politicians and journalists accommodated at the Paris "Crillon" hotel.

It might seem that this is what the situation is like, but when things are turned around, Croatia is the one that is in a lesser hurry. Washington is certainly not happy that the key factors for peace have not completely normalized relations. The so-called Yugoslavia has to find its way onto international institutions, just as Croatia did. Although Croatia will, because of the lack of mutual recognition, remain "outside in the corridor," Serbia will remain in the freezer. A note for the Croatian population: Not even after the Paris agreement has peace come to Croatian territory.

Options for E. Slavonia Reintegration Considered

AU2012093695 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 17 Dec 95 p 3

[Mate Piskor article: "Patience — But Not For Long"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Has the peaceful reintegration of the remaining occupied parts of Croatia come closer, or is it further away after the peace agreement was signed in Paris? We have to ask ourselves this question, because the mutual recognition between Croatia and the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" was not achieved — although it had been announced and agreed upon — which in the opinion of many people means that Milosevic has not given up territorial aspirations towards Croatian territory yet, or that he is trying to get additional concessions. This question is even more present, because the implementation of the Erdut-Zagreb agreement — which is anyway imprecise and incomplete — is being extremely postponed by the UN institutions.

What do these facts mean? Is this yet another attempt to evade what was agreed upon, or are certain international circles participating in a new effort to reward the aggressor — the Serbs and Serbia? Answering these questions, and speaking about peaceful reintegration in the light of the lack of mutual recognition, the Croatian President Mr. Franjo Tudjman has pointed out that all this need not have a negative effect on the peaceful

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reintegration of the Croatian Podunavlje [Danube region] into the Croatian legal and constitutional system. First of all because Croatia has firm international guarantees, and since the Serbian side too is interested in the implementation of the Erdut-Zagreb agreement.

What Was Agreed Upon in Dayton?

Commenting on the UN secretary general's proposal and on his model for the implementation of the Erdut agreement, Mr. Tudjman has pointed out that Ghali's proposal for the solution to the problem of the Croatian east cannot be accepted, as it is not aimed at the implementation of the agreement. The U.S. Administration has expressed the same attitude about Ghali's proposal; Mrs. Albright, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, expressed a sharp warning, and the U.S. President firmly promised the Croatian president in Paris that the United States of America would do everything in order that the UN Security Council pass the decisions in accordance with the Dayton solutions to that problem.

What was agreed on in Dayton regarding the implementation of the Erdut-Zagreb agreement? It was first of all agreed that it was not questionable that the occupied parts of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem belonged to Croatia, that the process of the peaceful reintegration had to be completed within a year, that demilitarization and disarmament of Serbian paramilitary troops as well as the withdrawal of Serbian troops from Croatia had to be completed within a month, that a temporary military and civilian administration under the U.S. leadership had to be appointed, that disarmament and demilitarization should be carried out by the existing or slightly strengthened units of the former UNCRO [UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia], that Croatian state and economic institutions and refugees should be enabled to enter the area immediately, and that reconstruction should start.

Croatia has already had consultations with the Russian and Belgian Governments — since their units are in eastern Slavonia now — and they expressed their readiness to carry out the stipulations of the agreement. They should have an easy task, as Serbia, too — according to what they claim — agrees with the implementation of the agreement. It is possible that these military forces are strengthened by the UN Protection Force Nordic Battalion stationed in Tuzla, which would be quite enough for the implementation of the agreement within the set time limits. This is what it was agreed upon, this is what should happen, but there are still problems. Where?

There Are Problems at the UN Main Office

There are problems at the UN Main Office, as it requires that 11,500 well armed soldiers be sent to the small area of eastern Slavonia with strong air support. Why is Butrus-Ghali doing this, why is he requiring that these units act according to Article 7 of the UN Charter, although according to the information from Dayton a "soft," peaceful reintegration was agreed upon, so that around 4,000 soldiers would be enough, according to the Article 6 of the Charter? Butrus-Ghali is either afraid of another failure in Croatia, so that he is extremely careful, or he has some additional information, which points to a possible Serbian evasion of the agreement. Therefore he wants to send a respectable military force to eastern Slavonia, whose primary task would not be to disarm the Serbs and force them to respect the agreement but to prevent Croatia from a military implementation of reintegration, which — according to the agreement — Croatia is entitled to if peaceful reintegration fails within the set time limits.

And it seems that the problem lies in the time limits. For Croatia and its refugees all this is developing too slowly, and for the Serbs and the slow UN administration it is going to quickly. Croatian refugees want to go home, Christmas is approaching, and Vukovar is still far away, although it was promised that it would be free by the Christmas time. The implementation of the Erdut agreement should finally avert the war from the Croatian territory, and for the sake of peace the Croats will wait for the beginning of its implementation and the return to their homes for some time. But not for too long. If necessary, there will a "storm in the Danube region," but no one will be entitled to "switch on the red light." Because these are Croatian regions.

Commentary Views Tudjman Strategy for Zagreb

AU1912134495 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 12 Dec 95 p 20-21

[Commentary by Davor Gjenero: "'The Zagreb Case': Franjo Tudjman's Anti-Parliamentarianism"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A case study of some unique political event will often tell us much more about the nature of a political system than an analysis of the institutions of that system. One case, which started recently and is still going on in Zagreb, is probably the best at revealing the character of the current Croatian political authorities and the domineering political mentality of a man who considers himself the representative of Croatia's sovereignty.

The ruling party in Croatia lost the electoral confidence of the capital's citizens, even though it had scheduled local elections in Zagreb only because it was counting on strong support from the electorate, so as to be able to compensate for the loss of authority in the municipalities of Zagreb's surroundings. The results

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of these elections, which resulted from a bad political decision, however, are not "holy writ" for Tudjman and his authority. Tudjman's first reaction to the possibility of himself and his party losing immediate control of the executive power was the announcement that the creation of an "oppositional situation" in the capital could not be tolerated, because it was disproportional to the Croatian political system, particularly at the time of "the end of the war," when, according to Tudjman, the "stability" of his power is particularly important for Croatia's international position.

The first surprise for the political public was that Dr. Franjo Greguric, who with the political authority acquired as prime minister in the government of national unity, as late as 1994 was one of the rare HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] members who persisted in holding a dialogue with the opposition and was looking for a "formula of reconciliation," appeared in public with the really ridiculous arguments that the HDZ was entitled to choose the mayor of Zagreb, because the HDZ had a majority at state level and because Croatian "sovereignty" "lives and works" in Zagreb. If we look at the results of the elections in October, we will understand why Dr. Greguric had to agree with his party's nomination of himself for a seat in the Varazdin constituency's assembly, where he became engaged in a battle against a popular local HSS [Croatian Peasants' Party] leader, a battle that was lost in advance. Based on the Zagreb and Dugo Selo cases, anybody can easily see how this battle was won. After a politician conducts elections in the way Dr. Greguric did, all his political authority becomes worthless for his party.

"Do As Ordered"

With skillful electoral engineering, the HDZ election staff definitely destroyed two of their top quality people, Dr. Greguric and Dr. Granic, who cannot expect any respect after his "victory" in Dubrovnik. The other two "winners" of the same character, Branko Miksa and Ivica Gazi, have never enjoyed any credibility in any case, either within the party or among the public, and Tudjman's personnel managers said a lot about how much they cared about the parliament when they elected Jadranka Kosor, the person with "the most suspicious" mandate, Miksa's deputy, as a deputy chairman of parliament.

When the opposition formed the new City Assembly, Administration Minister Davorin Mlakar prepared a procedural trap, which only at first sight seems worthy of Dr. Smiljko Sokol, that excellent technician in preserving Tudjman's absolute authority, with a request for a two-thirds majority of the deputies present, according to City Assembly procedural rules that expired a long time ago. Then Tudjman ordered that in every possible way the legality of the thus constituted representative body was to be challenged. From the statement of Dr. Zdravko Tomac, the newly elected chairman of the Assembly, it is easy to deduce that the HDZ's boycott of the Assembly results from the will of Franjo Tudjman, because, as Tomac says, an agreement on the distribution of official positions in the Assembly had been reached the day before with some formally not at all unimportant people from the HDZ. However, Tudjman did not want to surrender executive power to the opposition coalition and his party and state "aparatchiks" were simply tasked with fulfilling their president's will.

The process of making the decision declaring that the City Assembly formed by the opposition is not legitimate tells us most about the balance of power in the Croatian political system. Tudjman's opinion was, first of all, adopted by the party presidency as its own opinion. In a centralized party such as the HDZ, that is enough, so one can now expect nothing more than the unequivocal implementation of this party view from all the HDZ members from different levels of state decision-making. The next instance of discussions on the complication in Zagreb occurred at the Council of Defense and National Security. This newly constituted Council of Defense and National Security, unlike previous versions of this body, exclusively comprises members of the executive. It is, in fact, a narrower government cabinet, reinforced by representatives from the ruling party's leadership, the President's Office, and the commander of the army. As the president's advisory body, it should deal with questions of protecting the constitutional order and the functioning of the state. This body's discussion on the situation in Zagreb clearly shows that, for Tudjman, the fact that HDZ lost power in the capital is nothing but a conspiracy against the foundations of the state establishment.

In such a context, the party's policy on the illegitimacy of the new city authorities is confirmed as that of most influential "coordinating body" of the executive power in the country, and the position that conditions should be provided for the old city authorities, that is, that the Assembly (whose mandate in every logical sense expired with the election of the new one) and the municipal authorities should continue to function, is nothing more than an instruction to the formal representatives of the executive — Matesa's cabinet — to "do as ordered."

Understanding Parliamentarianism As Bad Theater

The next day, the government made a decision that was the result of this attitude of the Council of Defense. Of course, the opposition had already announced that

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it would request the protection of its legality from the Constitutional Court. Tudjman's concept of real power in the country had probably already conceived of a new answer to that. Apart from the Council of Defense and National Security, which comprises only the leadership of the executive, Tudjman has formed yet another "coordinating body." This is the Presidential Council, which bridges the tripartite division of power, which is unacceptable to Tudjman's mentality. The division of power into three autonomous spheres, the executive, legislative, and judicial, in addition to which it goes without saying that civic society and finance are entitled to their own autonomy, is the basis of the functioning of any parliamentary democracy. Tudjman's aversion to the principles of parliamentarianism does not follow from, for instance, the school of philosophy of Karl Schmidt, but is a product of the genuine ignorance of an ungraduated pupil at a commercial academy, who acquired his little social and scientific knowledge letter by letter from Bolshevik primers.

Vlado Dabcevic, one of the funniest phenomena of the Montenegrin and Yugoslav Bolshevik movement, allegedly said of Tudjman that "Comrade Tudjman is an honorable man and a true communist, who is just creatively applying the teachings of Marxism and Leninism in the given circumstances." Gathering the representatives of the legislature, executive, and judiciary, as well as the governor of the National Bank, who is supposed to be independent in creating monetary policy, precisely corresponds to the Bolshevik conception of parliamentarianism as bad theater, whose inability to function leads to its replacement with operative coordinating bodies, which improve the effects of "democratic centralism."

That Drazen Budisa and Stjepan Radic refused to serve on the Presidential Council, after Tudjman had shown that he would do everything to obstruct the opposition in creating a normal (electorally legitimate) situation in Croatia's capital, exclusively as their personal protest, without questioning the character of this "coordinating body," tells us much about the quality of the social imagination of the leading Croatian opposition leaders.

The president of the Constitutional Court is a member of the Presidential Council, so when the opposition's complaint about the government and request for the protection of the legality of the constitution of the new City Assembly arrives before the Constitutional Court, one may expect that the case will also be discussed by the Presidential Council and that the same view as that of the HDZ Presidency and of the Council of Defense and National Security will be taken, and after that the Constitutional Court can do nothing but judge as Tudjman wants. It is true that Jadranko Crnic, the president of the court, is a serious lawyer who has proven in several cases hitherto that his ethics as an expert and his civic pride are not unimportant to him and hardly anybody could raise a procedural question about his term as president of the Constitutional Court for the next four years. The question is, however, whether he and his colleagues at the Constitutional Court will judge that it is the right time for an open conflict with the president and the system of authority organized by him, and the right time to protect the Constitution and the autonomy of the judicial authorities. The most serious challenge to Crnic and his colleagues may have been sent by the moderate Dr. Tomac, who has announced that the opposition will respect any decision of the Constitutional Court, whatever it might be. After all, a responsible politician should not be talking otherwise if he intends to continue to participate in the parliamentary order of a country, so as to limit the reach of the authority organized in that way.

So, not only does the Zagreb case tell us that Tudjman and his HDZ are really not prepared for any democratic principles in the division of power, let alone to surrender authority in the case of an election defeat, but also the decisionmaking process shows how the Croatian political system really functions, on principles essentially different from those defined by the Constitution.

Military Success of Operation 'Flash' Praised

96BA0031A Zagreb VELEBIT in Serbo-Croatian 26 May 95 p 15

[Article by Dario Barbalic: "The Splendor of Croatian Armed Forces"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Various articles have been written in our own and the foreign press about what was demonstrated by Operation "Flash," which was carried out by Croatian armed forces in the liberation of western Slavonia. When we read the comments published in various military and other foreign journals, we quickly learn what conclusions are being drawn concerning the limited action of the Croatian Armed Forces, and that is that no one expected such rapid and effective action from forces that had experienced only five years of growth and development, from volunteer detachments to a respectable armed force similar in all respects to Israeli and American units. It is now obvious that in terms of the objective achieved, the relatively low number of casualties, and the speed of execution, it was carried out better than any other offensive operation of the Croatian Armed Forces in the Homeland War. Almost symbolically, it occurred exactly four years after the slaughter of the Croatian Police in the action at Borovo Selo, which at that time made it clear to everyone that

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the situation in Croatia could not be resolved merely by a limited action of police forces, but that outright war with the former JA [Yugoslav Army] and Serbia was inevitable.

On Statehood Day four years ago, the review of the National Guard Corps made it clear to anyone with a good familiarity of military affairs that, aside from the will and the heart of its soldiers, Croatia had little with which to oppose violence. But those armed forces, which were created within and from the police and grew up from the large number of volunteers, managed to perform the fundamental task of preserving most of Croatia and, with the strength of its resistance, compelling the world to recognize the Croatian state. That move was a political, moral, and military gain for Croatia. From the political standpoint, the position of its negotiators that negotiation could not go on forever, and that Croatia had the military operation in reserve, merely gained credibility. As the operation developed, journalists were given timely and truthful reports in the regular press conferences of the Croatian Army [HV] conducted by Brigadier Ivan Tolj, principal coordinator of the Information Command and chief of the Political Administration. I have seen for myself that not only domestic, but also foreign journalists were satisfied with that procedure. For that matter, all the journalists immediately had an opportunity to visit the area of the operation, and even to follow from up close the development of the final phase in the vicinity of Pakrac, which was unthinkable, for example, as operations were carried out in the Gulf War. As for morale, Croatia proved to itself, but above all to the Serbian rebels, that it could defeat an adversary quickly and completely, and that there were limits to our accommodation of the United Nations and the international public. But what does this victory mean from the standpoint of the military balance of power?

What characterizes this operation is the fact that the principal objectives were achieved so rapidly that the outcome of the battle was decided at the very beginning of the second day, so that the adversary was not left any opportunity for an effective military response, as can best be seen from the militarily meaningless missile attack on Zagreb and the already commonplace shelling of towns closer to the battle line. At the same time, complete surprise of the enemy was obviously achieved, and that had to instill even more panic into enemy ranks. An additional satisfaction was also the secrecy and speed of preparation in carrying out the operation, which is already becoming a specialty of the Croatian Armed Forces.

In speaking about this, we should always bear in mind that it all took place in an area that was within range of foreign military observers, and that Croatia is a small country in which no significant movements of military units can go unnoticed. That is why the operation was initiated by small units of special-purpose forces of the Croatian Police and the HV, who later began to be joined by units with greater firepower. It is very indicative that the total balance of power in the entire operation was only 1.7:1 in our favor (broken down into elements: 1.5:1 in armor, 1.6:1 in infantry, and 1.3:1 in artillery). Incidentally, it is generally held that the superiority of the attacker must be at least 3:1 when the enemy is defending himself from prepared positions, if one is to count on success with a certain confidence. Moreover, the Serbian casualties were several times greater than Croatian casualties. This clearly indicates that the motivation and training of the military units of the Croatian Armed Forces which were used was much greater than that of their adversaries. The low morale of the Serbian paramilitary formations of the so-called 18th Corps is also indicated by the large number of captured weapons and the fact that those military units which withdrew toward Bosnia did so in a disorderly fashion and intermixed with civilians. At the same time, although the Croatian forces consisted of three components (police units, some professional guard units, and territorial units made up of the local population), they operated irreproachably. The action of the ground forces was supported by the Air Force, using MiG-21 fighters and combat and transport helicopters. The forces of the Bosnian Serbs, from whom the rebels in western Slavonia expected much, were unable to aid them. Those forces which were not occupied on other fronts and which had been sent to halt the action of the Croatian Armed Forces were quickly and effectively destroyed. In other words, the dream of a great Serbia on the borders of Virovitica-Karlovac-Karlobag was shattered once and for all with the liberation of western Slavonia. Croatia in return gained a passable railroad line and highway between the central part of the state and eastern Slavonia, which has great economic importance, and which previously, under agreements with the United Nations, could not be used for military transport, which means that the Croatian Armed Forces now have considerably greater opportunity to maneuver. In addition, the shortening of the length of the battle line and the advance to the Sava, as a natural line of defense, will free many units which up to now had to be stationed in the area of western Slavonia. This has created more favorable preconditions for further action in liberating the other occupied parts of Croatia, should that be necessary. The fact that all the services necessary for the normal life of the local population (administrative agencies, PTT, the health service) reached the newly liberated

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area immediately behind the military units provides the best evidence of the readiness of the Croatian state to effectively reintegrate the areas occupied until recently, naturally with full protection of the rights of the local Serbian population. What is more, the military success of Operation "Flash" enables the Croatian state to prove to the Serbian population, which so far has been living under the eye of Serbian extremists on the spot, that life in the Republic of Croatia is possible and attractive even for them, and in this way the process of peaceful reintegration of the other occupied parts of the country is facilitated and accelerated. If that is the case, the importance of this operation will far exceed the scope of just another splendid victory for the Croatian Armed Forces.

Varazdin Unit's Role Lauded

96BA0031C Zagreb VELEBIT in Serbo-Croatian 26 May 95 p 15

[Article by Zeljko Stipanovic: "Artillerymen From Varazdin"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In a small and pleasant area of western Slavonia near Nova Gradiska, we encountered the 18th Artillery Battalion from Varazdin. This is a young reserve unit. It was founded at the beginning of August last year, but its members are all veterans of the homeland war who have experienced everything. There is no reason to speak specifically about their war experience, because they have gained it on terrain all over Croatia.

This unit had its "baptism by fire" in the recent operation known as "Flash." They performed their mission irreproachably and very professionally, as is in fact fitting for any unit of the Croatian Army and any Croatian soldier.

Those for whom this was the first combat action followed the examples of the veterans. Those young soldiers who have come from conscript units were among the best, not only in their knowledge and skill, but also for their courage, which proved that they have had very good training.

A large role during the operation was also played by their logistical arm, which was timely and operated quickly and replenished the unit with everything necessary at the given moment. We learned by talking to the soldiers that they were satisfied with the operation and with their own activity, and that it was a great honor for them to have taken part in liberating Croatian territory.

"It was a bit strenuous, but we knew what we were doing, and so we tried hard. In such moments, a man does not think about fatigue," the soldier said.

What particularly distinguishes the unit as a very persistent one is that not a single rifle bullet was fired without good reason, which means that there were no cases of misconduct at all. The Croatian soldier is a modern soldier, and every form of indecent behavior must be immediately repudiated. They are also very aware of that. Unable to do anything, the enemy declared that this unit had been captured and killed, which is, of course, just another lie in the entire web of lies the enemy has been using.

The unit was visited by Mr. Zvonimir Sabati, zupan of Varazdin, with his associates, and he congratulated them in his own name and in the name of the entire Croatian people. And we left the unit performing its everyday tasks, wishing them a great deal of success in their future efforts and training.

Contribution of 123d Brigade in Slavonia Praised

96BA0031B Zagreb VELEBIT in Serbo-Croatian 26 May 95 p 15

[Article by Gordan Lausic: "The Pozega 123d Is Moving On"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Rapid strike, effectiveness, coordination — these are the characteristics of the operation in western Slavonia. An important contribution to this was made by a brigade, all of whose characteristics can be summed up in these words: The 123d is moving on. The combination of the knowledge and experience of regular and reserve personnel with the use of conscripts yielded an effect that was most visible in the results achieved by the tank and gun crews and infantry even on 1 May, the operation's first day. Powerful strikes from the flanks forced the enemy to abandon the carefully prepared plan of active resistance and to begin a pell-mell flight toward the temporarily occupied regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The surprise was complete on the side of the enemy. As they themselves say, as they complete the task begun in December 1991, the return of the displaced persons, Croats, to all their territory has been confirmed by words which typify a soldier from Pozega: The 123d is moving on.

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Commentary Views Continued Serbian Pressure

AU2012072995 Skopje VECER in Macedonian 16-17 Dec 95 pp 4-5

[Commentary by Goran Mihajlovski: "Liberation From Yugoslav Burden"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Paris—"A new week is being born in the city of illumination," U.S. President Bill Clinton said in a typically U.S., pathetic way. The host, French President Jacques Chirac, said: "Our efforts for peace in Bosnia are efforts for Europe." The most tragic figure at the Paris feast, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, confessed with a Balkan mistrust: "This agreement we take as a man who is drinking bitter, but useful medicine."

Each one of them commented on this agreement, that is, the further function of what was signed in Paris in reality and in the field, with a dose of personal skepticisms. However, they all see this as a turning point in the history of the region, from which future promotion would start.

Macedonia in Real Position

What is the importance of the Paris peace agreement for Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]? Great. First, because it is the end of the war in the near vicinity, and therefore its importance is immeasurable. Stabilization in the region will open new markets. It will revitalize connections with the former Yugoslav republics, it will ease the way to integration with Europe, it will give possibilities for participation in the reconstruction of devastated Bosnia and Herzegovina....

On the political plan, the Paris peace conference that was held two days ago will definitely ease Macedonia from the burden of the crisis in former Yugoslavia. This could be sensed in Paris on several occasions. Macedonia was invited to participate as a neighbor to the countries signing the peace accord, logically as an interested party. Contrary to the London conference which was held in August 1992, the main actors in the crisis—Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina—were separated in Paris in December 1995. Macedonia was given its real place, the one that it has been occupying throughout the duration, starting from the beginning of the war in 1991—in the audience.

The state appearance was the same—it was interested, but not too much. That is why it had been decided that only Foreign Minister Stevo Crvenkovski should represent us in Paris, to show symbolically that "we do not belong to the group for whom the whole spectacle had been organized."

There was another alternative by which Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski was to arrive in Paris, particularly after it had been revealed that Slovenia would be represented by Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek, but the last decision was to send only the minister. This was interpreted here as "repaying old debts" to Slovenia, for at the 1992 London conference, to show that they are not interested and are separated from the Yugoslav crisis, Slovenia's President Milan Kucan did not come, while Macedonia was represented by President Kiro Gligorov. On this occasion, Janez Drnovsek was lonely, and as it was explained, Branko Crvenkovski could not join the conference because of important internal matters in the state which did not give him the time to attend the ceremonial activities in which Macedonia acted only as an observer.

This time even the official document that was adopted by the foreign ministers a day before signing the peace agreement is called the Declaration on Stability and Good Neighborly Relations in Southeast Europe. Next year, by May, a pact on stability in southeast Europe is expected to be signed, and thus, the term "Yugoslavia" is being erased more and more from the vocabulary on the crisis.

Outside Package

In this context and to show that Macedonia is not in the package of former Yugoslavia, during the adoption of this document, Minister Crvenkovski never used the term "Yugoslavia," but he spoke of Macedonia as a part of the region of southeast Europe.

In his speech Minister Stevo Crvenkovski emphasized "Macedonia has demonstrated a new approach to the solution to the problems in the region through an open dialogue with neighbors, and it expects them to act in the same way, which is a precondition to gaining mutual recognition." Recognition was not reached in Paris. The hosts had the idea of signing a document by which all former Yugoslav republics would be mutually recognized.

This was rebuffed at the very beginning, because recognition is a bilateral matter, and moreover, most of them have mutually recognized each other as independent states back in 1991. French Foreign Minister Ervet de Charet pushed for another idea to reach a series of mutual recognitions during the conference. However, Croatia and the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] stumbled on the question concerning eastern Slavonia and Prevlaka, and Macedonia and the FRY also stumbled [as published].

It was impossible in Paris to determine the obstacle in Skopje-Belgrade relations. Officially, Macedonia does

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not wish to recognize the former Yugoslavia's state continuity to the FRY. Officially, on the other hand, Belgrade does not ask for recognition, explaining that the FRY already has continuity and does not need to be recognized as a state, and that the FRY is the one that has to recognize the "secessionists." Unofficially, in Paris we could hear of Milosevic's continued pressure on Macedonia. Allegedly, in Belgrade he offered President Gligorov a customs union a day before the assassination attempt, but after Gligorov had refused it, he decided to continue with stronger pressure.

In any case, this question will have to be solved soon. The UN Security Council confirms that a concession will be made to Serbia in such a way that the FRY will not have to submit an application for access to the United Nations because it will take the place of the former Yugoslavia. However, the resolution that provides for this says that the old federation known as the former Yugoslavia has been broken up, and that the Security Council welcomes mutual recognition of states which were formed from the former Yugoslavia.

Will the Council be able to welcome something that has not taken place? Or will it give Serbia another concession? In that case, will it be possible to have a member in the United Nations that is called "The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" and another member by the name "Yugoslavia," while they are both neighbors and mutually not recognized?

Military Cooperation Protocol With Turkey Signed

AU1912182795 Skopje MIC in English 19 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Program on cooperation for 1996 between the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and Turkish armies, was signed in the Army Hall in Skopje yesterday. The Agreement was signed by representatives of the General Staffs of the two friendly countries, General Major Janakie Manasievski and General Major Metip Javuz Jalcin.

Immediately after the signing of the Program, General Major Manasievski emphasized that, in effect, the program will operationalize the previous Agreement signed by Defence Minister Blagoy Handziski and his colleague from Turkey.

The Turkish General Major stressed that the Program foresees joint activities of the armed forces of the two countries next year, which are being worked out at the moment. In response to a journalist's question whether the import of arms for Macedonia was discussed as well, General Jalcin said that both countries were reviewing that question at the moment.

Otherwise, Defence Minister Blagoy Handziski yesterday received the high-ranking military delegation of the armed forces of the Republic of Turkey, led by General Colonel Ersim Ilmaz, chief of logistics in the Turkish General Staff and General Major Jalcin, chief of operations. The same delegation was received by the Chief of the Macedonian General Staff General Colonel Dragoljub Bocinov.

VMRO-DPMNE Leader Urges Early Elections

AU2012070195 Skopje VECER in Macedonian 19 Dec 95 p 8

[Interview with Ljupco Georgievski, leader of VMRO-DPMNE, by Branko Geroski; place and date not given: "Opposition Is in the Margins"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Geroski] The peace agreement on stopping war in the former Yugoslavia, which was signed in Paris last week, did not raise public reactions among the leadership of the most powerful opposition party, the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity].

[Georgievski] The agreement must certainly be welcomed as an act which ends war in our neighborhood. It is true that the Dayton, that is the Paris, agreement has a direct impact on the situation in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonian—FYROM]. I believe that Macedonia was present for little of this process and that it made little effort to obtaining something before the signing of the agreement. As many times before, the train was passing by us, and we failed to catch it. At least in the final definitions of the agreement we should have asked for direct and concrete recognition of the Republic of Macedonia from the Serbian side. Now all questions remain open, particularly in the relations between Serbia and Macedonia.

Secret Clause?

[Geroski] Do you fear that there is a secret plan that is related to Macedonia's fate?

[Georgievski] Although the big powers proclaim principles by which there are no more hidden politics and divisions, as was the case before World War I, practice shows that the principles, particularly after 1990, have been dislocated. We fear and we wonder whether it is possible to have some particular clauses or at least verbal promises for putting Macedonia again under Serbian influence: In simple words, to make Macedonia a Serbian satellite in exchange for the concessions that Serbia made to Bosnia. It looks as if the Macedonian Government has slept through the whole process. There

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has not been a single note, not a single openly raised question to the international forces.

[Geroski] Your party did not make a public address before the signing of the agreement in Paris.

[Georgievski] As far as the implications of this agreement on Macedonia are concerned, we do not agree with it because we think that somebody else is to address the public in this state—the so-called authority. As we can see, it is dozing. This is a problem that has to concern us, and it shows how the international policy of the Republic of Macedonia is conducted.

[Geroski] Macedonia has been accepted in the key international institutions, and it has become a member of the "Partnership for Peace" Program. Do you not believe that this is a sufficient set of guarantees for the country's position in the region?

[Georgievski] Of course, there are guarantees for Macedonia within the system of collective security. However, with the exception of Russia and two to three other countries, all of Europe has been included in this system. The best security for a country is if this country is aware of the importance of a strong army that will restrain the enemy from attacking the state. In the last four years we have had the biggest problems with a country that is not only a member of "Partnership for Peace," but also a member of NATO. It is Greece. I am sure that if Greece, for instance, were to make a military aggression over Macedonia tomorrow, our signature in "Partnership for Peace" will be our last defender. On the contrary, I even think that NATO will support Greece.

"They Negotiate on the Name"

[Geroski] The Macedonian Government, as it has been publicly informed, is discussing the differences over its name with Greece.

[Georgievski] These have already become negotiations over the name. Saying that differences are discussed is for the sake of public opinion. VMRO-DPMNE said what it had to say concerning the signing of the Macedonian-Greek accord. The name is a subject of this accord—with this accord the Macedonian side committed itself to discuss the name as a problem between the two sides. These are in principle catastrophic mistakes: If you have once accepted a document to discuss the name, this document will be used tomorrow by the Greek side and the international community to rub your nose into. However, at the moment this accord was signed, with the exception of two to three political forces which reacted strongly against it, all other political forces, including the journalists and the intelligentsia, welcomed this accord with euphoria.

[Geroski] After the signing of the accord, the southern and northern borders were opened. According to some opinions, there is a trend among some economic and even political forces for pushing exclusive economic and tomorrow probably also political relations with the northern neighbor.

[Georgievski] As far as I know, the official policy in the Republic of Macedonia has been speaking about so-called equal distance in the last four years. All of a sudden, when the UN embargo against Serbia was lifted and when Serbia started acting as a normal country and introduced a customs policy toward Macedonia, we realized that a number of important political structures in the country have never accepted the policy of equal distance. I am glad that Serbia is showing us how a state should behave. I am happy about the measures Serbia undertook because this is an element by which the political sovereignty of the Republic of Macedonia is politically recognized. I hope that this will make the Macedonian so-called Government and the Macedonian powerful businessmen start using their own heads and look for a solution to their own economy. I am also happy because in this way many known economic channels will be interrupted, and when I say economic channels, I have in mind internal agreements between a manager from Macedonia and a manager from Serbia. This will be another achievement in obstructing corruption in Macedonia. Finally, I hope that this will help us obtain a real picture of the Macedonian economy.

[Geroski] There had been statements according to which your party's bank account profited from these economic deals with Yugoslavia.

[Georgievski] I am not familiar with any benefits that the VMRO-DPMNE has had from such connections. The benefits went to the businessmen who were connected with the government and who had priority in this trade exchange.

In the Margins "by Force"

[Geroski] The VMRO-DPMNE is opposition outside parliament. There is a general assessment that the so-called national opposition in Macedonia has been definitely put in the margins. What is your opinion of this assessment?

[Georgievski] It is true that the VMRO-DPMNE is in the margins, but the reason for this is because it was done from the position of force: It was the forgery of the elections, the firm control over the mass media, a state not governed by law and absent independent courts, a system of a gentle dictatorship that has been functioning in the Republic of Macedonia for five years. Not only

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the VMRO-DPMNE, but also the term opposition in Macedonia has been put in the margins. We are faced with a process in which the multiparty system is dying out in the country. It is a problem that has to be of concern to the Macedonian population and those who believe that they should be concerned with such processes. We can check the real force of the VMRO-DPMNE at fair and free elections. Even in spite of the forged election results, the VMRO-DPMNE is the party that got over 100,000 votes. This is an image that deserves respect.

[Geroski] When do you expect the next rating test of your party? Can local elections be such a chance?

[Georgievski] Yes, the local elections can represent a good test, but only if new election laws are adopted. The Macedonian state is committed to that. The problem is also when are these elections going to be held. Only the so-called authorities in the Republic of Macedonia know the exclusive secret of when these elections are going to be held. Nevertheless, the view of the VMRO-DPMNE is to join the elections and to redemonstrate our force.

[Geroski] Are there any relations at this moment, any discussions or negotiations, among the opposition parties outside parliament about some possible common actions at the next election test?

[Georgievski] There is some discussion, but not about joint actions. We do not see the reason for this because the elections have not yet been scheduled.

[Geroski] There is also an assessment that there is a slowdown in the development of democracy in the Republic of Macedonia. This assessment is generally pushed by opposition politicians, but there is an impression that it is even more spread.

[Georgievski] There are numerous tiny examples that can illustrate a slowdown in democracy, but I would like to point out some big ones: First, the one-party parliament; second, judicial power has not been constituted in the state; third, local management has been suspended, that is to say local elections. These are three huge elements that are disapproved by the entire democratic population in every state and by the international community. The process of democratization will start the moment these three big problems are solved: New parliamentary elections, new local elections, and constitution of an independent judiciary system. This is the minimum for the three corner stones of democracy in Macedonia.

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Walesa Calls Top-Level Meeting on Security Threat

LD1912205895 Warsaw TVP Television Second Program Network in Polish 2000 GMT 19 Dec 95

[Relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia Network]

[FBIS Translated Text] A few minutes ago a meeting of leading politicians began at the presidential palace. Our reporter Malgorzata Zietkiewicz is on the spot:

[Zietkiewicz] Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. All lights are ablaze at the presidential palace in Krakowskie Przedmiescie street.

The president summoned the following persons for 2100 [2000 GMT]: the speakers of both chambers of parliament, Jozef Zych and Adam Struzik; the first president of the Supreme Court, Adam Strzembosz; the president of the Constitutional Tribunal, Professor Andrzej Zoll; the president of the Supreme Administrative Court, Andrzej Hauzer; and Interior Minister Andrzej Milczanowski. All of them have arrived.

The meeting is to be chaired by President Lech Walesa and only by President Lech Walesa. None of the presidential ministers will be present at the meeting, although they are inside the Viceroy's Palace, because lights are on everywhere.

What is the meeting about? This morning, while joking and talking with journalists, Minister Zakrzewski [head of Walesa's office] said that as men of this caliber, statesmen of this rank, were holding a meeting, it was not to wish one another Merry Christmas.

What do we know? Unofficially, I know that the meeting concerns a present threat to Poland's interests. Such assumptions can be made on the basis of, for instance, the recent meeting of the KPN [Confederation for an Independent Poland] parliamentary floor group where Deputy Dariusz Wojcik said that Poland was ruled by an oligarchy. President Lech Walesa added it was an international oligarchy. He also said he was saying this on the basis of top secret documents that he could not disclose.

I am sorry, ladies and gentlemen, but I cannot do without these bits of paper. [consults his notes]

This morning at 1000 [0900 GMT] Interior Minister Andrzej Milczanowski appeared at the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office. He brought along documents. It was a report about the commitment of a crime, it was a report about a crime striking against the security of the state. Only Lech Walesa can say whom the crime concerns.

I have been informed that the president, who has only three days left until the end of his term of office, thinks he could not leave this information for himself alone, he could not take it with him to Gdansk. It is far too important and has too much political weight. I presume these papers will be shown to those who have come to the meeting today, those who are at the presidential palace right now. These are not the most important men in the state. There is someone missing. But I do not have the courage to tell you about that.

This was Malgorzata Zietkiewicz, outside the Viceroy's Palace, for "Panorama."

Prime Minister Oleksy Implicated

LD1912211695 Warsaw TVP Television Second Program Network in Polish 2025 GMT 19 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Radio Information Agency [IAR] has unofficially learned that at the meeting now being held in the presidential palace, Lech Walesa intends to deliver documents originating from the Ministry of Internal Affairs concerning Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy to Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych.

The head of the government wanted Minister of Internal Affairs Andrzej Milczanowski to make these documents available to him. This was refused by the head of the ministry. According to the IAR, President Lech Walesa will insist on the setting up of a special commission which would clarify the issue.

The commission would include Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych, Supreme Court First President Adam Strzembosz, and Andrzej Zoll, president of the Constitutional Tribunal.

We asked Government Spokeswoman Aleksandra Jakubowska why Jozef Oleksy had not been invited to President Lech Walesa's meeting.

[Begin Jakubowska recording, speaking on phone] This is a slightly strange question. He is not present because, it seems, there is no such need. On the other hand, the news we hear is mystifying. We do not know the contents of these materials the president and the media are talking about. Minister Milczanowski and his people are said to have been preparing various materials for a month, but they were not delivered to the prime minister. The prime minister expects that he will be able to get acquainted with them. [end recording]

Walesa Accuses Oleksy of 'High Treason'

LD2012005195 Warsaw Radio Zet Network in Polish 0000 GMT 20 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy wants to convene the National Defense Committee [KOK]. Oleksy justifies his decision by saying that only this body is able to assess the situation in Poland

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properly. The KOK can be convened only by the president, and the prime minister sent a motion to him to this effect.

In the evening, Lech Walesa revealed documents concerning the threat to the security of the state and high treason of people who were in top posts in the country. Unofficially it is rumored that Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy is the person in question.

A 30-minute meeting of the president with the Sejm and Senate speakers, the presidents of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court, and the Constitutional Tribunal ended in the presidential palace just before 2200. Internal Affairs Minister Andrzej Milczanowski was also present. Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy was not invited, and therefore did not attend the meeting.

On 19 December, Internal Affairs Minister Milczanowski submitted to the Military Prosecutor's Office a report about a crime which threatened the security of the state. Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy asked Milczanowski to make the relevant documents available to him. Milczanowski, however, refused this request.

Unofficially it is said that Jozef Oleksy has collaborated with foreign intelligence services since 1983. This collaboration continued when Oleksy was Sejm speaker. There are no documents which would prove that Oleksy collaborated with foreign intelligence services during his tenure as prime minister.

Government Spokeswoman Aleksandra Jakubowska told Radio Zet that the Interior Ministry head and his services have been preparing various documents for a month. Jakubowska also stressed that there are no legal grounds for the setting up of a special commission to investigate the matter. President Lech Walesa is said to have demanded such a special commission at this evening's meeting in the presidential palace. The commission would be composed of Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych, Supreme Court President Adam Strzembosz, and Constitutional Tribunal President Andrzej Zoll.

Let us recall that on 12 December, at a meeting with deputies of Confederation for an Independent Poland, Lech Walesa announced that before his departure he would reveal documents proving international links of the post-communist oligarchy. At the same time, however, he stressed that these would be secret matters, of special importance [as heard].

Oleksy: 'Dirty Provocation'

LD2012114595 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1050 GMT 20 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 20 Dec — Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy told journalists after a meeting with Speaker Jozef Zych in the Sejm on Wednesday that he described his views on what happened and what was presented to the public in the context of a "dirty provocation."

The prime minister said the recent events prove that "state security is perhaps threatened by those who are incapable of leaving in dignity".

Oleksy declined to comment on President Lech Walesa's refusal to summon a meeting of the National Defense Committee.

Walesa: KOK Meeting Unjustified

LD2012101195 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0940 GMT 20 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 20 Dec — The president thinks the situation at our borders, as well as the internal situation in the country, do not justify a meeting of the National Defense Committee [KOK], Marek Karpinski, President Lech Walesa's spokesman, told PAP on Wednesday morning.

"Thank God there is calm at the borders and we are not threatened by internal unrest either, so it would not be appropriate to convene this body, and the president, on whose initiative the KOK is convened, will not take such an initiative," the spokesman added.

[Government spokeswoman] Aleksandra Jakubowska said on Tuesday evening that Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy wants a meeting of the KOK, as it is the only appropriate body to assess the situation in the country.

Army Ready for All Eventualities

LD2012085395 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 0800 GMT 20 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] In an interview for Polish Radio National, Defense Minister Zbigniew Okonski made an assurance that military information services of which he is in charge did not take part in the preparation of materials implicating Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy.

When asked whether the army is prepared for any actions in the event a state of emergency is declared, he replied that the army is prepared for any eventuality. However, he expressed the hope that such a need will not materialize because the country is calm; there are no riots or military actions.

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Cabinet Denies State Security Threat Exists

LD2012154395 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1448 GMT 20 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 20 Dec — At its emergency meeting today, in which President Walesa also took part, the government said it did not share the view that there was a threat to state security. At the end of the two-and-a-half hour meeting Government Spokeswoman Aleksandra Jakubowska read out a statement to that effect.

The statement says that the government has assessed that the information received from the minister of internal affairs and from the defense minister gave no grounds to make such an assessment or to take any specific measures in this connection.

The president did not make any statement to journalists after the meeting. The prime minister, however, said that the statement which had been read out contained everything which the government wanted to say on the subject.

Russian Security Denies Oleksy-KGB Ties

LD2012131995 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1228 GMT 20 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 20 Dec — On 20 December, Radio RMF [private radio station] broadcast a report by Waldemar Gontarski, its Moscow correspondent, who had interviewed General Aleksandr Mikhaylov, press spokesman for the Russian Federal Security Service. This is the text of the report:

— What does the Russian Federal Security Service, the successor of the KGB [State Security Committee in the former USSR], think about the rumors that President [as received] Aleksander Kwasniewski and Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy collaborated with the Soviet security service?

— I thought the time had passed when mud could be thrown at anyone using arbitrarily prepared materials. These revelations are complete nonsense. This is some kind of political provocation, a provocation aimed at compromising people who have been successful in Poland.

— Can you state very firmly that there exist no materials which could prove that Kwasniewski and Oleksy cooperated with the KGB?

— Yes, I can state very firmly that there are no such materials.

— And what will happen if the Polish authorities, President Lech Walesa, show you such documents?

— It will be very difficult for President Walesa to prove anything and present genuine evidence. Nobody will confirm the existence of such collaboration.

— Are you not worried that a state of emergency may be declared in Poland?

— Yes, I am concerned that a dirty political incident may occur.

Allegations 'Groundless'

LD2012140995 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 1200 GMT 20 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] The Russian external intelligence service has described as illogical the allegations about intelligence work which are being made against Jozef Oleksy.

[Correspondent] In an interview for the Polish Radio spokeswoman of the external intelligence service, Tatyana Samoylis, said that since 1949, Russian special services had been banned from recruiting agents in the countries of the Eastern bloc. Since 1953 this has been supplemented by a ban on recruiting communists as collaborating agents.

According to Samoylis, these two facts show that the allegations made against Oleksy are groundless.

Samoylis added that special services are not entitled to provide information about their possible collaborators but the situation which has developed in Poland is exceptional.

[Announcer] Our reporter has learned that the official position of the Russian security service will probably be known in a few hours' time.

Borowski: Walesa Trying To Stop Kwasniewski

LD2012094795 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 0800 GMT 20 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] Marek Borowski, head of the Council of Ministers office, told Polish Radio this morning that the government will demand that democratic procedures be adhered to with regard to this matter. In his opinion it cannot be ruled out that in this way Lech Walesa wants to disturb or prevent the swearing-in of the president-elect.

[Begin Borowski recording] We will all support and demand that all democratic procedures be adhered to here, and that there should be no extraordinary means, no stirring up of public opinion. The entire democratic procedure connected with the elections must be brought to completion.

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It cannot be ruled out here that the president simply wants in some way — we still do not know what measures he will take — to disrupt or prevent the swearing-in of the new president. [end recording]

[Announcer] The head of the Council of Ministers office added that this hypothesis is also confirmed by the so-called presidential ministers who are staying on in their offices. When submitting their resignations after Lech Walesa lost the elections, they declared their wish to leave their posts on 20 December. Now they have announced that they will stay in their offices two days longer, until the end of the term in office of the outgoing president.

Marek Borowski suggested that Lech Walesa in this way has decided to maintain full control over these ministries.

Press Reacts to Walesa's Allegations

WS2012104895

[FBIS Editorial Report] On 20 December three major Warsaw vernacular dailies comment on the allegations leveled by Polish President Lech Walesa at Prime Minister Oleksy.

GAZETA WYBORCZA publishes an untitled front-page 150-word commentary by Chief Editor Adam Michnik, who points out that the situation is "perfectly unclear. No one knows anything specific." Michnik stresses that "three days before the president-elect is sworn into office, the public is entitled to expect that the stability of the state will not be undermined. Everything must be done in line with the principles of a legal state." He points out that "the allegations must be clarified and possible charges must be formulated in accordance with the usual procedures."

ZYCIE WARSZAWY carries a front-page, 300-word commentary by Jerzy Wysocki entitled "If It Is Treason...". Wysocki calls the affair "a national tragedy," because "the prime minister has been accused of high treason." He adds that "we do not know all the circumstances. In a situation where there are fears about the security of the state, the role of the press is certainly not to pass judgment and further destabilize the state. We are hoping that the constitutional institutions of the state will be able to fulfill their functions." Like Michnik in GAZETA WYBORCZA, Wysocki also believes that the allegations "need to be unequivocally clarified." He adds, however, that "if what we are witnessing is only a culmination of the political fight, if it is the third round of the presidential elections, then a shadow will be cast on the outgoing president." According to Wysocki, if indeed this is a case of high treason, then "some radical questions must be asked," such as "whether over the last period, since the politicians of the Democratic Left Alliance came to power, Poland's policies have been worked out in Warsaw or in Moscow." He believes, however, that the fundamental question is "what will happen next and what should happen" and that such issues as "whose country Poland will be and what it will be like are being decided right now."

RZECZPOSPOLITA publishes on page 3 a 250-word commentary by Krzysztof Gottesman entitled "Truth Entails a Sentence." He writes that by accusing the incumbent prime minister of taking actions which threatened the state's security, Walesa made "probably the most difficult decision in his political career." Gottesman points out that actually "not much can be said about the affair, except that it is serious. Details will certainly be revealed soon, and the constitutional state organs will have to act quickly to say unequivocally what the truth is. There must not be any understating of the situation. The interests of the state require this. In addition, resolution of the problem will mean that one of the politicians has passed a sentence on himself."

SLD Deputy Comments on Treason Accusations

LD2012113795 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 1000 GMT 20 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] Danuta Waniek, an Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] deputy and the head of Alexander Kwasniewski's election staff, thinks that President Lech Walesa would rather set Poland on fire than leave office.

[Correspondent] The accusations against Prime Minister Oleksy involving treason are very serious accusations, Waniek thinks. It is not acceptable that two people should be saying that they have evidence to prove that the prime minister has been involved in treason, and at the same time apply secrecy procedures, Deputy Waniek said. This is Mira Nowakowska, speaking from the Sejm building.

Deputy Sejm Speaker on Walesa's Allegations

LD2012140495 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1145 GMT 20 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 20 December — According to Deputy Sejm Speaker Aleksander Malachowski, the most dangerous thing with regard to the latest events is the fact that behind the backs of the highest authorities processes have been taking place whose nature and aims we are not able to decipher.

The deputy Sejm Speaker said on 20 December that the participants in the Tuesday meeting had not been given "any specific information." When asked whether Minister Milczanowski had not presented such information,

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he said that even if he had, nobody would have even touched such materials. According to information available to the deputy speaker, Minister Milczanowski only informed the invited guests that he had sent the materials to the Military Prosecutor's Office and submitted a motion for preparatory proceedings to be launched.

The manner in which the Tuesday meeting was called aroused the deputy speaker's "surprise and concern." He said that the telephone messages containing invitations to the meeting had arrived in the afternoon on 19 December. Nobody explained why the meeting was called at night and why it was called in that manner, the deputy speaker said.

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New Envoy Assesses 'Very Good' Ties With U.S.

AU2012092295 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 14 Dec 95 p 6

[Interview with Mircea Dan Geoana, new ambassador to the United States, by Ana Cristina Litescu; place and date not given: "The Main Axiom of Relations with the United States Is Partnership"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Litescu] Mr. Mircea Geoana, regarding your appointment as ambassador to Washington, what, in your opinion, were the trumps that tilted the balance in your favor?

[Geoana] I believe that there are a number of professional elements in the life of each man, particularly the life of a diplomat, which qualify him for an important activity in public administration at home or abroad. However, each man's life is equally influenced by certain favorable circumstances. Therefore, I do not think one can talk about trumps here, but rather about a complex of such professional and circumstantial elements. It is certain that, the fact that I belong to the relatively young generation in the Romanian administration and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the fact that, in all these years—aside from my administrative tasks in the ministry—I had the good fortune of fulfilling another exciting and demanding job, that of spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has counted and tilted the balance, so to say, in my favor. The position of ambassador to Washington is a highly responsible job, in view of the fact that the relations with the United States, the planet's main economic, political, and security power, are a priority target for any country in the world.

[Litescu] The current dynamics of our policy at global and regional scale makes your position even more responsible than before.

[Geoana] In the current situation, Romania is going through one of its great moments of change in its contemporary history, with an extremely ambitious social program currently in progress, whose ultimate targets are a democratic society and a market economy, that is the great values that have dominated the U.S. political and public life in the last centuries. Fortunately, Romania's short, medium, and long-term goals as well as our national interest coincide with the great values constantly being propagated by the United States.

[Litescu] Nevertheless, the political relations between Romania and the United States are not the best right now.

[Geoana] I would say that, at this time, Romania's relations with the United States are very good. It is true that we had to overcome certain difficult moments, particularly in the years immediately after the 1989 revolution. There were certain subjective and objective elements, which made that certain difficulties should emerge particularly in connection with these values of the U.S. democracy and policy. The decisive element for the resumption of our bilateral relations was the fact that the U.S. part understood Romania's desire to develop this kind of society. The difficulties that had to be overcome also resulted from Romania's unique situation within the Warsaw Pact and the specific features of our previous policy. I believe that the main thing for consolidating and developing the interest of the U.S. Administration, Congress, businessmen, and mass media in Romania is to present the almost unique opportunities offered by the Romanian market and economy in our region. They are already on the point of overcoming this kind of reservations and, thanks to the latest developments in our region and the former Yugoslav space, we have reached the stage of consolidating relations of partnership and alliance between the United States and Romania.

[Litescu] The Americans are generally known as extremely pragmatical. Is Romania an attractive country for the U.S. businessmen?

[Geoana] As far as the legislative framework is concerned, there are no problems for foreign investments. However, both the U.S. partners and other Western states have signaled some difficulties still manifest in Romania, due to certain bureaucratic practices or delays in the communication of decisions or answers to concrete offers. In the specific case of the relations with the United States—given the priority we attach to them—we decided to set up, as soon as possible, an interdepartmental council, coordinated by the minister of foreign affairs, which will administer the overall economic, but also the political and other relations between the United States and Romania. We hope to establish a pattern of cooperation that will function in accordance with the normal logic and pace prevailing in the U.S. business world.

[Litescu] The United States plays a decisive role in NATO and influences, to a certain extent, the EU decisions, too. Can Romania's relations with these two institutions be improved through the Washington connection?

[Geoana] The problem of NATO's expansion depends, to a large extent, on the way in which the U.S. Administration, along with the West European countries, understands how to conduct this process. As far as Romania is concerned, the bilateral relationship with the United States, from a security and military viewpoint, is closely linked to the transatlantic dimension, against the

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background of Romania's firm intent to join NATO. A close Romanian-U.S. relationship in the military, security, and also political spheres is capable of accelerating and of considerably increasing Romania's chances of integration in the North Atlantic alliance. At the same time, we are witnessing a development of the relations between the United States and the EU—let me recall here the recent signing of the transatlantic document in Madrid, which exclusively deals with the relationship between NATO and the EU—which allows for the European and transatlantic interests to overlap. This situation favors the Central and East European states that want to join NATO and the EU.

[Litescu] Romania signed the Paris Stability Pact this year. To what extent is this event relevant, given the fact that we have not yet concluded any of the basic political treaties with our neighbors (except Bulgaria)?

[Geoana] First of all, Romania's relations with the neighboring countries, as well as the relations between countries in general, cannot be confined to the basic political treaties alone. Indeed, the basic political treaty is considered to be an important document, but it does not represent the overall ensemble of bilateral relations. The philosophy behind this kind of pact was to "sink" them into the Stability Pact, the moment they are concluded. Therefore, the Stability Pact was transferred from the EU to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE]. Consequently, any bilateral legal instrument of this kind concluded between Romania and the countries belonging to the Central-European Stability Pact will be beneficial to all of them. The negotiation and conclusion of treaties are bilateral matters between the governments of the respective countries, and the concrete solutions to be adopted must reflect the interests of both sides. The fact that the EU stimulates—including through these arrangements—the conclusion of basic political treaties and the creation of a European atmosphere in our region can only encourage these negotiations. However, I repeat: The negotiations must be carried out between governments. Regarding Hungary, I believe we are now at a truly historic moment, when, concurrently with the basic political treaty, we are attempting a profound reconciliation between the two nations, which exceeds by far the spirit of the Stability Pact.

[Litescu] Mr. Mircea Geoana, in your capacity as Romania's ambassador to Washington, how do you think you can contribute to improving Romanian-U.S. relations?

[Geoana] I do not believe that one should not have excessive demands on an ambassador or embassy in this respect. What we can do here, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in Romania's Embassy in Washington is to emphasize and accelerate this process of consolidating the relations of partnership and of economic, political, and security alliance between Romania and the United States. We will focus more than we did thus far on our relations with the U.S. Congress, which is a very important element of the U.S. policy's sophisticated equation, and on the economic, financial-banking, and investment relationship. A problem of particular concern for us is that of Romania's image. We will try to transfer the good relations existing between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Romanian press to the American mass media, which is so strong, influential, and even severe. We will strive to be frank with the U.S. mass information media, admit the problems facing us, and also emphasize Romania's progress and attractiveness for the United States. Romania will shortly be perceived as an interesting market for the United States.

[Litescu] Thank you.

Parliament Authorizes Sappers Battalion for Bosnia

AU1912152995 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1400 GMT 19 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] At the Romanian president's request, the Chamber of Deputies today made a draft decision authorizing our country to participate in the peacekeeping force in Bosnia with a battalion of sappers consisting of 200 troops and to ensure transit services at Timisoara Airport. The expenses for this activity will be covered from the state budget. [passage omitted]

Russian Gas Imports To Increase by 20 Percent

AU1912145795 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 12 Dec 95 p 1

[Article by MEDIAFAX: "Gas Imports from the Russian Federation Will Increase by 20 Percent"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Romania's gas imports from the Russian Federation will increase by 20 percent in 1996, said Stefan Man, director of the Romgaz autonomous company. Last week, a Romgaz delegation held meetings with officials of the Gazexport company of Russia, with a view to establishing details for the 1996 delivery. The officials also discussed issues regarding the opening of new points at which the gas from the Russian Federation should be taken over, as well as the issue of connecting the Romanian transportation system to the Ukrainian system and ensuring transit through Romania towards countries located in the southeast of the Balkans. Currently, Romgaz has no debts to its Russian partners, and letters of credit are ready for December, said Man. For

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1995, the gas imports from the Russian Federation are estimated at 6.2 billion cubic meters.

Poll Shows Iliescu, PDSR Leading in Popularity

AU2012124395 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 2000 GMT 19 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Over the period 9-14 December, the Romanian Institute for Public Opinion Polling carried out a poll for the Multimedia Foundation for Local Democracy.

To the question whether they are interested in the political life of the country, debates in Parliament, and what Romanian political parties and politicians stand for and do, the subjects answered in the following way: 20 percent—very low interest; 19 percent—very interested; 31 percent—not too much interest.

In 1992, the threshold for the political parties to enter Parliament was set at 3 percent of the votes; currently, debates are in progress to increase that threshold. A threshold of 5 percent was favored by 32 percent of the polled persons; a threshold of 7 percent was favored by 11 percent; 25 percent of the respondents could not answer this question.

Referring to the idea of holding early elections, 41 percent favored the idea, 43 percent rejected it, while 16 percent could not answer the question.

If parliamentary elections took place now, 30 percent of the polled persons would vote for the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania], 29 percent for the CDR [Democratic Convention of Romania], 6 percent for the PD [Democratic Party], 5 percent for the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania], 5 percent for the PRM [Greater Romanian Party], 5 percent for the PSM [Socialist Party of Labor], 4 percent for the PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party], 3 percent for the PAC [Civic Alliance Party], 3 percent for the PDAR [Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania], 2 percent for the PL '93 [Liberal Party '93], and 1 percent for the PSDR [Romanian Social-Democratic Party]. One percent could not make up their minds. Ten percent of the interviewed persons would not go to vote.

As far as their sympathy for various CDR-member political parties or groupings is concerned, 18 percent prefer the PNTCD [National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party], 5 percent PNL [National Liberal Party], 1 percent other parties or groupings. The remaining 5 percent have no options for any CDR parties.

To the question of whom they would vote for the office of president, 35 percent replied that they would vote in favor of Ion Iliescu, 23 percent for Emil Constantinescu [CDR president], 7 percent for Adrian Nastase [PDSR executive president and Chamber of Deputies speaker], 6 percent for Petre Roman [PD president], 4 percent for Corneliu Vadim Tudor [PRM president], 3 percent for Gheorghe Funar [PUNR president], 2 percent for Ion Diaconescu [PNTCD interim president], 2 percent for Nicolae Manolescu [PAC president], and 1 percent for Mircea Ionescu-Quintus [PNL president].

We would like to mention that the poll was conducted among a sample of 1,055 persons older than 16 years, living in 84 various urban and rural localities.

PNTCD's Ratiu To Run for Presidency If Asked

AU2012065495 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 13 Dec 95 p 3

[Interview with Ion Ratiu, National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party deputy, by Andreea Munteanu; place and date not given: "Ion Ratiu: It Would Be Dire for Romania if Ion Iliescu Is Reelected in 1996"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After the disappearance of Corneliu Coposu [late president of the National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party—PNTCD], tensions that have been disguised or carefully hidden have started to emerge in the PNTCD. One of the issues of conflict is the distrust of some CDR [Democratic Convention of Romania] members in the political power of Mr. Emil Constantinescu, the CDR president, who, according to the electoral protocol of this alliance, is to become the single candidate of the Convention at the 1996 presidential elections. Dissatisfied with this prospect, PNTCD Deputy Ion Ratiu expressed his willingness to run on behalf of the CDR, considering that Constantinescu is not capable of putting Ion Iliescu in difficulty and win the elections.

[Munteanu] You have often remarked lately that Emil Constantinescu has no chance of defeating Ion Iliescu in the 1996 elections. What does Mr. Constantinescu lack to become a strong adversary for the current president?

[Ratiu] It is very difficult for me to characterize Mr. Constantinescu, but it boils down simply to the way he appears. Even the program that he proposed a short while ago entitled "Contract with Romania" seems to me lacking realism and I consider it another one of his mistakes. His political judgment, his reaction to the leadership, as well as a number of other attitudes that he had, disqualify him and are dangerous to his image as a possible president. Moreover, I believe that his performance in direct competition with Iliescu in 1992 was very poor.

[Munteanu] If the CDR granted you the chance to represent it in the presidential race, what would be your trump cards compared to Mr. Constantinescu's,

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what would be your electoral message that you would propose?

[Ratiu] I will offer what I offered in 1990, counting on the fact that currently the electorate perceives things differently. The political analysis that I made then proved to be correct and it is still the same today. Just like then, I believe that what could save Romania from the current crisis is a massive investment of foreign capital. Even though in 1990, many accused me because of this belief of mine, saying that I intend to "sell the country." Now even Mr. Iliescu has realized the viability of the proposal that I made then. However, Iliescu tries to correct this situation a little bit too late and with not so much power of conviction as I would have. Constantinescu could do even less in this respect. Unfortunately, in 1990 we had no foreign debts whatsoever, something that has changed today, but we still have the human element, which is very important, and we can make use of it. I believe that my trump cards, compared to Mr. Constantinescu's, are the power of analysis, the international connections that I have made, and the fact that I am independent from a financial viewpoint, thus I do not depend on a post. All these things weigh something in the mind of the Romanians after the unfortunate experience that they went though in the past years. It is true that Emil Constantinescu does not have my political prestige, my credentials, but he has the advantage of being much younger. However, thank God, I am very active and in full force.

I do not intend to make any speculations about my or Mr. Constantinescu's presidential candidacy. I reassert my willingness to offer my services when I am going to be invited to. I will not run if I am not wanted. I expect support from the PNTCD's electoral constituencies; I have had many signs in this respect and I am informed that there will be other signs as well. In any event, I will respect the decisions of my party.

[Munteanu] Assuming that neither you nor Mr. Constantinescu will enjoy the support of the CDR members to run for Romania's presidency, do you believe that there is still time and there are necessary resources to run another candidate capable of winning in the race with Ion Iliescu?

[Ratiu] Yes, in this situation we must find another person, because it would be very dire for Romania if Mr. Iliescu is reelected. We will advance just as slowly as we have done so far, without changes, without positive and fundamental reforms.

[Munteanu] Before his death, Mr. Corneliu Coposu held some talks with Petre Roman regarding the conclusion of an act between the CDR and the PD [Democratic Party] on this issue, but those negotiations reached a bottleneck. What is your position in this respect?

[Ratiu] I believe that it is important to hold free discussions within the opposition and to weigh the beneficial and effective political commitments that would lead us to our success in the elections. This is my position which, unfortunately, does not coincide in every aspect with the views of my party.

CDR Leader Details 'Contract With Romania'

AU1812164295 Bucharest JURNALUL NATIONAL in Romanian 8 Dec 95 pp 16-17

[Interview with Emil Constantinescu, president of the Democratic Convention of Romania, by Anne Juganaru; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text]

It Is Obvious That the Government Is Sawing Off the Limb on Which It Is Sitting by Promoting a Policy That Strangles the Private Economic Sector

[Juganaru] Mr. President Emil Constantinescu, the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR] recently launched the draft of a contract it wishes to conclude with Romania. You, in your capacity as the leader of the CDR, have the mission to conclude a "contract" with the media, that is, to explain that program, and JURNALUL NATIONAL is interested in hosting debates on this subject in its pages. As a beginning I suggest that we should tackle the issue of the financial resources, without which no program can be put into practice. Well, from what sources and in what ways does the CDR think it can finance all these projects if it is elected to rule the country?

[Constantinescu] We did not publish this program, on which we worked for an entire year, before finding an answer to that question. The maximum global costs needed to put our political offer into practice amount to 8,000 billion lei [L]. The 1996 state budget sets the expenditures chapter at L20,000 billion. In order to achieve our contract we are principally relying on the redistribution of the funds allotted to various sectors in the budget.

[Juganaru] What principles guided you in the elaboration of this contract?

[Constantinescu] These principles originate from our political strategy, which we made known as early as in 1992, during the election campaign. The goal of our governing program, which is the basis of our political offer, is to stimulate the sector of small and medium-sized companies. I will try to explain the difference be-

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tween our offer and the policy promoted by the current government. During their three years of government they developed an excessive tax system that is a heavy burden for the small and medium-sized companies. Even in the statistics published by the government, the sole dynamic evolution is to be seen in the case of such companies, which are making profits. It is obvious that the government is sawing off the limb on which it is sitting by promoting a policy that strangles the private economic sector. We believe that by decreasing the taxes we could stimulate the development of that sector, and although the government would obtain less taxes from individual companies, the number of tax-paying companies would increase. Another suggestion of ours refers to stimulating the companies that reinvest the profit they make in creating new jobs. This would lead, on the one hand, to less funds being allotted to paying unemployment benefits, and, on the other hand, to an increase in production, meaning that there would be more VAT [value-added tax], profit taxes, and so on; that is, new budget sources would be generated. Of course, it is not my job to go into every detail, because we have our experts who dealt with every point of this project. However, what I think is worth mentioning in this context is the fact that we intend to cut the bureaucratic and nonproductive apparatus drastically, cut the expenses that are in contradiction with the austerity budget, such as very expensive festive ceremonies, travels abroad, and so on.

[Juganaru] You said that the essential thing for the CDR is to develop the small and medium-sized companies. But let us not forget that in Romania there are also very large companies, industrial giants, employing hundreds of thousands of people. What do the authors of the Contract With Romania intend to do with these companies inherited from the communist regime, which we cannot simply blow up and the conservation of which would also be extremely expensive?

[Constantinescu] To answer this question I have to remind you again of our 1992 electoral program. At that time, too, we insisted very much on the fact that first one has to develop the small and medium-sized companies, so as to create well-paid jobs, which would then naturally attract the people working in the nonproductive industrial mastodons. Following their development, the former companies would have been able to take over the work force set free by restructuring the giant companies. Currently one can see that this restructuring has been achieved merely by patching things up, which means that it has to be redone. Any serious politician has to tell the truth and admit that the reconstruction of such a sector generates unemployment, as it cannot be done without retooling the large companies, so as to obtain a higher productivity, and cutting the work force employed. To that purpose retraining programs are available, although they have not been used. I also have to point out that we intend to decrease and even annul subsidies for some of the public corporations, especially the concealed subsidies, as currently practiced, which, if they continue to be paid, next year will lead to the collapse of the budget. It is quite obvious that the private sector will also refuse to pay taxes if such nonprofitable state-run companies continue to be exempted from paying taxes. Such a policy merely intended to prolong the agony is of no real use to anyone. We suggested concrete solutions on how to attract foreign investors, with whom we would negotiate so that they accept certain social protection measures.

[Juganaru] But Mr. President, the question still remains: What are we going to do with the huge plants, such as the ones in Hunedoara, Resita, Galati, Savinesti, the Faur plant of the IMGB [Bucharest Heavy Machine-Building Plant]?

[Constantinescu] Many of these companies may be able to continue working. They might find markets for their products. The only problem is that they ought to find competent managerial teams. But the current policy, intended to keep them afloat regardless of the results, does not stimulate replacing the managements. Parts of these industrial giants are competitive even today. At Galati [iron and steel mill], for instance, there are certain sections that are equipped according to modern technology norms and they would be able to face competition, had they not been compelled to carry the burden of the other, nonprofitable, sections of the plant. I personally visited the plant in Calarasi and I held talks with the entire leadership of that large, still unfinished company. What they need there is a categorical decision. There are giant sectors that ought to remain in the hands of the government, such as the rail-manufacturing industry. If economic reconstruction had been begun with the rebuilding of the infrastructure, that section of the Calarasi plant would have received very profitable orders. As far as the plant in Savinesti is concerned, it may become profitable if the marketing of its products could be done in a normal way, on the domestic and international plane.

[Juganaru] Let us now concentrate on further points in the Contract With Romania. This contract says that "the right of the peasants to own their means of production, which they were deprived of on joining the agricultural production cooperatives, will be reinstated, so that they can obtain reparations." It would be fantastic for the farmers if this thing could be achieved, the sole problem being the fact that such an action would first require extremely ample investigations, as well as significant

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financial resources to pay the reparations. How does the CDR believe it could accomplish this project?

[Constantinescu] I would like to point out that in this case we did not pledge to achieve this within 200 days. What we did pledge was that within 200 days we will forward to Parliament a set of draft laws stipulating the payment of such reparations. This is an essential difference, because there are also ill-meaning people, who now claim to be completely naive, but later on might accuse us of having ventured into projects that can never be achieved. Not every reader of your daily has carefully gone through the entire text of our Contract With Romania, and therefore it is important to clarify this. We are already working on these draft laws, as well as on methods to reestablish the old archives, as well as assessing the value of various goods in view of paying reparations.

[Juganaru] Mr. President, this leads us back to the difficult problem of the funding. How does the CDR think to be able to obtain such important funds to pay reparations to the farmers, as well as money for the young families to build homes, whom you promised "access to land plots and long-term credits, with a maximum 10-percent interest on them?" Point 11 of the contract refers to the promotion of a law "to ensure that women are entitled to a two-year paid leave after giving birth to a child and to a monthly allowance representing 10 percent of the average salary in the economy for each child under 16 years of age in their care." This project also presupposes a considerable financial effort to be made by the government. Therefore, how do you imagine to obtain sufficient money to finance all three aforementioned projects?

[Constantinescu] What we are talking about is, above all, a political strategy. We have to distinguish between what is vital now for the Romanian nation and the things that ought to be done in the long run. You have brought up the issue of the allowances to be granted to women after giving birth to their children. Well, currently all the statistics show that Romania's population is shrinking dramatically. Aside from the fact that the natural population growth is negative, infant mortality is very high. If we let things evolve in this direction, I wonder what Romania's population will be in 20 years' time. The statistical figures show that about 240,000 births are registered in Romania each year. It is true that ensuring two-year paid leaves for women who give birth to children presupposes a considerable financial effort, but all the developed countries do it in this way. Besides, I also think that this is a realistic way to approach this issue, because currently women are practically compelled to lock their children up at home or let other people look after them while they are working, as it is a known thing that nurseries have become a utopia in Romania. What women currently do is go on fake sick leave or resort to other tricks to avoid going to work. Such methods lead to losses in economy. Furthermore there is also the question of what we actually wish to become of our children. Do we want them to roam about in the streets, to be abandoned, or get sick? Is it not preferable rather to restructure the budget, assigning priority to the genuine problems of the nation, and try to find sufficient funds, including from foreign loans, to implement these very important projects?

As far as the young families are concerned, they represent the most disadvantaged segment of our society. The other generations have managed, although it was not easy for them either, to buy the apartments, in installments, in which they are living. Today, however, the young ones who wish to establish new families have to pay tens of millions of lei to buy an apartment, which lies beyond their possibilities. No wonder that the birth rate is not growing and the number of new families is dropping as well.

[Juganaru] Mr. President Constantinescu, you said that if the CDR becomes the ruling party, mastering the budget of the country, you will resort to foreign loans to put the projects included in your Contract With Romania into practice. Did the CDR experts calculate how much money these foreign loans would amount to?

[Constantinescu] Yes, they did. But of course, such things should not be detailed now. For the time being let us remain in the domain of principles. It is only normal that one should resort to foreign loans. Abnormally is just the way such loans have been used so far. Let us not forget that between 1990 and 1992 the rulers of the country used up loans worth $2 billion, money that was spent exclusively on consumption, more concretely to buy their success in the 1992 elections. Today, after a three-year grace period, the Romanians have to pay back the $2 billion, as well as the interest due. This money was not used on various programs intended to solve the essential programs of our society or economy, but rather to respond to the interests of the ruling bureaucracy, to buy the votes of certain social categories. And today no new loans can be obtained because the current government lacks credibility. There is no confidence in this government, which proved to be unable to ensure the restructuring of our economy to turn it into an efficient and profitable one. The measures we intend to take, the gist of which is included in our offer, are meant precisely to place the Romanian economy rapidly on a healthy basis. If this is achieved the loans will start coming again and it will be no problem if we have foreign debts. The essential thing is how one uses the

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money obtained by making foreign debts. And I have to give you an example to illustrate the grave consequences of the delays in promoting a realistic policy.

As early as in 1992 we explained on numerous occasions, in the press, on radio, and during our meetings with citizens, that if one wants to rebuild any economy one has to begin with the infrastructure. Therefore if they genuinely want to revive our economy, they will have to begin by establishing the necessary infrastructure, that is, the freeway, road, and railway network, the ports, airports, and modern telecommunications. During the numerous and lengthy talks I held not just with leaders of other countries, but also with chairmen of international corporations, they repeatedly drew my attention to the fact that they will not venture into any investments unless we develop an infrastructure comparable with those of the developed states. So then I asked the same question that you asked me now, namely where should we get the money to develop a system of freeways, for instance, needed to turn to good account Romania's extraordinary geopolitical location? Let us not ignore the fact that over the past three years Romania's geographic positioning gained even more in value due to the war in former Yugoslavia, which made the routes in the southern part of that region inaccessible. This time again Romania missed a great chance, namely, to turn its road transportation potential to good account. Currently the major freeways that should have been running all over Romania, and which do exist on the drawing boards of all major Western investors, are running the risk of being abandoned to the benefit of the southern projects. All these freeways, which would have made the connection with Central Europe, could have been built by granting licenses. When I reminded them of this, they came up with all kinds of very stupid objections, such as the fact that the investors would come with their own expert personnel. Well, no company would have come with its own personnel, whom they would have had to pay according to Western standards, especially since in Romania the labor force is much cheaper. The rapid commencement of the works to build the freeway network and the reconstruction of the railroad system would have generated new jobs at our designing institutes, but also for the untrained workers and would have relaunched an extremely wide range of professions all over the country.

[Juganaru] What was the reason, in your opinion, why the current rulers of the country, who rely on an entire army of experts, did not find any solutions to that problem, so easily sketched up by the CDR?

[Constantinescu] They never even tried. The current rulers represent the interests of the political, administrative, and economic bureaucracy of the former regime. The interests of the political-economic mafia have nothing in common with those of Romanian society. The leaders of the former were exclusively busy with setting up their monopoly in the domain of imports and exports, by which they could rapidly make huge profits, and they were obviously not interested in developing production proper or in restructuring the economy. On the basis of those huge profits they slowed down the development process, practically blocked privatization, and began to erect a monopoly system. In Romania a new monopoly system is about to be set up, which is exactly the opposite of market economy. The most intelligent ones among the new rich, who made fortunes and who used their political position to benefit economically, then used their economic position to buy and corrupt the politicians, are well aware of the fact that they would be unable to operate in an open competition system. Neither under the circumstances of a healthy and active national economy, nor under those of international economy. This is what our drama consists in, the drama of Romanian society, struggling between the interests of a small group, which became rich beyond all imagination, and those of the rest of the extremely impoverished population. This is why in our Contract With Romania we have a special point stipulating that "a law will be promoted and implemented on declaring and checking the wealth and incomes of the president, legislators, government members, and mayors" and the prohibition of "the cumulation of functions, as both dignitaries and members of the management boards of state enterprises." Furthermore we also believe that all the dignitaries owning private property should transfer the management of such assets to administration companies, which are to be set up by law.

[Juganaru] In the conclusion of this Contract With Romania you say that "if all these promises are not fulfilled by the respective deadlines, it means that we violated the present contract, which you are signing by voting for the CDR; consequently, you are entitled to give up on us." Supposing that the CDR wins the elections, but due to various reasons it will be unable to fulfill all these pledges, what should the people do who voted in favor of the "key" [electoral symbol of the CDR]?

[Constantinescu] I would like to point out that the essence of the Contract With Romania is to inaugurate a new way of considering the relation between politics and our citizens. This contract has three principal characteristic features:

—the replacement of certain vaguely formulated promises, such as "we will fight to curb poverty," "we will fight against communism," or "we will instate democracy," with other, concrete objectives, such as

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the paving of 30 percent of the roads, the promotion of certain laws having a social nature, and so on;

—the establishment of precise deadlines, spanning over 200 days, 18 months, two years, four years, and six years for the accomplishment of certain projects;

—finally, and this is my reply to your question, the issue of [assuming] responsibility. Look around; today, six years after the revolution, the political parties that in 1992 came up with social programs, in which they promised everything, are now going to run again serenely in the elections and will announce that the transition period is a difficult one, that no one knows when it will conclude, that there have been problems, but they will do in the next four years whatever they failed to do during all these past years. No one prevented them from abandoning their promises, on top of which they also benefited from the advantage of having absolute majority in Parliament. It is high time for us to have our turn now, to change radically the politicians' relations with the citizens. We will have to talk very realistically to the people, unlike the way it has been done so far. It is simple to tell them that one would create 1 million new jobs by developing rural tourism [reference to Iliescu's 1992 promise], but the fact that this promise has not been put into practice reveals either incompetence or falsehood. If those who made such assertions would have been competent, they would have known precisely that such a thing cannot be achieved. It cannot be achieved because the preconditions to develop rural tourism include providing all the villages with electricity, sewers and drains, and paved roads. Well, all these things cost money and take time, and only in the long run can they become profitable by generating an active economic sector that would open the perspective of creating new jobs. In conclusion, by our Contract With Romania we compelled all other parties to talk seriously, without demagoguery, and use precise terms. Look, even the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] comprehended that it has to abandon the policy of making huge promises, which does not ensure them any credibility. They also comprehended that they cannot go on promoting their current policy and that they have to exclude the delirious offers made by the extremist parties.

[Juganaru] Mr. President, your Contract With Romania stipulates certain deadlines. Did you also take unforeseeable factors into consideration?

[Constantinescu] Regarding the very precise deadlines that are indeed included in our Contract With Romania, I consider that the CDR president bears full responsibility for their observance, who ventured to conceive and launch this program together with the leaders of other political parties members of the CDR. The finale of the Contract With Romania represents but a first step. We will take the next one at the local elections, in which all our candidates will be compelled to conclude similar contracts focusing on the specific problems of the various municipalities, towns, communes, or villages where they are to run. Furthermore, we will compel our deputies and senators to conclude similar contracts with the citizens in their electoral constituencies, in view of the coming parliamentary elections. Currently our parliament members do not feel responsible with respect to the citizens who elected them. The people we now select as our candidates are aware of what their tasks consist in should the CDR become the ruler of the country. These persons, who will become members of the future local bodies of power, are well prepared and aware of the fact that they will not be allowed to use their positions to become rich in an unjustified way. They know that we will never allow such a thing. But still, should there be isolated cases of persons looking for compromises, we advise them to join other parties, where relations are based on complicity, blackmail, and promoting own interests.

[Juganaru] Mr. President, I believe that you in the CDR are facing two problems. One of them is posed by the monarchists, who oddly enough still believe they should endorse someone in the presidential race. As early as a few years ago assertions were made to the media according to which [National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party] President Corneliu Coposu gave you all his support so that in case you would become Romania's president you would make efforts to alter the Constitution so as to allow for the return of ex-King Mihai. The question arises, why should the monarchists be interested in endorsing you in the presidential race?

[Constantinescu] I can see that this is an unavoidable question. Three years ago I offered a prize to the first journalist who does not raise that question in an interview with me. Well, the prize is still available because I could not give it to anyone. You missed this chance, too.

[Juganaru] I believe that your press bureau does not keep correct track of your interviews, Mr. President. In the preceding interview you granted to JURNALUL NATIONAL there was no such question, so you can give me that prize!

[Constantinescu] But of course, I should also wonder why the journalists do not ask similar logical questions when they interview other persons, too. Such as how can some parties support Iliescu if they consider Ceausescu a great leader and believe that he was eliminated by assassination? Regarding the question you just asked

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me, I have to point out that there are no monarchist parties or groupings within the CDR.

[Juganaru] I did not refer to political parties, but rather to certain individual CDR members with monarchist options. As a matter of fact, Mr. Corneliu Coposu also reasserted this belief of his on a great number of occasions.

[Constantinescu] Here one has to distinguish among things very clearly. President Corneliu Coposu stated quite clearly that the PNTCD is not a monarchist party. Even the Future Romania [movement] by the voice of its chairman, Simina Mezincescu, pointed out that it is not a monarchist grouping. Of course, we have members who have certain beliefs, and they represent quite a significant segment, if not a very important one, of the Romanian nation. And if these people believe that my election as president would be beneficial for the country, if their feelings are sincere, I see no reason to reject them. As far as my point of view is concerned, I have been constantly reiterating it over the past three years: I am ready to run for president, but the president has no constitutional prerogatives to change the regime in Romania. That is something to be dealt with by Parliament, rather than the president. The latter is the guarantor of the constitution and the state institutions. Here I note again this transfer of the competence, which has its source in a mentality we could not get rid of yet, namely, that of a unique leader. On the other hand, it is the duty of the president to see to it that the constitution is observed. Well, over the past five years we have been living under a constitution that has not been applied, not in point of all its stipulations, especially the ones referring to human rights. The constitution passed in 1991 stipulates the setting up of the office of People's Attorney, which has not been implemented so far, and which was intended to protect the rights of the citizens against the abuses of the state. Have you never wondered why President Iliescu never intervened that this institution should be set up, as stipulated by the constitution? Why are there such long delays in setting up the Constitutional Council, as well as other justice councils and bodies, the establishment of which lasted over many years? Why is the right to property being violated, and such acts are tolerated and allowed, despite the spirit and letter of our current constitution? So the principal task of the president is to see to it that the constitution is applied. If Parliament, by its democratic mechanisms, decides to alter the constitution, the president, regardless of who he is, will have to obey.

[Juganaru] The second problem of the CDR, in my opinion, is posed by its members sharing Iron Guard views. The CDR has always clearly delimited itself from xenophobic, anti-Semitic, in one word, extremist views and manifestations. Then why do you allow people who make no secret of their association with the Iron Guard movement to continue to be members of your alliance?

[Constantinescu] Personally I do not know about any such stances. We do not indulge in witch hunts. This is an internal problem of the political parties belonging to the CDR. All I can tell you, and this is certain, is that I do not know of any public expression of the ideas you mentioned, pro-totalitarian, xenophobic, or anti-Semitic ones, which should have been uttered as a political stance of either the CDR or any of the members of our alliance.

Editorial Views Emerging 'Leftist' Opposition

AU1512161095 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 11 Dec 95 pp 1, 10

[Editorial by Adrian Ursu: "Who Is the Greatest Opposition Figure in the Country?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In a democracy, it is not absolutely necessary to have a united opposition; the important thing is to have an efficient one. This last quality has nothing to do with the merging of all parties which are not in power. Despite the evidence to the contrary, the obsession with unity has come to blur the outlook of certain leaders, who, out of the desire to stick to the family picture—which must include all the known faces of the family members—have managed to actually tear it into shreds. The idea of unity at all costs has continued to be ventilated as a basic condition for change. Stubborn in his effort to achieve this utopian wish, Emil Constantinescu, leader of the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR], has managed to turn the CDR into a totally inefficient political structure. Right now, as far as he is concerned, nothing else counts but achieving the goal of gathering everything that moves in the opposition under the banner of the CDR. What Mr. Constantinescu or the supporters of the idea of political collectivism fail to realize is that, until the opposition's unity is sealed in proper documents, the forces making it up should at least agree on concrete actions to justify their purpose, namely, amending the government's actions and offering a credible alternative to the electorate.

Instead of that, what do we see happening within the opposition? The CDR is quarreling with the Democratic Party [PD] on the subject of the "Contract With Romania," an electoral offer pompously launched by the CDR, which has no chance of being looked upon as anything else but utopian. The Liberal Party '93 [PL '93] is warring with the government and keeps pushing one motion after another on a basically worthy subject, which is

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nevertheless too small for a true war, namely, the issue of the voter cards; let us also not forget that all of this is taking place against the more or less suspect background of Dinu Patriciu's [PL '93 leader] Alfa group of companies. The Social Democratic Party of Romania [PSDR], in the throes of death, is trying hard to find the best formula, including a possible fusion with the PD, in order to seize a seat at the Socialist International table. The Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR] is still busy with the already adopted and revised Education Law, while its leaders continue to unrestrainedly go about their business activities in the regions where they have managed—with the help of Hungarian mayors and councillors—to institute a true ethnic autonomy in economic matters. The Civic Alliance Party [PAC] occasionally is chiding the press, through the mouth of literary critic Manolescu [Nicolae Manolescu, PAC president], for failing to understand his party's wonderful program. Nor are things any better in the CDR family. On the one hand, the friction between the National Liberal Party [PNL] and the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party [PNTCD] for gaining supremacy within the alliance is getting stronger with each passing day. On the other hand, each one of these parties has its own problems. The PNTCD must cope with inner tensions, due to competition between various factions for the presidential chair left vacant by Corneliu Coposu's [former PNTCD president] death. For the liberals, the main problem is what to do not to lose the party's main sponsors, Catarama [Viorel Catarama, PNL vice president] and Danielescu [George Danielescu, member of the PNL Permanent Delegation]. Another little war recently broke out around the insignificant person of Niculae Cerveni, president of the National Liberal Party-Democratic Convention [PNL-CD], which consumed so much substance, worthy of a better cause. Then, on top of everything, came the announcement of Emil Constantinescu's joining the PNTCD, so as to be able to run for a seat in Parliament. There is no doubt that Rector Constantinescu [Emil Constantinescu is also rector of Bucharest University] is afraid that, in case of his foreseeable failure at the next presidential elections, he will share the fate of Agamita Dandanache [character in classic playwright Ion Luca Caragiale's "Lost Letter"]: "I remained without colleagues, if you know what I mean." Paradoxically, the most realistic statement in all this confusion came from Ion Ratiu [PNTCD vice president] in Cluj, where he said that Emil Constantinescu's candidature for the 1996 presidential elections is a big mistake (as it was in 1992) and that the alliance has no chance of winning the elections with such a presidential candidate. Therefore, as everybody can see, the opposition is currently very busy solving the country's urgent problems.

In these conditions, it is hardly startling that most surprises for the government are not comimg from those who six years ago labeled themselves as the opposition, but rather from the new opposition, which emerged when the first splits occurred in the team which formed the parliamentary majority in 1992. First to leave the team were Surdu's [Victor Surdu, president of the Agrarian Democratic Party of Romania—PDAR] agrarians. Then followed the split within the Socialist Party of Labor [PSM] and the emergence of Mohora's [Tudor Mohora, president of the Socialist Party—PS] PS. Last autumn, the quadrilateral [alliance between the PDSR, the Romanian National Unity Party-PUNR, PSM, and the Greater Romania Party—PRM], which descended from the Pentagonal [the initial alliance between the PDSR, PUNR, PSM, PRM, and PDAR], became a trilateral, after the discarding of the PRM. Of late, the PSM is also showing signs of rebellion, meaning that soon there will be only two parallel lines of support for Victoria Palace [seat of the government]: the PDSR and PUNR. After their departure, all these secessionist parties declared themselves to be opposition parties. The older ones occupying that niche laughed in their face telling them that the place is already taken. Nevertheless, one can see that this leftist opposition seems to gain in efficiency with each passing day. At this time, it is the greatest danger for the PDSR and its government. As it became apparent, the latter were taken rather by surprise by the attacks coming from the left, which annihilated their decade-long experience in fighting against the right. The new opposition reacts faster and severely criticizes the government and the ruling party, with a promptness which the classic opposition has failed to display.

The last examples are quite telling. The first to signal the disastrous situation of hundreds of thousands of hectares of unsown land, due to the lack of interest shown by the Ministry of Agriculture and the state banks in this respect, were the agrarians. Those who criticized most severely the bragging at the PDSR National Conference and the tendency of this grouping to turn itself into an oligarchic party run by corrupted people were Mohora's socialists. Even though it did not actually tear up the protocol on the governmental alliance before the journalists' cameras, the PSM leveled, at the end of last week, a number of extremely serious accusations—most of which are true—at the Vacaroiu cabinet and its economic and social policy. The PRM is the only grouping so far which has clearly stated that both the falsifying minister Petru Crisan and his protector Nicolae Vacaroiu should resign. The pragmatism and efficiency of such reactions clearly exceed the clumsiness of the actions of the CDR, PD, or the liberals.

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Maybe we ask too much from Messrs. Constantinescu, Diaconescu [Ion Diaconescu, PNTCD acting president], Roman [Petre Roman, PD president], Rusu [Horia Rusu, PL '93 president], or Cunescu [Sergiu Cunescu, PSDR president], when we think that they should offer an alternative, as solid as possible, to the undecided voters. Maybe we ask too much from them when we think that they should defend the country against all the obviously totalitarian trends of the current government formula. Well, may be it is too much, indeed! What matters to them is a senator's or deputy's seat, with all its inherent privileges (wages, daily allowances, trips abroad, influence peddling, and so forth), which is even more comfortable if it continues to be placed in that part of the Parliament chamber reserved for the opposition.

Hardliner Objects to UDMR Leadership Policy

AU2012065995 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 15 Dec 95 p 2

[Report by Paul Florescu: "Radical Adam Katona Blames Bela Marko for the Moral-Political Crisis Within the UDMR"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A short while before he began his hunger strike on 23 October 1995, Adam Katona, the leader of the radical group called the Transylvanian Hungarian Initiative [IMA] within the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania], granted a full-page interview to the Oradea weekly ERDELYI NAPLO. In the interview, which was published in the 13 December issue of the paper, Katona talks about both the purposes of his hunger strike and the situation within the UDMR. Among other things, the IMA leader accuses UDMR President Bela Marko of having plunged the UDMR into a moral-political crisis because he encouraged the supporters of the policy pursued by former UDMR President Geza Domokos, namely, Senators Gyorgy Tokay and Attila Verestoy, both of whom are well known for their balanced views.

According to Katona, party president Bela Marko fails to harmonize his statements with his pledges, a thing that is proved by the fact that for more than a year he has been postponing the analysis repeatedly requested by Laszlo Tokes [UDMR honorary president] to clarify the rumors circulated both abroad and at home that "we (that is, the representatives of the IMA) should be the UDMR's extremists, who endanger peace in our region." Judging from Bela Marko's actions, the IMA leader draws the conclusion that the serious moral and political crisis the UDMR is currently living through is a preamble to the "diasporization" and "Ceangauization" [Ceangau is a totally isolated Hungarian ethnic group in northeastern Romania] of "the Hungarian national community" in Romania.

PDSR's Nastase-Martian Struggle Continues

AU1912181095 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 12 Dec 95 p 3

[Report by Lucian Tudorancea: "Following Their Defeat During the PDSR National Conference, Dan Martian Reorganizes the Group of the Dissatisfied"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Cotroceni Is Aware of the Offensive Against the Nastase Group

Despite the fact that it was clearly defeated—although not for good—during the recent PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] National Conference, Dan Martian [PDSR vice president] is signaling that he is not prepared to acquiesce in this situation. Recently he confessed to some of his close aides that "things will not remain as they currently are," and that his future actions will be supported by Cotroceni [presidential headquarters]. To this purpose, Martian intends to reorganize (and lead) the adversaries from within the PDSR of Adrian Nastase [PDSR executive president], and to conduct, under the facade of the anticorruption struggle, various actions to disclose his political enemies. "Accidental" leaking of information and documents to the press cannot be excluded either.

It is worth noting that Dan Martian is counting on the support of a significant part of the common PDSR members, while Adrian Nastase solely gathered around him wealthy and influential people, most of whom, nevertheless, are involved in dubious affairs, as well as resounding corruption cases.

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Coalition Parties Agree on Reduced 1996 Budget

AU1912203795 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1800 GMT 19 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] After a whole day of coordination, shortly before 1900 [1800 GMT], the negotiators of the coalition parties agreed on the amended version of the 1996 budget at an amount of 567 billion Slovene tolars. During today's coordination, the negotiators agreed on a 2.7-percent reduction in the contributions of industry. In light of the fact that the proposal envisions the abolition of some export incentives, they estimate that by this the budget will be reduced by approximately 30 billion tolars altogether. The representatives of the coalition parties will ceremonially sign today's agreement tomorrow morning.

Leftists Pass Law Halting Land Restitution

AU2012065595 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1800 GMT 19 Dec 95

[Report by Vesna Burnik — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Burnik] After several months of controversy, deputies today nevertheless decided on the fate of a law that, according to its original version, temporarily halts the restitution of forests and land belonging to the [Catholic] church and, according to the bill's later amendments, also the restitution of the land belonging to the big landowners. The United List of Social Democrats, the Liberal Democracy, and Jelincic's National Party today succeeded in pushing through a proposal on a three-year moratorium on the restitution of land exceeding 200 hectares in cases where the entitled party received or was entitled to receive compensation from a foreign country for the nationalized property and in the cases when the encumber offices subsequently established that the entitled party had been a Yugoslav citizen after World War II.

The above decision was preceded by numerous recesses and party clashes. However, on this occasion, the parliamentary parties did not decide on obstruction, although they tried to score political points until the very last. For example, the Christian Democrats and their deputy Jana Primozic:

[Primozic] What Prime Minister Drnovsek did not manage to accomplish, Jelincic has accomplished. Namely, he pooled the left-wing deputies in the parliament. This is the new coalition of Jelincic's National Party, Drnovsek's Liberal Democrats, and Kocjancic's United List.

[Burnik] Lev Kreft from the United List, however, said:

[Kreft] Ultimately, this law has been put to the widest of all referendums. Those who will vote at the elections for the parties that favor denationalization on these issues will vote against this law.

[Burnik] Of the 55 deputies present [the parliament has 90 seats], 47 voted in favor of a temporary and partial halt, while 2 deputies were opposed. The opposition and the Christian Democrats abstained from voting, as they had announced beforehand.

Court Staves Off Reform of Payments Agency

AU1612210895 Ljubljana SLOVENEC in Slovene 13 Dec 95 p 1

[Report by "V.K.": "Agency Remains Unified"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ljubljana — The Agency for Payment Operations, Audit, and Information (the former Public Accounting Service) will continue to perform all its present tasks with the same incumbencies, to the same extent, and with the same people as there have been so far.

This is what the Constitutional Court ruled yesterday, on the basis of a demand put forward by the agency's employees. The constitutional judges in the explanation of their decision emphasized that for as long as the agency was dealing with the ownership transformation of the public assets, it must enjoy an independent position. Apart from this, an effective and unhindered performance of the privatization audits must also be safeguarded. With this conclusion, judges temporarily halted all procedures pertaining to the agency's transformation, including the appointment of new officers and the reassignment of its present employees. The withholding of the implementation of the law on the reorganization of the agency also means that the agency will continue to be in charge of the payment operations. Out of all the announced changes only the article pertaining to the cashing of checks with the banks directly will stay effective. Romana Logar, agency's director general, in a written statement said that such a decision by the court facilitated an unhindered and, thus, the speediest completion of the privatization audits, and simultaneously ensured the necessary time required for the preparation and the organization of a unified tax service. This decision has also facilitated the legislative authorities to have a say in the reform of the payment operations.

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Federal

UNSC Asked To Postpone Resolution on Srebrenica

LD2012000695 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2353 GMT 19 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] New York, Dec. 19 (TANJUG) — Yugoslav mission head at the United Nations VLadislav Jovanovic called on the U.N. Security Council to postpone the adoption of a resolution on crimes allegedly committed by Bosnian Serbs last summer in Srebrenica until material facts were established about what actually happened there.

Jovanovic suggested in a letter to current council President Sergey Lavrov that if U.N. officials were unable to investigate events surrounding Srebrenica this could be done by a special commission of NGO's [non-governmental organizations].

Otherwise, he said, the council would pass "sentence" on Bosnian Serbs on the basis of suspicions and allegations.

The motive behind Jovanovic's letter was the report of the U.N. secretary-general to the council on Nov. 27 this year in which he spoke about human rights and humanitarian law violations in Srebrenica and its surroundings.

On the basis of this report, which mentions alleged Serb crimes and mass killings in numbers that range from 2,000 to 8,000 killed and missing, the council has drafted a resolution strongly condemning Serbs but without dwelling concretely or in detail on the crimes committed in other parts of Bosnia, such as, say, Mrkonjic Grad, Sipovo and other places which last autumn suffered at the hands of the Muslim and Croatian armies.

In the letter, he cited data obtained from the official authorities of Republika Srpska, as to what happened in Srebrenica last summer.

According to this information, after the Bosnian Serb army took Srebrenica, an accord was reached between the Serbs and the local Muslim authorities in the presence of UNPROFOR representatives to the effect that the Muslim population in Srebrenica could on its own accord choose whether to stay or leave. Those who decided to leave would have Serb protection and that of UNPROFOR.

Under the accord, men who laid down their guns would be treated as civilians ad would not be tried. However, all those men who would not lay down their arms would be deemed rebels and enemy elements.

That developments had taken on the agreed-on course was confirmed in a written statement also by representative of the Muslim authorities in Srebrenica Nasib Mandzic on July 17 this year.

Jovanovic's letter furthermore cited what happened in Srebrenica immediately before the Bosnian Serb army entered it.

According to official statements of the authorities of Republika Srpska there was unrest and clashes between the Muslim forces in the town — between those who wanted to lay down their arms and those who would not and who wanted to continue fighting.

The latter then mercilessly began to kill those who wanted to surrender. When the Serb army entered the town, it found a large number of bodies, both civilians and soldiers, lying on the streets.

The Muslim Sarajevo government later wanted to make use of the clash between the Muslims themselves to launch a new propaganda action against Bosnian Serbs, accusing them of mass killings and disappearance of Muslims from this enclave.

Such propaganda caught the attention of world media. The authorities of Republika Srpska met the requests of all reporters who wanted to go on the spot and investigate what happened. Jovanovic said, citing claims by Serb authorities in Bosnia, that in August this year, newsmen and crews of CNN, CBS, BBC, RAI, REUTERS, AFP and some others toured the area.

Recently, an expert group from the U.S. asked to go to the Srebrenica area. Republika Srpska authorities gave permission for such a tour, which did not as yet take place.

The U.N. Security Council would during Tuesday's session open a debate on Srebrenica and alleged Serb Crimes there. As set out, chances that the council would postpone the adoption of the resolution until there were more substantial facts established were not high.

Army Budget of 4.2 Billion Dinars Announced

AU1912163295 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 19 Dec 95

[Report by Ida Maricic]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] The committees for the federal budget of the Chamber of Citizens and Chamber of Republics have reviewed the draft law on federal resources amounting to 5.721 billion dinars. The committees will make their final decision on the budget tomorrow, after the government submits its answers to a great number of amendments. Ida Maricic has the details.

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[Maricic] A debate was held on the draft law on the 1996 federal budget, which was preceded by an extensive address by Deputy Federal Prime Minister Jovan Zebic. Zebic appealed to the committee members to pass the budget, and stressed that it was extremely important for it to be passed before the beginning of the calendar year so that revenue and expenditure could be established. According to Zebic, the 1996 budget is extremely restrictive, anti-inflatory, and completely coordinated with [National Bank] Governor Avramovic's Program 2 [second phase of economic recovery program]. Not a single article in the federal treasury's expenditure will cause a collapse of parameters on which the 1996 economic program has been based.

According to Zebic, the largest part of the resources has been earmarked for financing the Yugoslav Army and the country's defense, that is, 4.2 billion dinars. The remaining resources, amounting to 1.5 billion dinars have been earmarked for refugee aid — for housing, for personnel and people returning to Kosovo and Metohija, the construction of a university campus in Pristina, the restructuring of banks, interventions in agriculture, and support for development. [passage omitted]

In response to remarks regarding the high figure earmarked for financing the Yugoslav Army, Borivoje Jovanic, in charge of the Yugoslav Army's federal budget, stressed that the budget resources earmarked for financing the Yugoslav Army, that is, 4.215 billion billion dinars, fall short of the army's realistic needs by 1 billion dinars. [passage omitted]

Kontic Receives Military Financial Experts

LD1512185895 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1215 GMT 15 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 15 December (TANJUG) — Dr. Radoje Kontic, the federal prime minister, today received a delegation of the Military Department of the Yugoslav National Bank, led by its director general Major-General Dr. Vuk Obradovic, the Federal Secretariat for Information announced.

The delegation briefed the prime minister on the 45 years of activity of this specialized financial organization of special interest for the defense of the country and the development of the military industry. Obradovic particularly underlined the important potential of this financial institution in the further development and advancement of financial dealings of the federal state, especially in international financial transactions.

According to balance indicators, the Military Department is among the six largest Yugoslav banking organizations, and according to the profit achieved by employees it is the best financial organization in the country.

Prime Minister Kontic congratulated the Military Department on the anniversary of its work and noted the continuous top results in banking activity during the 45 years of operations of this specialized organization within the National Bank of Yugoslavia.

During the meeting there was discussion of bringing the status of the Military Department into line with the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It was assessed that all the conditions exist for the Military Department to be transformed next year into a business commercial bank of the federal state on a shareholding basis.

Taking part at the talks were Federal Defense Minister Pavle Bulatovic and Bozidar Gazivoda, deputy governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia, the statement from the Federal Secretariat for Information adds.

Serbia

Daily Assails Media 'Barriers' in Serbia, Bosnia

AU1912181895 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 19 Dec 95 p 2

[Commentary by Predrag Vitas: "A Barrier for the Media"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Today many people are saying, rightly, that the suspension of sanctions has not lifted many of the barriers that were erected in the country three and a half years ago. One of these barriers pertains to information, which in many cases obstructs journalists. Why is this happening at all, when, until recently, journalists were accused of allegedly bearing part of the responsibility for the lost media war, and why is it still happening?

The latest example, regarding the release of the two captured French pilots, perhaps illustrates best who is obstructing the media. Namely when, prior to the Paris conference, Slobodan Milosevic's wise move led to the release of the two soldiers held captive in the Serb Republic, and when political and media points should have been scored, barriers were raised against the media on both sides of the Drina River.

The pilots could only be interviewed and photographed by foreign correspondents, while our journalists were shortchanged. Thus, REUTERS "exclusively" covered the event for our media, while we in Belgrade had no clue when the Frenchmen would be holding a press conference, when they would be crossing the border on the Drina River, or whether they would first be going to the French Embassy or proceeding directly to the airport. This information was withheld from us, but was accessible to foreign media. Some of our colleagues

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thought they were in a foreign country, although such things do not happen there.

The question is, why is there a barrier against domestic media, erected by the authorities, both in the Serb Republic and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia? The war seems to have upset many things. It is common knowledge that, across the Drina River, foreign and domestic media are "assessed" by the daughter of the number one man [Radovan Karadzic], and that only the carefully "selected" get their turn. Foreign colleagues have confirmed this. Maybe this was the reason why our photographers and correspondents were not allowed to report on the release of the French pilots.

However, who was it that stopped the correspondents in FRY at a time when even CNN in the United States has to fear competition in the field of 24-hour news production? It is hard to believe that a forgetful clerk in the Information Ministry is to blame, which was the explanation given for such blunders in former times. Maybe something worse is to blame! A poor assessment! Be things as they may, because of this barrier, erected by bureaucrats, analysts, or those who do not know what journalism is, our correspondents were shortchanged and had to borrow photographs and reports on the pilots' release from foreign agencies and television stations. Yet it was precisely the foreigners who conducted the media war against us. Perhaps that is why we are "guilty" of losing the media war?

Montenegro

Bulatovic on Yugoslav Recognition of Croatia

LD1912181895 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1758 GMT 19 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Podgorica, Dec. 19 (TANJUG) — Yugoslavia will recognize Croatia once it meets the obligations it has willingly assumed under the Dayton agreement in terms of a full normalization of relations between the two states, Montenegro President Momir Bulatovic said Tuesday.

Bulatovic told a regular news conference that Yugoslavia was ready to wait for "favourable internal conditions in Croatia for the fulfillment of the respective obligations."

"However, we cannot and will not renounce our interests which arecontained in the text of the accord," he stressed.

The Montenegro president said Croatia was not showing enough readiness to fulfill the obligations relating to the Adriatic peninsula of Prevlaka.

The Prevlaka peninsula lies between Yugoslavia and Croatia and it controls the entrance into the bay of Boka Kotorska.

Bulatovic, who was member of the Yugoslav delegation at the talks in Dayton, Ohio, said the Dayton agreement was basically fair and, therefore, a long-term one.

Asked about the possibilities of Yugoslavia joining the NATO "Partnership for Peace" program, Bulatovic said the issue was not a taboo and similar initiatives should be decided about without prejudices.

He told the press that it was the duty of Yugoslavia to investigate the charges raised against its citizens by the international tribunal for crimes in the former Yugoslavia but it had no right to extradite them.

The Montenegro president said Yugoslavia wanted quickly and correctly to resolve the issues of succession on the territory of the former Yugvslavia.

Yugoslavia, as a state, "does not base its actions on its current economic interests when matters of continuity and succession are involved," Bulatovic stressed.

FRY Right to SFRY Succession

AU1912210595 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 19 Dec 95

[Report on press conference by Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic in Podgorica on 19 December; by Miodrag Vukovic — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Vukovic] President Bulatovic reiterated that the world was unanimous in its assessment that Dayton has been successful in securing peace for Bosnia-Herzegovina and stability in the entire region, and that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] and Serb Republic delegations had contributed decisively to this fact. President Bulatovic went on to say the following:

[Bulatovic] Precisely because of all these reasons I believe that after Dayton we have entered a new phase of civilization in former Yugoslavia. The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is over; no side has emerged from it as a complete victor or complete loser. The war has ended with a sensitive balance of power. That is why so much effort is being invested into the implementation of peace, both in the military and civilian sectors.

The normalization of circumstances in the region is a constituent part of the comprehensive solution, that is, the process of mutual recognition between the new states that have emerged in former Yugoslavia. It is the FRY's position that a series of bilateral agreements should precede mutual recognition, which would resolve

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all the open issues in mutual relations between the states that are about to establish full diplomatic relations.

We believe that we have already managed to secure Croatia's, Macedonia's [Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia — FYROM], and Bosnia-Herzegovina's acceptance, that is, recognition of the FRY's international legal continuity. There can be no doubt that following World War I, Montenegro and Serbia, as internationally recognized states, invested their international capacity into the creation of the first Yugoslavia.

Following such great and extensive statehood of both the mutual state and individual federal units, we simply cannot queue up and request the recognition of that which was created and enjoyed for generations in Montenegro and Serbia. We particularly cannot allow the recognition of our mutual state to be decided by states that have no right to do so.

This, of course, does not mean that we intend to shortchange the former Yugoslav states when dividing the balance of rights and obligations of the former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. We want a speedy and correct resolution of the succession issue. We shall contribute to its efficiency and fairness. The FRY is a serious state, and when it comes to continuity and succession, its moves are not motivated by momentary economic benefits.

Albanian Parties Oppose Military Port

AU1012153395 Zurich BOTA SOT in Albanian 8 Dec 95 p 3

[Report by the Kosovo Information Center: "Opposition in Montenegro Against Construction of Military Port in Valdanos"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ulqin, 7 December [QIK] — The political parties in Montenegro are against the construction of a military port on the Valdanos Bay in Ulqin.

At the Montenegrin assembly in Cetine, the opposition seriously reprimanded the Montenegrin Government for giving the territory to the Serbian-Montenegrin Army. The Liberals and Social Democrats consider the permission to construct a military port in Valdanos, as well as build houses for officers in Pinjesh, illegal, as Ulqin was supposed to remain a tourist area. Both Albanian political parties in Montenegro, the Democratic League and the Democratic Union of Albanians, have expressed deep disagreement regarding the construction of the military port in Valdanos. The Albanian parties believe that this act will allow Montenegrin authorities to militarize the coast and create conditions that will lead to an increase in ethnic cleansing of Albanians from their century-long territories.

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